

A Survey of the Afghan People

AFGHANISTAN IN 2016



The Asia Foundation

AFGHANISTAN IN 2016

A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE



The Asia Foundation

AFGHANISTAN IN 2016

A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE

Project Direction

The Asia Foundation

Editors

Zachary Warren, John Rieger, Charlotte E. Maxwell-Jones, and Nancy Kelly

Authors

Henry Duke Burbridge, Mohammad Mahdi Frough, Mohammad Shoaib Haidary, Charlotte E. Maxwell-Jones, Lauryn Oates, Ann Procter, Siavash Rahbari, Yara Zgheib Salloum, Christina Satkowski, Helen Seese, Mohammad Jawad Shahabi, Kris Veenstra, Zachary Warren, and Fahim Ahmad Yousufzai

Fieldwork and Monitoring

Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR)
Sayara Research

Book Design

Rohullah Mohammadi

Photography

Gulbuddin Elham, Rohullah Mohammadi, and Mohammad Jawad Shahabi

© 2016 The Asia Foundation

Cover design: Kristin Kelly Colombano; Cover image: Gulbuddin Elham

Printed on acid-free 100% recycled paper

About The Asia Foundation

The Asia Foundation is a nonprofit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia. Informed by six decades of experience and deep local expertise, our work across the region addresses five overarching goals—strengthen governance, empower women, expand economic opportunity, increase environmental resilience, and promote regional cooperation.

Headquartered in San Francisco, The Asia Foundation works through a network of offices in 18 Asian countries and in Washington, DC. Working with public and private partners, the Foundation receives funding from a diverse group of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, foundations, corporations, and individuals.

For more information, visit asiafoundation.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
1.	NATIONAL MOOD	17
1.1	DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY	23
1.2	LOCAL MOOD	24
1.3	BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN	27
1.4	BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH	28
1.5	SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS	30
2.	SECURITY	35
2.1	FEAR FOR SAFETY	36
2.2	CRIME AND VIOLENCE	42
2.3	PERCEPTIONS OF AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES	44
2.4	PEACE AND RECONCILIATION	50
3.	ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT	57
3.1	OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMY	58
3.2	HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION	59
3.3	EMPLOYMENT	60
3.4	WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY	65
3.5	HOUSEHOLD ASSETS	67
3.6	HOUSEHOLD INCOME	69
3.7	WEALTH AND HAPPINESS	71
4.	DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY	77
4.1	ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	78
4.2	HEALTH	82
4.3	EDUCATION	86
4.4	AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	91
5.	GOVERNANCE	103
5.1	SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE	103
5.2	CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS	105
5.3	CORRUPTION	107
5.4	JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION	111
6.	POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	117
6.1	EXERCISING BASIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS	118
6.2	ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS	120
6.3	POLITICS AND RELIGION	122
6.4	WOMEN AND POLITICS	123
6.5	ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY	126

7.	ACCESS TO INFORMATION	131
7.1	SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION	132
7.2	ACCESS TO INTERNET AND USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA	135
7.3	ROLE OF TELEVISION IN PUBLIC OPINION AND BEHAVIOR	136
8.	WOMEN IN SOCIETY	143
8.1	WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE	144
8.2	CUSTOMS AND CULTURAL PRACTICES	146
8.3	POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	154
8.4	EDUCATION	159
8.5	ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES	162
8.6	GENERAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS	165
9.	MIGRATION	171
9.1	WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE	172
9.2	REASONS FOR LEAVING	176
9.3	DECREASE IN WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE	182
	APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY	189
1.	SUMMARY	189
2.	QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN	190
3.	SAMPLE DESIGN	190
4.	CONTACT PROCEDURE	192
5.	WEIGHTING	193
6.	WEIGHTED SAMPLE, BY PROVINCE	194
7.	SAMPLING REPLACEMENTS	195
8.	QUALITY CONTROL	196
9.	MARGIN OF ERROR	198
	APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS	203
	APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE	207


TABLE OF FIGURES


1.1	NATIONAL MOOD: DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY	18
1.2	RIGHT DIRECTION, WOMEN IN URBAN VS. RURAL	19
1.3	NATIONAL MOOD, BY ETHNICITY	20
1.4	REASONS FOR OPTIMISM: RURAL VS. URBAN	21
1.5	REASONS FOR OPTIMISM, BY ETHNICITY	22
1.6	TOP REASONS FOR PESSIMISM, BY REGION	23
1.7	TOP REASONS FOR PESSIMISM: RURAL VS. URBAN	23
1.8	WHAT IS GOING WELL IN YOUR AREA	24
1.9	NATIONAL MOOD, BY PERCEPTION OF WHAT IS GOING WELL IN LOCAL AREA	25
1.10	BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN YOUR LOCAL AREA	26
1.11	BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA, BY REGION	26
1.12	BIGGEST PROBLEM FACING WOMEN IN YOUR AREA	28
1.13	BIGGEST PROBLEM FACING YOUTH	29
1.14	SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS, BY REGION	30
2.1	FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY	37
2.2	FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY, BY PROVINCE	38
2.3	LEVEL OF FEAR, BY ACTIVITY	40
2.4	AWARENESS OF ISIS/DAESH, BY REGION	41
2.5	PERCEPTION OF ISIS/DAESH AS A THREAT, BY REGION	42
2.6	EXPERIENCE OF CRIME OR VIOLENCE, BY REGION	43
2.7	REPORTING CRIME TO INSTITUTIONS	44
2.8	PERCEPTION OF WHO PROVIDES SECURITY IN THE LOCAL AREA	45
2.9	PERCEPTION OF WHO PROVIDES SECURITY IN THE LOCAL AREA, BY PROVINCE	46
2.10	PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	47
2.11	PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	48
2.12	CONFIDENCE LEVELS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES, BY REGION	48
2.13	PERCEPTIONS OF IMPROVEMENT IN AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES, BY REGION	49
2.14	CONFIDENCE IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS, BY REGION	50
2.15	SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS	51
2.16	SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS, BY PROVINCE	52
2.17	REASONS ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS ARE FIGHTING AGAINST GOVERNMENT	53
3.1	ECONOMIC CONCERNS, BY PROBLEM AREA	59
3.2	ECONOMIC INDICATORS: WORSE COMPARED TO ONE YEAR AGO	60
3.3	GENERATING INCOME, BY GENDER AND URBAN VS. RURAL	61
3.4	REGIONAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME, MEN AND WOMEN WORKING	62
3.5	MEN EARNING INCOME, BY PROVINCE	63
3.6	WOMEN EARNING INCOME, BY PROVINCE	64
3.7	OCCUPATION, BY GENDER	65
3.8	HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WOMEN CONTRIBUTE TO INCOME	66
3.9	SUPPORT FOR WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME, BY PROVINCE	67
3.10	HOUSEHOLD ASSET INVENTORY	68

3.11	HOUSEHOLD LAND OWNERSHIP	68
3.12	HOUSEHOLDS OWNING LIVESTOCK, BY PROVINCE	69
3.13	AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY REGION	70
3.14	AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME, BY EDUCATION LEVEL	71
3.15	INCOME AND HAPPINESS	72
4.1	PERCEPTION OF IMPROVED ELECTRICITY SUPPLY, COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, BY PROVINCE	79
4.2	SOURCES OF ELECTRICITY USED IN PAST MONTH	80
4.3	SATISFACTION WITH ELECTRICITY SUPPLY, OVER TIME	81
4.4	ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (ANY TYPE), URBAN VS. RURAL RESPONDENTS IN 2014	82
4.5	PERCEPTION OF DECREASED QUALITY OF FOOD IN DIET COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, BY PROVINCE	83
4.6	DISABILITY PREVALENCE RATE, BY PROVINCE	85
4.7	HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION, BY GENDER	87
4.8	YEARS STUDIED IN ISLAMIC MADRASA	88
4.9	FORMAL VS. MADRASA EDUCATION, BY AGE OF RESPONDENT	89
4.10	RESPONDENTS WITH HIGHER/UNIVERSITY EDUCATION, BY REGION	90
4.11	AVERAGE YEARS OF ISLAMIC MADRASA EDUCATION, BY REGION	90
4.12	AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN LOCAL AREAS, 2006-2016	91
4.13	AWARENESS OF ELECTRICITY PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE	92
4.14	AWARENESS OF HEALTHCARE PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE	93
4.15	AWARENESS OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE	94
4.16	AWARENESS OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE	95
4.17	AWARENESS OF ROAD OR BRIDGE PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE	96
4.18	EFFECT OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ON NATIONAL MOOD: CHANGE IN OPTIMISM, BY PROJECT	97
5.1	SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE	105
5.2	OVERALL CONFIDENCE IN OFFICIALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS	106
5.3	PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION: MAJOR PROBLEM	108
5.4	EXPOSURE TO CORRUPTION	109
5.5	EXPERIENCE OF CORRUPTION WITH NATIONAL POLICE, BY PROVINCE	110
5.6	DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USE OF HUQUQS OR SHURAS/JIRGAS	113
5.7	OPINIONS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION INSTITUTIONS	113
5.8	TYPES OF CASES TAKEN FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION	114
6.1	FEAR WHILE VOTING	118
6.2	FEAR WHILE PARTICIPATING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, BY REGION	119
6.3	INFLUENCE OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS	120
6.4	PERCEPTION OF ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS, BY PROVINCE	121
6.5	FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED LOCAL INFLUENCE	122
6.6	ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN POLITICS	123
6.7	WOMEN AND ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING	124
6.8	WOMEN AND ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING, BY GENDER AND URBAN VS. RURAL	125
6.9	SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY	126
6.10	SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, BY PROVINCE	127

7.1	SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION, 2013-2016	133
7.2	MOBILE PHONE OWNERSHIP, BY HOUSEHOLD	133
7.3	TV OWNERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN	134
7.4	HOUSEHOLD INTERNET ACCESS ON MOBILE PHONES	136
7.5	CONFIDENCE IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, BY HOURS OF TV WATCHED	138
7.6	CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, BY RADIO LISTENERSHIP	139
8.1	TYPE OF DISPUTE, BY LOCATION: WOMEN	145
8.2	ACCEPTABILITY OF BAAD AND BADDAL, OVER TIME	147
8.3	APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC: PERCEPTIONS OF MEN VS. WOMEN	149
8.4	SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION	150
8.5	APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENT	150
8.6	APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, PASHTUNS OVER TIME	151
8.7	APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, HAZARAS OVER TIME	151
8.8	IDEAL AGE FOR MARRIAGE	152
8.9	IDEAL AGE FOR A WOMAN TO MARRY, ACROSS TIME	153
8.10	PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS	155
8.11	STRONG SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY YEAR	156
8.12	STRONG OPINIONS ON WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS	157
8.13	SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S INDEPENDENCE IN VOTING	158
8.14	SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION	159
8.15	SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION, BY PROVINCE	160
8.16	SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION, OVER TIME	161
8.17	SUPPORT FOR WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME	162
8.18	REASONS WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	163
8.19	ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYMENT VENUES FOR WOMEN	164
8.20	WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTION TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME	165
8.21	FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS	166
9.1	DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY REGION	172
9.2	DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY PROVINCE	173
9.3	DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN: RURAL VS. URBAN	174
9.4	DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY ETHNICITY	175
9.5	FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH EMIGRATION	176
9.6	DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT	178
9.7	DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY CONFIDENCE IN THE MEDIA	182
9.8	DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY REGION	183

REGIONAL MAP OF AFGHANISTAN





PREFACE

Afghanistan in 2016: A Survey of the Afghan People is the twelfth edition of our annual public opinion survey exploring critical social, economic, and political issues in Afghanistan. Since 2004, the *Survey* has gathered the opinions of more than 87,000 Afghan men and women, providing a unique portrait of public perceptions as they have evolved over time. This year's *Survey* polled 12,658 Afghan respondents from 16 ethnic groups in all 34 provinces, including insecure and physically challenging environments. It reveals a nation facing complex changes, with rising uncertainty about its future.

Afghans in 2016 are more fearful for their security, more dissatisfied with the economy, and less confident in their government. The national mood continued to decline, and this year marks the lowest level of optimism since the *Survey* began in 2004. Early 2016 saw the failure of peace talks with the Taliban, and security in Afghanistan has since deteriorated, with new incursions by the Taliban and record civilian casualties. Repercussions from the withdrawal of international troops in 2014 can still be felt in the Afghan economy, while slow job growth has contributed to high rates of urban unemployment, and more than one-third of Afghans say their household financial situation has grown worse in the past year. The promise of electoral reform, a key issue ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections, remains stalled, and most Afghans say they have no confidence in the Independent Elections Commission to do its job. Confidence in every level of government appears to have fallen since 2015.

This year's *Survey* also provides some reasons for optimism, however. Despite the worsening economic and security environment, the desire to emigrate fell to a record low this year, a striking change from 2015, as large numbers of previous emigrants have returned from European countries where disincentives to immigration have been on the rise. More Afghans, particularly rural Afghan men, support women's right to vote and women's right to work outside the home than ever before. Although corruption rates remain very high, the rate at which Afghans report actual encounters with corruption, in the customs office or their provincial governor's office, has decreased. When asked what is going well in their local area, many Afghans mention development in education. Internet access continues to increase rapidly, and rising television viewership appears to predict changes in the way that viewers see women's role in society.

With its broad scope and long duration, *A Survey of the Afghan People* is a map of social change over time, highlighting the Afghan experience in a rapidly transforming nation. Through this annual project we hope to provide a deeper understanding of Afghanistan, while also contributing to the knowledge environment for policymaking and programming as the Afghan government sets its own course towards peace. For international partners, this year's findings point to a need for patience and strategic thinking, as well as sustained support, as Afghanistan weathers ongoing political challenges and economic hardship.

David D. Arnold

President, The Asia Foundation

December 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A Survey of the Afghan People is the product of numerous contributions from the partners and staff of The Asia Foundation. The survey report was produced under the guidance of Afghanistan Country Representative Abdullah Ahmadzai, and led by a team of Afghan data analysts including Fahim Ahmad Yousufzai, Mohammad Mahdi Frough, Mohammad Shoaib Haidary, Sayed Masood Sadat, Sayed Mahboob Rahman Rahim, Marzia Habibi, and Ali Reza Houssaini, working under the direction of Mohammad Jawad Shahabi, project manager, and Dr. Zach Warren, director of policy research. Special thanks are due, for statistical guidance, to Dr. Rusan Chen, who generously donated his time to build Afghan data analysis skills.

Rohullah Mohammadi led the report design, with publication by Rouge Communications in Delhi, India. Editorial and production support was provided by The Asia Foundation's Global Communications team and Washington, DC, office. Jaime Medrano of JD Systems constructed the online tool for visualizing 2006–2016 survey data.

ACSOR-Surveys, a subsidiary of D3 Systems, Inc., worked closely with the Foundation to conduct all survey fieldwork. The Foundation is grateful for ACSOR's facilitation of third-party monitoring by Sayara Research, and for their commitment to quality-control best practices in one of the world's most challenging research environments. Special thanks are due to ACSOR Managing Director Ashraf Salehi and Sayara Research's Haroon Rasheed for their professionalism and attention to detail. The General Directorate for the Office of the Minister of Interior provided valuable assistance in securing permission to conduct fieldwork, while the Afghan Central Statistics Organization (CSO) provided population estimates used for the construction of survey weights.

The Asia Foundation thanks the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the German government's Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) for their support for this survey and for Afghan research capacity.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Afghanistan in 2016: A Survey of the Afghan People is The Asia Foundation's twelfth annual public opinion survey in Afghanistan. The longest-running barometer of Afghan opinions, the *Survey* has gathered the views of more than 87,000 Afghans since 2004 and provides a longitudinal portrait of evolving public perceptions of security, the economy, governance and government services, elections, media, women's issues, and migration. Unique in its broad scope and long duration, the *Survey* tracks trend lines on questions of special interest to Afghans and the international community alike.

This year, the downward trajectory in national mood which began in 2013 has continued: in 2016, just 29.3% of Afghans say the country is moving in the right direction, the lowest level of optimism recorded in the *Survey* since it began in 2004, and down from 36.7% in 2015. While the drop in 2015 can be partly explained by post-election disappointments after the exuberance and campaign promises preceding the 2014 presidential elections, the lower optimism in 2016 appears to reflect a sustained change in sentiment related to perceptions of security, the economy, and government achievements. Early 2016 saw the failure of peace talks with the Taliban, while a recent peace agreement with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Hezb-i-Islami has not been welcomed by all Afghan political groups. Afghans appear to have less confidence in every level of government, yet they also have less desire to emigrate. Despite a worsening economic and security environment, Afghanistan has seen a high number of returnees from European countries.

This year's *Survey* polled 12,658 Afghan respondents, 52.7% of them male and 47.4% female, representing 16 ethnic groups from all 34 provinces in the country. Face-to-face interviews were conducted between August 31 and October 1 by a team of 1,003 trained Afghan enumerators matched with respondents by gender (men interviewed men and women interviewed women). All enumerators are indigenous to the provinces where they conducted interviews. Survey results have been weighted to be gender balanced and nationally representative using the most recent population data (2015–2016) released by the Afghan Central Statistics Organization. The total sample consisted of 25% urban households and 75% rural households, and this year's margin of error is $\pm 1.6\%$, based on a design effect of 3.45 and a confidence interval of 95%.

The Asia Foundation's longstanding research partner, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research, conducted all survey fieldwork and logistics, while its parent company, D3 Systems, Inc., provided analytical and methodological support. As in the 2013, 2014, and 2015 surveys, Sayara Research conducted third-party validation of fieldwork, a best practice for survey research in challenging environments. Together with its partners, the Foundation is committed to quality-control processes guided by principles of validity and reliability. The survey data is available for further analysis at www.asiafoundation.org.

This year's *Survey* includes several new questions proposed by key users of the survey findings. New questions explore Afghans' views on what is going well in their local area, their awareness of legal rights and public defender services, Internet access, reasons to migrate, and remittances from family abroad. A question on whether respondents have a *tazkera* (national identity card) and a six-item scale used to measure the prevalence of disabilities were added. As before, the *Survey* includes measures of both fact and opinion. An in-depth discussion of the survey methodology is provided in Appendix 1 of this report.

NATIONAL MOOD

- **Direction of the country.** The highest rate of optimism was recorded in 2013, when 58.2% of Afghans said the country was moving in the right direction. The downward trajectory of optimism beginning the following year has continued, and this year just 29.3% of Afghans say the country is moving in the right direction, the lowest level of optimism recorded since 2004. Residents of the Central/Kabul region report the lowest level of optimism (16.3%), followed by the North East region (25.8%), and the Central/Hazarajat region (26.4%). Meanwhile, respondents from the East are most likely to say the country is moving in the right direction (41.1%). By province, respondents are least likely to say the country is moving in the right direction in Panjshir (4.6%), Kabul (13.3%), and Parwan (16.1%).
- **Reasons for optimism.** Among Afghans who say the country is moving in the right direction, the most commonly cited reasons are reconstruction and rebuilding (32.5%), good security (26.6%), active Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) (10.4%), and newly opened schools for girls (10.3%). Rural respondents are more optimistic overall compared to urban respondents (31.7% vs. 22.2%, respectively), a pattern consistent with previous years.
- **Reasons for pessimism.** As in all years since 2007, insecurity is the reason most commonly given for why the country is moving in the wrong direction (48.8%), followed by unemployment (27.5%), corruption (14.6%), bad economy (10.4%), and bad government (8.7%). The proportions of Afghans citing insecurity, unemployment, and corruption have increased from last year by 4.2, 2.1, and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. The proportion citing bad government has decreased by 2.7 points.
- **Local mood.** The *Survey* asked respondents what is going well in their local area, and their responses echo an overall pessimism, with 30.0% saying they don't know and 17.0% saying that nothing is going well in their local area. Development reasons are most frequently cited by those who give a reason. When respondents were asked to name up to two of the biggest problems in their area, 31.5% said unemployment, and 22.7% said security issues/violence.
- **Biggest problems facing women.** When asked to name the two biggest problems facing women in their area, education/illiteracy remained the most cited problem at 36.1%, up from 20.4% in 2015. Unemployment, at 22.9%, was up significantly from 11.3% in 2015, and domestic violence was cited by 22.1%, an all-time high. As in previous years, women cited domestic violence more frequently than men.
- **Biggest problems facing youth.** Respondents were first asked in 2015 to describe the two biggest problems facing youth. Their responses have changed little since last year. A majority of respondents list unemployment (71.2%), while a minority say illiteracy (25.7%), poor economy (16.0%), or drug addiction (13.8%). Lack of higher education opportunities was a more common concern in 2015 (15.3%) compared to this year (7.9%), while lack of youth rights decreased 3.8 percentage points from last year, to 1.8% in 2016.

SECURITY

- **Fear for personal safety.** Overall, 69.8% of Afghans report sometimes, often, or always feeling fear for their personal safety, the highest level in over a decade. As in 2015, fear for personal safety is most salient in the South West region (82.0%). Within this region, Helmand stands out, with 55.4% of respondents saying they are always afraid for their personal safety, 22.6% often afraid, and 14.3% sometimes afraid. Afghans in the East region (80.1%) also report high levels of fear for personal safety. Since last year, the largest changes in perceived insecurity appears in the North East, where it rose from 57.1% to 63.2%, and in the North West, where it rose from 58.1% to 66.5%.
- **Experience and reporting of crime and violence.** In 2016, the percentage of Afghans with a family member who was a victim of crime or violence increased by 1.2 points, to 19.4%. Most frequently cited are physical assaults (35.8%), theft of livestock (20.0%), and racketeering (17.4%). Murder (13.4%) and kidnappings (12.4%) also affect Afghans substantially. Of war-related incidents, suicide attacks are the most frequently reported (15.2%). The proportion of respondents who reported their experience of a crime or violence to another party remained stable from previous years, with 64.3% saying they approached an authority outside the family in 2016. The ANP remains the preferred authority, with 50.1% of those who experienced a crime or violence reporting the incident to the ANP.
- **Perceptions of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).** A narrow majority (53.7%) say the ANA is getting better at providing security, while 20.0% say it's getting worse. On the Afghan Local Police (ALP), 39.6% say it is getting better, 26.4% say it is getting worse, and 32.6% see no change. Of the three, views of the ANP's ability to provide security appears the most mixed, with 34.6% saying better, and 30.7% saying worse.
- **Reconciliation.** Confidence that the peace process can help stabilize the country remained comparable to 2015 (62.9%). The percentage of Afghans who say they feel sympathy for armed opposition groups (AOGs) decreased 10.8 percentage points this year, from 27.5% in 2015 to 16.7% in 2016. More Afghans in 2016 perceive AOGs as motivated by the pursuit of power (23.1%) compared to 2015 (18.9%) or 2014 (15.6%).
- **Fear of encountering armed forces.** Opposition forces uniformly trigger fear among Afghans, with 93.0% reporting fear of encountering the Taliban. Afghans still consider an encounter with the ANSF to have comparatively little risk, with 44.8% reporting some or a lot of fear when encountering the ANP, roughly the same as in the previous two years. Fear of encountering the ANA was reported by 42.1% in 2016.
- **Knowledge and threat of ISIS/Daesh.** General awareness of ISIS/Daesh has increased, from 74.3% in 2015 to 81.3% this year reporting familiarity with the group. Overall, perceptions of ISIS/Daesh as a security threat decreased, from 54.2% in 2015 to 47.9% in 2016.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

- **Perception of the economy.** Among the 65.9% of Afghans this year who say the country is moving in the wrong direction, the second-most common reason for pessimism after insecurity is unemployment (27.5%). Other economic reasons for pessimism include a bad economy (10.4%), lack of reconstruction (4.8%), and high prices (2.9%). Afghans also cite the economy when things are perceived to be going well. Among the minority of Afghans (29.3%) who are optimistic about the future of the country, 53.3% cite economic reasons for optimism, including reconstruction and rebuilding (33.0%) and economic revival (9.7%).
- **Household economic situation.** When asked about their household financial situation, 36.6% say their financial situation has worsened this year, compared to 29.7% in 2015. Only 18.8% of Afghans say their household financial situation has improved in 2016, compared to 21.0% in 2015.
- **Employment.** The *Survey* asks Afghans if they are involved in any activity that generates money, and 45.0% of all respondents in 2016—80.6% of men and 9.4% of women—say that they are. Almost two-thirds of respondents (59.9%) say that employment opportunities for their households have worsened, while 31.6% say they remain unchanged, and just 7.6% say they have improved since last year.
- **Women and the economy.** After a gradual trend upward since 2009, this year only 19.1% of Afghans say that a woman contributes to their household's income, down from 22.6% in 2015. When asked if they agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home, more respondents agree in 2016 (74.0%) than ever before in the *Survey*.
- **Assets.** Compared to rural Afghans, urban Afghans are more likely to report having household appliances that require electricity, such as a television (83.2%), a refrigerator (61.4%), or a washing machine (61.4%). Rural Afghans, on the other hand, are more likely to have a bicycle (51.3%), a motorcycle (51.8%), and a sewing machine (70.9%). Household mobile phone ownership continued to rise, from 82.3% in 2015 to 88.8% in 2016, while land ownership increased from 53.7% in 2015 to 59.3% in 2016.
- **Household income.** This year, respondents report an overall average monthly household income of AFN 10,949 (USD 165), with urban areas reporting higher incomes (AFN 14,284/USD 215) than Afghans living in rural areas (AFN 9,845/USD 148). Residents in the South West region report the highest average monthly income (AFN 15,052/USD 226).

DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

- **Electricity.** This year, 43.4% say their household electricity has worsened since last year (up from 40.3% in 2015), while 13.9% say it improved (down from 15.0% in 2015). For many Afghans, access to electricity is affected by changes in the economy, including relative purchasing power for fuel and solar panels, or the affordability of electricity bills. Afghans in urban areas are significantly more likely to report improvement (22.4%) in access to electricity since last year compared to Afghans in rural areas (11.1%).

- **Health.** Healthcare access and nutrition remain two central areas of concern. When asked to describe the quality of food in their household diet compared to 12 months ago, 16.1% of Afghans say it has improved. This figure represents a nearly 25 percentage point decline from five years ago, when 40.9% reported an improvement in household food quality. Poor nutrition appears particularly severe in provinces with high rates of insurgent violence. This year in Helmand province, for example, 75.9% of respondents indicate that the quality of food in their diet has worsened in the past year, the worst of any province.
- **Education.** More than half of Afghans (52.0%) report having no formal or informal government or private education, including two-thirds (66.4%) of women and 37.7% of men. Just over half (51.0%) of women say they have never been to a government school nor a madrasa for any type of education, compared to less than a quarter of men (23.4%).
- **Awareness of development projects.** Public awareness of new development projects has increased in every category of the *Survey* since last year. More than one-third of respondents (34.3%) say they are aware of a project to build or repair roads and bridges in their community, a significant increase from last year's rate of 30.3%. Awareness is greatest in Wardak (69.4%) and Laghman (68.6%), and lowest in the Central/Hazarajat area. The biggest increase in awareness is of new mosque construction, which rose from 21.9% in 2015 to 30.8% in 2016. Across all categories of development, levels of awareness are well below peak levels in 2011, which coincided with high levels of international and military aid expenditure.

GOVERNANCE

- **Satisfaction with government performance.** Following a sharp decline in 2015, Afghan perceptions of how well government institutions do their job again declined to historically low levels in 2016. Only 49.1% of Afghans surveyed say the National Unity Government (NUG) is doing a good job, down from 57.8% in 2015. Satisfaction rates are also low for provincial governments (52.9%), municipal governments in urban areas (42.4%), and district governments in rural areas (50.7%). Women (52.7%) are slightly more likely to express satisfaction with the NUG than are men (45.4%).
- **Confidence in public institutions.** In most categories related to confidence in government and nongovernment institutions, nationwide rates in 2016 were the lowest recorded in the 10-year history of this survey. Afghans say they have the lowest levels of confidence in national government institutions, including Parliament as a whole (37.0%) and government ministries (35.6%). By comparison, Afghans express the highest levels of confidence in religious leaders (66.1%), the media (64.5%), and community shuras/jirgas (62.1%). Only 24.3% of Afghans report that their member of Parliament (MP) has done something positive for their province. When asked which issues they believe their MP cares about most, 34.7% of Afghans say personal interest, 22.2% say ethnic interests, 18.7% say provincial issues, 12.0% say district or municipal issues, and 9.8% say national issues.
- **Corruption.** There appears to be a small gap between perceptions of corruption and the experience of corruption. In 2016, nearly all Afghans say corruption is a problem in all areas of daily life, with 61.0% calling it a major problem and 28.2% saying it is a minor problem. This represents no significant change from 2015. Urban residents (72.1%) are significantly more likely than rural residents (57.3%) to see

everyday corruption as a major problem. While the perception of corruption remains unchanged since last year, however, the rate at which respondents report actual encounters with corruption in various government institutions has decreased. If this decrease continues, perceptions may eventually “catch up,” but overall perceptions do not yet show a reaction. Afghans most frequently report directly experiencing corruption in the courts and judiciary (59.5%) or the municipal and district governor’s office (58.9%). Rates of reported corruption decreased the most for the customs office, and other small but statistically significant decreases are seen for municipal government, the ANP, and the ANA.

- **Justice and dispute resolution.** As a new question in 2016, the *Survey* asked Afghans about the role that defense lawyers play in their lives. Responses indicate low levels of awareness of the kind of work defense lawyers generally do. While 74.3% of Afghans correctly identify defense lawyers as professionals who help people who have been arrested or detained, some respondents believe they manage marriage proposals (47.0%) or work in Parliament (35.3%). A majority of Afghans (79.3%) say that individuals arrested for a crime should have the right to a defense lawyer, regardless of whether they are guilty or not. When respondents are asked what kind of defense lawyer they would trust to defend their rights, 64.0% say that they would trust a government defense lawyer, followed by an independent lawyer (58.4%), a lawyer from a civil society organization (49.0%), and a lawyer from an international organization (40.1%). Use of national and local judicial institutions has remained steady over the past 10 years. Approximately one in five Afghans report that they have turned to the *Huquq* (rights) Department or a neighborhood shura/jirga to resolve a dispute in the past two years. Of those Afghans who used a dispute resolution institution, 43.5% report using a neighborhood shura/jirga.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

- **Basic political freedoms.** The percentage of Afghans in 2016 who say they felt fear while voting in a national or provincial election (53.7%) shows a slight decrease compared to 2015 (56.0%). The survey data shows that women (57.5%) and rural residents (56.9%) are more likely to express fear while voting than men (50.0%) and urban residents (44.4%). Similarly, a high percentage of Afghans (71.6%) say they would feel some fear or a lot of fear participating in a peaceful demonstration, and an even higher percentage of respondents (74.7%) say they would experience some fear running for political office. Notably, in the Central/Kabul region, fear while participating in a peaceful demonstration jumped from 54.9% in 2015 to 70.6% in 2016. This change may be a response to high-profile suicide attacks on peaceful protests within Kabul city. The *Survey* also asked Afghans how safe they feel criticizing their government in public. Just over half of Afghans (54.5%) say they feel safe criticizing their government, while 44.3% say they feel somewhat unsafe or very unsafe.
- **Influence over local government.** The percentage of Afghans who believe they can affect local government decisions (44.2%) is the lowest recorded in the past decade, and continues a declining trend since a recent high in 2014, just after the presidential election. This low percentage is similar among women (41.7%) and men (44.9%), as well as residents of urban areas (40.2%) and rural areas (44.4%).
- **Religion and politics.** A majority of Afghans (57.2%) say that religious leaders should be involved in politics. This is the lowest rate in the last 10 years of the *Survey*, down from a high of 69.5% in 2011. Men

(58.4%) and women (56.1%) report similar views on the role of religious scholars in politics, although residents of rural areas (58.9%) are slightly more likely to support an active role for religious leaders in politics than residents of urban areas (52.1%).

- **Women and politics.** A majority of Afghans (88.2%) say women should be allowed to vote in elections, up slightly from 83.4% in 2009. Women (90.6%) are more likely to hold this view than men (85.8%), as are urban Afghans (94.1%) compared to rural Afghans (86.3%). This year, 56.8% of Afghans say that women should make electoral decisions independently, whereas 21.3% of respondents say men should decide for women, and 20.8% say women should decide in consultation with men. The *Survey* also asks whether respondents prefer to be represented by a man or woman in Parliament. One-third of Afghans (34.4%) say they prefer being represented by a man, 31.6% say they prefer being represented by a woman, and 33.0% say it makes no difference.
- **Attitudes towards democracy.** This year, the percentage of Afghans who express satisfaction with democracy is 55.9%, a slight decrease from 2015 (57.2%). Women (57.9%) are slightly more likely to express satisfaction with democracy than are men (53.9%). The *Survey* also asks Afghans to rate how well members of Parliament perform key duties. Just over half (54.9%) say their MPs do a good job of listening to constituents and representing their needs.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

- **Sources of news and information.** As in previous years, radio remains the most common source of information, with 70.5% of respondents receiving news and information from the radio, followed by television (66.4%), mosques (47.5%), and community shuras (39.0%). Mobile phones, which 57.0% used as a source of information in 2013, are now used by only 42.1%, possibly an effect of the 10.0% tax on all phone calls introduced in 2015. Use of the Internet to obtain news and information showed a significant increase of 8.4 points, from 3.2% in 2013 to 11.6% in 2016.
- **Mobile phone ownership.** This year, respondents are asked how many members of their household have mobile phones, and in many cases, a single household has more than one phone. The overwhelming majority of respondents (89.0%) say there is at least one mobile phone in their household. When asked about personal ownership, however, only 55.9% of respondents personally own a mobile phone, including 74.3% of urban and 49.9% of rural respondents, with men twice as likely as women to have access to a mobile phone.
- **Television ownership and viewership.** TV ownership has not increased this year, possibly the consequence of a sluggish economy. Ownership is concentrated in urban areas, where electricity is more dependable, and corresponds to increased household income. The Central/Kabul region exhibits the highest TV ownership, with 53.3% of households having one TV set, followed closely by the East and South West regions. Nearly two-thirds of Afghans (64.5%) report watching TV programs. Tolo TV is the most watched network in Afghanistan, with 36.3% of viewing respondents, followed by Ariana TV (9.6%), Shamshad TV (8.9%), and Lemar TV (8.2%).

- **Access to Internet and use of social media.** Nationwide, 40.0% of respondents say they live in an area that has access to the Internet, including 32.6% of respondents in rural areas and 62.2% of respondents in urban areas. Only 11.2% of respondents say they personally have access to the Internet, which might involve a personal mobile phone with cellular Internet or some other personal means of access. Use of social media has increased in Afghanistan among politicians, youth, the private sector, and insurgents alike. Notably, three times as many men (17.0%) as women (5.5%) say they have personal access to the Internet. Barriers to Internet access include affordability, electricity, network coverage, conservative cultural views, and illiteracy.
- **Role of television in public opinion and behavior.** The *Survey* explored whether television viewership affects public perceptions in three areas: (a) support for women’s rights, (b) confidence in government, and (c) perceptions of insecurity. Respondents who watch more hours of television appear more likely to support women’s rights. This association also holds true in “intercept interviews,” conducted with respondents from highly insecure and inaccessible areas. A simple association suggests that people who watch more television are less likely to express confidence in the National Unity Government, whereas those who listen to radio are less likely than those who do not to say that the NUG is doing a very bad job. Afghans who watch more hours of television are significantly less likely to express confidence in various levels of the Afghan government. TV viewership also affects the perception of insecurity. Respondents who watch TV are more likely to say ISIS is a threat to their area than are those who do not watch TV, and significantly more likely to report higher levels of fear for their personal safety.

WOMEN IN SOCIETY

- **Access to justice.** Women who have used the state courts are more likely than men to say that they treat men and women equally (55.4% vs. 45.3%, respectively), a finding consistent with the common perception that state courts are more protective of women’s rights than the alternative, traditional justice mechanisms. Among those who say there is a place for women in their area to resolve their problems, a variety of places are cited. As in past years, the most commonly named place is the Directorate of Women’s Affairs (51.1%), followed by the Human Rights Commission (8.6%), a district office (6.9%), women’s shura (5.4%), or elders (4.5%).
- **Customs and tribal practices.** Overall, 65.4% of Afghans strongly disagree that the practice of *baad*, where a daughter is given to another party as a penalty or payment for some offense, is acceptable, with slightly more men than women strongly disagreeing (67.1% vs. 63.7%). Attitudes toward *baddal* reflect more ambiguity, with fewer Afghans expressing strong disagreement (45.1%). A majority of respondents (63.0%) agree that a daughter or wife is entitled to *miras*, or family inheritance, usually from a deceased father.
- **Perceptions of women’s attire in public.** A third of Afghans (34.0%) say that the *burqa* (a full-body covering) is the most appropriate public dress for women, while the *niqab* (a veil that covers the full face, with the exception of the eyes) is preferred by 27.1%. Only 1.1% say that it is acceptable for women to appear in public with no head covering. There have been no significant changes here since 2015. Compared to men, women prefer more liberal public dress for women.

- **Political participation.** Afghans have divided views on the acceptability of women in political leadership positions. This year, fewer than half of Afghans overall (44.5%) say that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, while a similar percentage (42.3%) say they should be for men and women equally. More than half of men (58.3%) say that political leadership roles should be mostly for men, compared to 30.6% of women. Respondents view the idea of women in local leadership positions more favorably than national leadership roles such as a cabinet post or president.
- **Education.** This year 80.7% of Afghans say they agree that women should have the same educational opportunities as men, with 38.5% expressing strong agreement. As in past years, however, this agreement is conditional. While most Afghans agree that women can be educated in an Islamic madrasa (93.6%) and in primary school (86.1%), more than half disapprove of a woman studying outside her home province (58.1% of men and 46.9% of women) or studying abroad (69.4% of men and 57.2% of women).
- **Work.** In 2016, three-quarters of Afghans (74.0%) agreed that women should be allowed to work outside the home, a significant increase from 64.0% in 2015. Part of this increase appears to be explained by poverty and the need for additional household income. Despite rising support for women working outside the home, the percentage of Afghans who say that women contribute to household income has decreased slightly, from 22.6% in 2015 to 19.1% in 2016. Slightly more rural Afghans (20.3%) compared to urban Afghans (15.5%) say that women do contribute to household income.
- **Employment venues.** Most Afghans say they agree with the idea of women working in female-only schools (85.9%) and in hospitals or clinics (84.4%), and high numbers agree with women working in government offices (68.1%) and co-ed schools (66.6%). Just less than half of respondents approve of women working for NGOs (45.8%) or for private companies where employees are all-female (45.5%). Afghans are least likely to agree with women working in the army or police (36.5%) and in private companies where men and women work together (32.9%).

MIGRATION

- **Desire to leave Afghanistan.** Between 2011 and 2015, there was a steady increase in the number of Afghans saying that they would leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else if given the opportunity. This year, the percentage of Afghans expressing a desire to emigrate decreased significantly, from 39.9% in 2015 to 29.6% in 2016, the largest drop on record in the *Survey*. Afghans living in the Central/Kabul region (36.1%) and the North East region (37.1%) are most likely to say they would leave Afghanistan, while those in the South West region are the least likely (17.8%). There is a wide variation across provinces. Over half the respondents in Baghlan (58.6%) say they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity, compared to much smaller numbers in Nuristan (11.7%), Helmand (12.0%), and Zabul (14.9%). By ethnicity, the Hazaras are most likely to express a desire to emigrate (38.6%), followed by Tajiks (32.0%), while Uzbeks (28.8%) and Pashtuns (24.3%) are least likely.
- **Reasons for leaving.** Motivations to emigrate include a combination of “push” and “pull” factors. Push factors are domestic circumstances that motivate people to leave their country, such as economic, social, political, or security problems. Pull factors are external influences that attract would-be migrants to a

particular destination, such as the destination's reception and resettlement policies, or the presence there of family and friends. Respondents who say they would leave Afghanistan are asked to give two reasons. Almost three-quarters (73.6%) cite insecurity as one of two reasons, including answers such as "Taliban are killing people," "suicide attacks," "fear of ISIS/Daesh," and "kidnappings." Another 28.8% of respondents cite concerns relating to weak government. Desire to leave Afghanistan is greater among those who think the National Unity Government is doing a very bad job than among those who think it is doing a very good job (33.2% and 26.5%, respectively). More than half of Afghans (51.5%) cite unemployment as a reason they would leave the country if given the opportunity.

- **Decrease in desire to emigrate.** The decrease in stated desire to emigrate runs counter to the expectation that key push factors would increase emigration from Afghanistan. For example, compared to 2015, this *Survey* shows that Afghans' fears about personal safety have risen, their optimism about the direction of the country has fallen, and their satisfaction with the national government has dropped. One explanation is that pull factors, rather than push factors, may have greater influence on migration decision-making this year. Broader developments in the global migration context since 2015 may further explain the reduction. Primary among these changes is a significant shift in the reception policies of a number of European countries.



ام تی او

۲ عدد سیمک

تماس بین
سیمکارت دق

1. NATIONAL MOOD

Each year, the *Survey* begins by asking Afghans whether the country is moving in the right direction or the wrong direction and why. The level of optimism, which rose more or less steadily from 2006 to an all-time high of 58.2% reported in 2013, dropped sharply in 2014 and has continued to decline since. This year's survey shows the lowest level of optimism recorded, dropping from 36.7% in 2015 to 29.3% in 2016. A record 65.9% of Afghans say the country is moving in the wrong direction. As in previous years, the most cited national problem is security, more so than in 2015. Respondents living in rural areas, as in previous years, report more optimism than those in urban areas. They cite reconstruction and rebuilding, good security, active Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), and newly opened schools for girls as reasons for optimism.

The precipitous drop in optimism seen in the 2015 survey was attributed in part to a realignment of expectations, primarily a fundamental shift in what Afghans could expect from their democracy as they saw a new government at work and a huge reduction in foreign troops. This year's continued decline is not interpreted as realignment, but rather as a genuine drop in optimism. Confidence in every level of government appears to have fallen, including the executive branch, the justice system, and the military.

While 2015 witnessed a rise in Afghan emigration—largely to European nations—the desire to leave the country has declined in this year's *Survey*. Pakistan declared it would return approximately 1.5 million Afghan migrants, many of whom have been living in Pakistan for decades, while other Afghan migrants became returnees from European countries.¹ During the October 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, held shortly after the conclusion of the *Survey* fieldwork, there were intimations that future donor funding could become contingent on the forced repatriation of Afghan migrants, despite the worsening economic and security environment and Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure to absorb these people.²

Security in Afghanistan has deteriorated, with record Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and civilian casualties, ISIS incursions in the east, Taliban incursions in Helmand, and a second major assault and takeover of Kunduz. The debut ISIS bombing in Kabul, at a civil protest over the TUTAP route led largely by Shia Hazaras,³ killed at least 80 and wounded hundreds, shook confidence in the government, and exacerbated ethnic tensions. A perceived drop in aid funding has left many uncertain about the economic future.

Late 2015 and early 2016 saw the high-profile attempt and failure of the Afghan government to hold quadrilateral peace talks including the Taliban leadership. Later in the year, it was announced that the National Unity Government (NUG) had made peace with politician Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and armed Islamist group Hezb-i-Islami, a decision that not all Afghan groups greeted as a step forward. Skirmishes in early fall between supporters of First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum and supporters of the late King Kalakani left many in Kabul nervous about the potential for high-level power struggles.

This chapter explores Afghans' opinions about the trajectory of Afghanistan's future, the problems and positive changes in their local areas, the difficulties facing youth and women, and self-reported levels of personal happiness.

1.1 DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY

Key Questions

Q-1. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction?

Q-2. (If Q-1 answer is "right direction") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q-3. (If Q-1 answer is "wrong direction") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

NATIONAL MOOD: DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY

The highest rate of optimism was recorded in 2013, when 58.2% of Afghans said the country was moving in the right direction. The downward trajectory of optimism beginning the following year has continued, and this year just 29.3% of Afghans say the country is moving in the right direction, down from 36.7% in 2015. A record 65.9% say the country is moving in the wrong direction, up from 57.5% in 2015 (Fig. 1.1).

NATIONAL MOOD: DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY




FIG. 1.1: Q-1. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction?⁴

Respondents living in rural areas continue to report more optimism than those in urban areas. Among rural respondents, 31.7% say the country is moving in the right direction, down from 39.8% in 2015 and 55.0% in 2014, while 22.2% of urban respondents say the country is moving in the right direction, down from 27.2% in 2015 and 53.7% in 2014. Rural Afghans are also more likely than urban Afghans to say they don't know which direction the country is moving—an average of 5.0% of rural respondents versus 3.3% of urban Afghans over the past three years.

There is no significant difference in reported pessimism between women (65.8%) and men (66.0%). However, when separated into urban and rural groups, urban women appear significantly more pessimistic than rural women in 2016 (Fig. 1.2). While urban women were consistently more pessimistic than rural women until 2014, this gap widened in 2015. Among urban and rural men, there is less variation in perception.

RIGHT DIRECTION, WOMEN IN URBAN VS. RURAL




FIG. 1.2: Q-1. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction? National optimism, urban and rural, by gender.

Region and province of residence play an important role in rates of optimism and pessimism. Among respondents from the Central/Kabul region, 80.3% say the country is moving in the wrong direction. This level is largely driven by respondents from Panjshir and Kabul provinces, who say wrong direction more than other provinces in the region (95.4% and 84.1%, respectively). After the Central/Kabul region, the North East (25.8%), Central/Hazarajat (26.4%), and North West (30.0%) are most likely to report a pessimistic national mood. Meanwhile, respondents from the East are most likely to say the country is moving in the right direction (41.1%), followed by the South East (40.5%), South West (36.9%) and West (34.1%).

By province, respondents are least likely to say the country is moving in the right direction in Panjshir (4.6%), Kabul (13.3%), and Parwan (16.1%), and the most likely to report optimism in Laghman (51.2%) and Khost (51.1%). However, the trend across provinces, year over year, suggests a growing pessimism. The percentage of respondents who say the country is moving in the wrong direction increased by 10 or more percentage points in 15 provinces,⁵ and by 20 or more points in five provinces, including Helmand (up 42 points to 73.5%), Panjshir (up 23.6 points to 95.4%), Daikundi (up 21.6 points to 63.3%), Parwan (up 20.1 points to 81.0%), and Takhar (up 20.1 points to 65.0%). For purposes of interpretation, the sampling margin of error for most provinces is less than $\pm 5\%$.

Ethnicity associates with some variations in reported mood. Overall, Pashtuns are more likely to say the country is moving in the right direction (35.1%) than are Tajiks (26.0%), Hazaras (21.6%), Uzbeks (29.0%), Turkmen (32.1%) or other minority groups (Fig. 1.3). However, in “intercept interviews” which target male respondents in highly insecure areas, only 25.5% of Pashtun respondents say the country is moving in the right direction, compared to 30.5% of Tajik respondents. This suggests that sampling replacements due to insecurity probably bias the rates of optimism among Pashtuns to a figure higher than if random sampling were unconstrained by access or security limitations.

NATIONAL MOOD, BY ETHNICITY




FIG. 1.3: Q-1. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction? (Optimism and pessimism, by major ethnicities.⁶)

National mood does not appear to carry any robust association with marital status, education, or income. However, age is negatively correlated with optimism, with older respondents less likely to say the country is moving in the right direction than younger people. This pattern persists even after controlling for gender, ethnicity, education, income, marital status, and province.

A strong, positive correlation exists between national optimism and stated confidence in the national government. Those who report higher confidence in a variety of government institutions, including national, provincial, and district-level government, are significantly more likely to say the country is going in the right direction than are those with lower levels of reported confidence. Other factors that appear to associate with national optimism include gender (males are more optimistic), improved household conditions since last year (household finances, employment opportunities, food quality, availability of products), and confidence in the ANSF.

REASONS: RIGHT DIRECTION

Among Afghans who say the country is moving in the right direction, the most commonly cited reasons are reconstruction and rebuilding (32.5%), good security (26.6%), active ANA and ANP (10.4%), newly opened schools for girls (10.3%), economic revival (9.7%), peace/end of war (8.8%), good governance (7.3%), improvements in education (6.9%), reduction in administrative corruption (6.2%), and road construction (5.6%).

Rural respondents are more optimistic overall than urban respondents (31.7% vs. 22.2%, respectively), and there are some urban/rural disparities in the reasons given. Urban respondents more frequently cite good security (31.8% urban vs. 25.4% rural), newly opened girls' schools (13.2% urban vs. 9.6% rural), economic revival (11.3% urban vs. 9.3% rural), and reduction in administrative corruption (10.0% urban vs. 5.3% rural). Meanwhile, rural respondents more frequently cite reconstruction/rebuilding (33.0% rural vs. 30.2% urban) and having an active ANA and ANP (11.4% rural vs. 6.1% urban) (Fig. 1.4).

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM: RURAL VS. URBAN




FIG.1.4: Q-2. (If Q-1 answer is “right direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

While there are few gender differences in the reasons for optimism (the top two reasons for both genders are reconstruction/rebuilding and good security), women consistently cite the opening of new girls' schools more frequently than men.

Across ethnicities, rebuilding/reconstruction is the most commonly given reason for optimism. Less common reasons vary. Hazaras, for example, are more likely to cite newly opened girls' schools (15.0%), peace/end of war (12.1%), and improvement in education (10.2%) than other ethnicities, while Pashtuns and Turkmens are most likely to cite an active ANA and ANP (13.3% and 16.3%, respectively) (Fig. 1.5).

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM, BY ETHNICITY




FIG. 1.5: Q-2. (If Q-1 answer is “right direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

REASONS: WRONG DIRECTION

As in all years since 2007, insecurity is the most commonly given reason for why the country is moving in the wrong direction (48.8%), followed by unemployment (27.5%), corruption (14.6%), bad economy (10.4%), and bad government (8.7%). The proportion of Afghans citing insecurity, unemployment, and corruption has increased from last year by 4.2, 2.1, and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. The proportion citing bad government has decreased by 2.7 points. Overwhelmingly, insecurity remains the predominant reason for pessimism across regions (Fig. 1.6). Year-over-year and quantitative analysis using this question is limited because the question is open-ended and yielded 114 different responses this year.⁷ However, a detailed breakdown of responses can be found online using the data visualization tool, at asiafoundation.org.

TOP REASONS FOR PESSIMISM, BY REGION




FIG. 1.6: Q-3. (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? By region.

Residents of urban areas are more likely to cite insecurity (51.6%) and unemployment (37.7%) than rural residents (47.8% and 23.5%, respectively). Urban and rural residents cite corruption, bad economy, bad government, and suicide attacks at roughly similar rates (Fig. 1.7).

TOP REASONS FOR PESSIMISM: RURAL VS. URBAN




FIG. 1.7: Q-3. (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (Top reasons for pessimism: rural vs. urban.)

1.2 LOCAL MOOD

Key Questions

Q-4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

Q-5. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

WHAT IS GOING WELL IN LOCAL AREA

In addition to asking about problems, the *Survey* also asked respondents what is going well in their local area. Responses to this question echo an overall pessimism, with 30.0% of respondents saying they don't know, and 17.0% saying that nothing is going well in their local area.⁸ Of those who give a reason, however, development reasons are most frequently cited, including education, agriculture, roads, clinics, drinking water, and dams. Good security, implementation of law and order, and support for the ANP are cited as well, but less frequently (Fig. 1.8).

WHAT IS GOING WELL IN YOUR AREA

	%
DON'T KNOW	30
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION	22
NOTHING	17
GOOD SECURITY	16
DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE/IRRIGATION/LIVESTOCK	14
DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY	11
BUILDING ROADS AND BRIDGES	10
UNITY AMONG PEOPLE	7
BUILDING CLINICS	6
AVAILABILITY OF DRINKING WATER	5
BUILDING DAMS	5
AVAILABILITY OF JOBS	5
BUILDING MOSQUES	3
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND ORDER	2
PEOPLE'S SUPPORT FOR ANP	2

FIG. 1.8: Q-4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

Those who cite roads and bridges, good security, health clinics, and reconstruction appear most likely to say the country is moving in the right direction. By contrast, and of no surprise, those who say nothing is going well in their local area are most likely to say the country is moving in the wrong direction (Fig. 1.9).

NATIONAL MOOD, BY PERCEPTION OF WHAT IS GOING WELL IN YOUR LOCAL AREA




FIG. 1.9: Q-4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Allow two answers.)* **Q-1.** *Generally speaking, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they're going in the wrong direction?*

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA

All respondents were asked to name up to two of the biggest problems in their area. Responses include unemployment (31.5%), security issues/violence (22.7%), lack of electricity (19.7%), lack of good roads (15.4%), lack of clean water (15.2%), illiteracy and lack of schools (10.6%), lack of clinics and hospitals (9.2%), high prices (7.1%), poor economy (6.2%), poverty (5.7%), and corruption (5.4%). Notably, the frequency with which security/violence is cited has risen from 12.3% in 2013 to 22.7% in 2016 (Fig. 1.10).

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN YOUR LOCAL AREA




FIG. 1.10: Q-5. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

Unemployment is the most commonly cited problem in most regions, ranging from 27.7% to 38.6% of responses. Two exceptions are the West Region, which reports security issues at a rate of 28.2% and unemployment at 27.7%, and the North East, which reports lack of electricity at a rate of 32.5% and unemployment at 31.3%. Residents in the Central/Hazarajat region are the most likely to name unemployment (38.6%) and lack of roads (21.6%), and the least likely to name security issues (2.6%) as their biggest problems. Lack of drinking water remains a serious problem, and was cited as the biggest problem by 23.9% in the North West, 26.3% in the North East, 26.8% in the North East, and 16.0% in the Central/Kabul region (Fig. 1.11).

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA, BY REGION

	UNEMPLOYMENT	INSECURITY/ ATTACKS/ VIOLENCE	ELECTRICITY	ROADS	DRINKING WATER	EDUCATION/ SCHOOLS/ LITERACY	DONT KNOW	HEALTHCARE/ CLINICS/ HOSPITALS
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
CENTRAL/ KABUL	33	21	14	20	16	10	11	9
EAST	36	28	30	9	8	11	6	7
SOUTH EAST	30	27	22	11	6	11	4	7
SOUTH WEST	28	25	18	5	8	10	20	5
WEST	28	28	13	12	7	12	11	5
NORTH EAST	31	21	33	20	27	9	6	13
CENTRAL/ HAZARAJAT	39	2	23	22	26	11	16	13
NORTH WEST	32	18	16	20	24	12	8	16

FIG. 1.11: Q-5. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Allow two answers.)*

The provinces of Logar (51.0%), Jawzjan (41.8%), Sar-e-Pul (40.9%), Uruzgan (40.0%), and Daikundi (50.1%) are most likely to cite unemployment as the biggest local problem. The provinces least likely to cite security issues as the biggest problem are Panjshir (0.5%), Bamyan (1.3%), and Daikundi (3.2%), whereas those most likely to cite security are Uruzgan (48.3%), Helmand (38.8%), Kunduz (39.6%), and Paktia (40.5%). High prices are most commonly cited in Helmand province (23.2%), where average household income is significantly higher than in other provinces, but also where income disparities correspond with involvement in or exclusion from the lucrative poppy industry.

1.3 BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN

Key Question

Q-7. What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem? (Allow two answers.)

Continuing a long-running trend, when asked to name the two biggest problems facing women in their area, the most frequent response this year is education/illiteracy (36.1%). According to the World Bank, estimates of adult women's literacy rates vary from 17% to 24% nationwide, with wide variations between provinces.⁹ UNESCO reports that women in Kabul have a literacy rate of 34.7%, while women in Helmand have a literacy rate of 1.6%. In contrast, male literacy is estimated at 68% in Kabul and 41% in Helmand.¹⁰

Additional problems cited include unemployment (22.9%) and domestic violence (22.1%, an all-time high) (Fig. 1.12). As in previous years, women cited domestic violence more than men. The 4.1 rise in percentage points of domestic violence in this year's *Survey* may signal a rise in its prevalence in Afghanistan. However, it appears more likely to indicate a growing awareness of domestic violence as a problem, where violence in the home may be increasingly problematized rather than described as acceptable. Provinces most likely to cite domestic violence as the biggest problem facing women include Logar (41.9%), Paktia (42.8%), Khost (38.8%), and Kandahar (28.4%). Khost also has the highest frequency of respondents citing forced marriage as the biggest problem facing women (45.7%), followed by Helmand (44.9%). Notably, older women cite poverty more frequently than younger women (13.4% vs. 8.8%), while younger women are more likely to report forced marriage than older women (15.3% vs. 9.4%).

BIGGEST PROBLEM FACING WOMEN IN YOUR AREA




FIG. 1.12: Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem?*

1.4 BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH

Key Question

Q-6. *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing youth in Afghanistan? What is the next-biggest problem? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24.*

Respondents were first asked in 2015 to describe the two biggest problems facing youth. There have been few significant changes in responses since last year (Fig. 1.13).¹¹ A majority of respondents list unemployment (71.2%), while a minority say illiteracy (25.7%), poor economy (16.2%), or drug addiction (13.8%). Lack of higher education opportunities was a more common concern in 2015 (15.3%) than this year (7.9%), while lack of youth rights decreased 3.8 percentage points from last year, to 1.8% in 2016.

BIGGEST PROBLEM FACING YOUTH




FIG. 1.13: Q-6. *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing youth in Afghanistan? What is the next-biggest problem? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24.*

While unemployment is cited by most respondents in all regions, regional variations among other responses reveal nuanced differences. Illiteracy is most commonly cited in the East region (36.8%) and least commonly cited in the Central/Hazarajat region (16.5%). Poor economy is most commonly cited in the Central/Hazarajat region (36.3%) and least commonly in the South West (8.5%). Residents of the South East cite drug addiction (23.3%) more frequently than residents of other provinces, with residents of the Central/Hazarajat region citing it least (2.7%). Costly marriage was more often cited in the South East (5.5%) than in any other region.

In 13 provinces, over 75% of respondents list unemployment as one of the biggest problems.¹² Illiteracy is listed by 42.3% of respondents in Nangarhar, compared to many fewer in Kapisa (9.3%), Parwan (13.8%), and Bamyan (12.7%). Almost one-third (29.0%) of the sample in Helmand, a province with some of the worst security challenges in Afghanistan this year, list involvement in crime as one of the two biggest problems facing youth, while no other provinces cite this problem more than 5% of the time.

At the national level, age of respondent does not appear to correspond with perception differences in terms of problems facing youth. However, there are small differences in terms of gender and urban/rural responses. Specifically, men are slightly more concerned about unemployment than women (73.6% vs. 68.8%), and slightly more concerned with illiteracy than women (28.2% vs. 23.2%). Women, on the other hand, are slightly more concerned about drug addiction than men (15.1% vs. 12.5%). Urban respondents (76.2%) list unemployment more frequently than rural respondents (69.5%), while rural respondents (27.3%) list illiteracy more frequently than urban respondents (20.9%). Lack of higher education opportunities is a slightly greater concern for urban (11.6%) than for rural (6.7%) respondents. However, concerns about the economy, drug addiction, insecurity, lack of schools, corruption, and migration appear similar.

1.5 SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS

Key Question

D-24. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

Despite the decline in national mood, rates of self-reported happiness slightly increased from 74.9% in 2015 (28.6% very happy, 46.3% somewhat happy) to 76.8% in 2016 (37.5% very happy, 39.3% somewhat happy). Rates of reported happiness are lower in intercept interviews, where insecurity may be high. For example, 8.8% of intercept respondents say that they are not happy at all, compared to only 5.0% of respondents in the main sample. However, the differences are smaller than expected.

Maintaining a pattern consistent with previous years, men this year are slightly more likely than women to say they are happy (78.8% vs. 74.7%). Regionally, the highest rates of reported happiness are in the East (86.9%), and the lowest in Central/Hazarajat (64.7%) (Fig. 1.14).

SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS, BY REGION




FIG. 1.14: D-24. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

A number of factors appear to carry associations with increased happiness. On average, males are happier than females, younger respondents are happier than older respondents, and more educated respondents are happier than less educated respondents. Those with higher incomes and those who feel they can influence local government decisions report happiness more frequently than those who are poorer and who feel they have less influence.¹³ Happiness is also positively associated with optimism about the future of the country, confidence in the government, satisfaction with dispute resolution mechanisms, and support for women's rights. It is negatively associated with the use of television to access news and information, and also negatively associated with a desire to migrate.

Satisfaction with democracy explains 19.7% of the variance in how happy a person says they are.¹⁴ The perception of corruption as a major problem in Afghanistan decreases the likelihood that respondents will say they are happy, although direct experience with corruption does not have a significant relationship with happiness.¹⁵

Importantly, however, these are simple associations and are not suggested to be causes or consequences of happiness. Happiness here is measured using a self-report question from the World Values Survey.¹⁶ How a person responds to the question may be influenced by a wide set of cultural and circumstantial factors.¹⁷ For example, respondents in the *Survey* are significantly more likely to report feeling happy if one or more elders are present and observing the interview, suggesting that a positive answer to the question may be a response to social desirability bias.¹⁸ This association holds even when controlling for age and gender of the respondent.

End Notes

¹ Pamela Constable, “Pakistan uses 1.5 million Afghan refugees as pawns in dispute with U.S.,” *Washington Post*, June 17, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/17/pakistan-uses-1-5-million-afghan-refugees-as-pawns-in-dispute-with-u-s/>.

² Brussels Conference on Afghanistan website, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/10/05/>.

³ Thomas Ruttig, *Power to the People (2): The TUTAP protests* (Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 16, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/power-to-the-people-2-the-tutap-protests/>.

⁴ Intercept interviews with individuals from particularly rural or insecure areas align closely with the countrywide figures, with 29.3% of respondents saying the country is moving in the right direction and 65.9% saying it is moving in the wrong direction.

⁵ Badakhshan (up 18.9 points to 61.8%), Bamiyan (up 18.8 points to 70.1%), Ghazni (up 17.1 points to 71.9%), Kunduz (up 15.3 points to 76.8%), Badghis (up 14.4 points to 55.2%), Paktia (up 12.9 points to 55.0%), Baghlan (up 12.7 points to 68.3%), Jawzjan (up 11.8 points to 63.8%), Kabul (up 11.3 points to 84.0%), and Wardak (up 10 points to 66.2%).

⁶ Sample sizes of other ethnicities are too small to be reliable.

⁷ The data visualization tool is recommended for a granular analysis of this question. The reason for this is that responses are not pre-coded into fixed categories for comparison. For example, at a glance, those from the East are most likely to cite insecurity (52.8%), while those in the South East are least likely (39.5%). However, those from the South East are more likely than any region to cite suicide attacks (13.0%), presence of Taliban (8.6%), kidnapping of children (3.1%), and presence of warlords (3.0%), categories which one might join with insecurity as a meta-response category.

⁸ Among those who say they don't know, or that nothing is going well in their local area, there appears to be little variation in terms of disaggregations by gender, by age, or by access to media. Respondents with no formal education and respondents with an average monthly household income of less than AFN 2,000 per month are more likely than others to say they don't know, but this response pattern is consistent for virtually all questions in the Survey. One geographic differentiation appears significant: urban residents (26.7%) are almost twice as likely as rural residents (13.8%) to say that there is nothing going well in their local area, consistent with an overall pessimism in urban areas.

⁹ World Bank, “Afghanistan: Literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and above),” World Bank website, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS?locations=AF>.

¹⁰ UNESCO, “Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) program,” website of UNESCO Office in Kabul, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/kabul/education/enhancement-of-literacy-in-afghanistan-ela-program/>.

¹¹ The perception of a problem need not bear a direct relation to whether or not that issue is a problem in a given area. For instance, this year none of the respondents in Helmand named lack of higher education as one of the biggest problems facing youth, while 12.7% of the respondents from Kabul did. Yet Kabul has the highest concentration of higher education institutions in Afghanistan, and Helmand routinely ranks among the lowest in terms of educational opportunities and achievements.

¹² Kabul (79.8%), Kapisa (80.6%), Parwan (78.6%), Kunar (80.2%), Badakhshan (81.8%), Takhar (77.9%), Kunduz (83.9%), Samangan (81.9%), Faryab (78.7%), Farah (78.9%), Nimroz (78.2%), Helmand (75.8%), and Bamiyan (77.0%).

¹³ Spearman's rho=0.174, p<.0001

¹⁴ Spearman's rho=0.197, p<.0001

¹⁵ This trend is seen in other surveys. See: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index: Also including selected data on Pakistan* (Brookings, July 31, 2015), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20150731.pdf>.

¹⁶ “World Values Survey Wave 6, 2010–2014, Official Aggregate, v.20150418,” Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid, Spain, World Values Survey Association website, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp>.

¹⁷ Carol Graham and Soumya Chattopadhyay, *Well-Being and Public Attitudes in Afghanistan: Some Insights from the Economics of Happiness*, Working Paper Number 2 (Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_afghanistan_happiness_graham.pdf.

¹⁸ Spearman's rho=0.0277.



2. SECURITY

Over the past year, the rapid deterioration of security in areas including Kunduz City, Baghlan, Uruzgan, and Helmand has threatened to undermine public confidence in the National Unity Government (NUG). The capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to reorganize and respond to ongoing threats will remain a key focus of domestic and international policy discussions in the coming year.

Since the completion of the security transition in December 2014, the ANSF has been in charge of managing the war efforts against armed insurgencies including the Taliban and ISIS, and providing everyday security services to the Afghan people. Under Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), which replaced Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Resolute Support, the successor mission to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), only a small contingent of 13,000 NATO troops has remained in the country to "train, advise, and assist" the ANSF.¹ The advance of the Taliban in several provinces in 2015, however, revealed structural weaknesses in the composition and readiness of the ANSF, requiring a more active role for NATO and OFS, including on-the-ground mentoring and air strikes.² This is reflected in the *Survey* findings for 2016, which show a continuing erosion of public confidence in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). In spite of this, Afghans who express positive views of the ANP and the ANA are still far more numerous than those who express criticism of them. The decline in approval rates for both since 2014 shows the perception of their achievements after Afghan security forces assumed control of security decision-making. The ANA's protection of civilians remains an issue, provoking further public scrutiny.

The *Survey* conducted fieldwork from September to October this year, which happened to fall in the middle of the fighting season. The typical spring harvest launch of the Taliban fighting season was delayed by several circumstances this year, including the assassination of Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor in May, and the holy month of Ramadan, which fell this year in June. Before fighting, the Taliban were forced to address the question of succession.³ Although skirmishes were recorded across the year, serious clashes began to erupt only after the end of Ramadan, as the *Survey* fieldwork began.

The 2016 *Survey* shows an increase in Afghans reporting fear for their personal safety (69.8%), as well as an increase in the number citing insecurity as a reason for pessimism about the future of the country. The findings also point to geographic and social factors, with urban residents (73.5%) being more afraid for their personal safety than the rural population (68.6%).

Once the opposition forces launched their offensive, the geographic focus of armed clashes remained similar to 2015. The first province under serious pressure was Uruzgan, where the Taliban had already made significant advances in 2015, capturing several districts. In September 2016, the provincial capital was attacked, and the local government escaped after ANSF reinforcements arrived from Kandahar. Armed opposition forces temporarily captured Kunduz in 2015, and have increased their activities in the province over the past 12 months. In October, shortly after survey fieldwork was completed, the Taliban penetrated the outer areas of Kunduz City, approximately one year since their first capture of the city. Helmand, Nangarhar, and the provinces in the North West also saw spikes in insecurity. By July, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) determined that Afghanistan had lost control over an additional 5% of its districts.⁴

This year's survey data underscores the insecure state of Helmand, Nangarhar, and Uruzgan provinces in particular, while also indicating some relief from insecurity in the South East region that invites further study.

Despite several renewed attempts by the NUG, the peace process with the Taliban produced no discernable progress, and little incentive exists for the Taliban leadership to compromise on their military gains. One significant development is the successful completion of the peace negotiations with Hezb-e-Islami, a political group affiliated with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. However, it remains unclear how integration of this faction will impact security trends and the internal coherence of the national government.⁵ Despite these mixed results, 62.9% of the Afghan population remains confident that reconciliation efforts can help stabilize the country, comparable to the levels of confidence measured for 2015 (62.6%).

The emergence of Daesh, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL), remains a point of concern in Afghanistan. Although battled by both the ANSF and the Taliban, ISIS/Daesh continues to maintain a presence in the eastern provinces and is rumored to have expanded to other areas. Early concern that the Taliban's internal conflict over leadership succession might be exploited by ISIS/Daesh has not been borne out, except in isolated cases.⁶ This year, concerns over ISIS/Daesh decreased slightly, from 54.2% in 2015 to 47.9%. The activities of ISIS/Daesh, however, remain a destabilizing factor that adds to the complexity of the Afghan conflict.

This chapter explores in detail how these developments are reflected in Afghans' perceptions of safety and security in their country, their confidence in the ANSE, issues of violence and crime, and the government's peace and reconciliation efforts.

2.1 FEAR FOR SAFETY

Key Questions

Q-19. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

Q-29. *Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election; (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration; (c) Running for public office; (d) Encountering ANP; (e) Encountering ANA; (f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country; (g) Encountering international forces (Western military only); (h) Encountering the Taliban; (i) Encountering ISIS/Daesh.*

Q-17. *Have you heard of the group called ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh?*

Q-18. *(If Q-17 answer is yes) In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district?*

Overall, 69.8% of Afghans report feeling fear for their personal safety always, often, or sometimes (Fig. 2.1). The proportion expressing the strongest sentiments (always and often feeling fear), increased by 8.2 points, from 30.9% to 39.1%, between 2013 and 2016.⁷

FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY




FIG. 2.1: Q-19. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety? (Percent who say always, often, or sometimes.)*

As was the case in 2015, fear for personal safety is still most prominent in the South West region (82.0%). Within this region, Helmand stands out, with 55.4% of respondents saying they are always afraid for their personal safety, 22.6% often afraid, and 14.3% sometimes afraid. Afghans in the East region (80.1%) also report high levels of fear for personal safety; however, the largest change in perceived insecurity appears in the North East, which rose from 57.1% to 63.2%, and the North West, which rose from 58.1% to 66.5%. The only region that registered a drop in perceived insecurity was the South East, where fear for personal safety declined 14 percentage points, from 81.0% in 2015 to 67.0% in 2016.

The rise in fear for personal safety can be seen across time in most provinces over the past decade, 2007–2016, as well as comparing 2016 to last year (Fig. 2.2). Only small pockets are reportedly less affected by the current cycle of violence in the country, such as the mountainous and remote Badakhshan (33.6%), the desert communities of Jawzjan (43.7%), the Hazara homeland of Bamyan (13.7%) and Daikundi (43.2%), and notably, the Tajik-dominated Panjshir province (0.0%).⁸

FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 2.2: Q-19. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety? (Percent who say always, often, or sometimes.)*

In intercept interviews with Afghans from insecure districts,⁹ the majority of provinces reported even higher levels of fear. In Sar-e-Pul, Faryab, Ghor, and Kunar, for instance, fear levels climbed to over 90%, and intercept interviews overall recorded considerably higher levels of fear for personal safety (80.3%). Moreover, the intercept interviews offer a potential clue to the positive trend—a decline in levels of fear—measured in the South East, primarily in Paktia and Paktika. Intercept interviews from Paktia showed an increase of 29.5 points in reported levels of fear compared to the main sample, suggesting that the decline in fear in Paktia is likely the result of sampling limitations.¹⁰

With most parts of the country affected by insecurity, ethnic differences in the levels of reported fear decreased. Compared to 2015, fear for personal safety remained stable among Pashtuns (77.3% in 2015, 75.8% in 2016) and Uzbeks (65.3% in 2015, 64.4% in 2016), while Tajiks and Hazaras, previously reporting lower levels of insecurity, reported an increase this year of 7.3 and 8.0 points, respectively, to 67.1% for Tajiks and 66.3% for Hazaras.

In 2016, more Afghans living in urban areas (73.5%) fear for their personal safety than those living in rural areas (68.6%). For instance, residents of Jalalabad (86.7%) fear for their safety more than respondents in the districts outside that provincial capital (81.7%), including those who have witnessed heavy fighting. The trend towards considering urban areas dangerous is a recent development in the *Survey*, as data in 2015 still showed the urban population trailing rural residents by 9.2 points in fear for their personal safety.

In addition to general concerns for personal safety, the *Survey* asked about fear of selected activities and groups (Fig. 2.3). With the deterioration of security, fear of cross-province travel has reached an all-time high, with 81.5% of Afghans reporting some or a lot of fear when travelling to other parts of Afghanistan. This is an increase of 5.1 points over 2014, and 20.5 points since 2008. These findings correspond with the evolution in military tactics of armed opposition groups (AOGs), which increasingly focus on cutting off major traffic routes connecting population centers in the country.¹¹

Activities related to civic participation are also affected by the growing sense of insecurity. While fear of voting in elections showed a minor decline, from 55.6% in 2015 to 53.7% in 2016 (a year in which no major elections took place), the percentage of Afghans who consider it dangerous to run for public office has increased slightly, by 1.9 points, to 74.8%. Afghans' fear of participating in peaceful demonstrations also increased slightly this year, from 69.1% to 71.6%. A high-profile attack on a demonstration in Kabul in July 2016, which killed 80 and triggered a temporary government ban on public gatherings, likely contributed to this fear.¹²

Afghans still consider an encounter with the ANSF to have comparatively little risk, with 44.7% reporting some or a lot of fear when encountering the ANP, roughly the same as in the previous two years. Fear of encountering the ANA was reported by 42.1% in 2016, after reaching a peak of 48.4% in 2013 and then dropping to 41.1% the next year. There are significant regional and provincial differences, however. In the South West, particularly Helmand, where the local population has been caught up in fighting between the ANSF and opposition forces, both the ANP (82.9%) and the ANA (80.9%) are met with high levels of fear.

In contrast, opposition forces uniformly trigger fear amongst Afghans, with 93.0% reporting fear of encountering the Taliban and 94.6% reporting fear of encountering ISIS/Daesh. These findings remain consistent when viewed on a regional level, but some individual provinces show contrasting trends. In Paktika, which in previous years reported lower levels of fear of encountering the Taliban, respondents answering “no fear” increased another 8.4 points in 2016, to 18.9%. Overall, residents of Zabul report the least fear of the Taliban (“no fear,” 56.8%). For ISIS, no such clear outliers could be identified, with the possible exception of Wardak and Laghman, where 42.7% and 46.4% respectively say they have little or no fear of encountering ISIS/Daesh.

LEVEL OF FEAR, BY ACTIVITY

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HAZARAJAT	NORTH WEST	NATIONAL AVERAGE
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
VOTING IN A NATIONAL/ PROVINCIAL ELECTION	48	61	65	78	57	38	30	51	54
PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	71	71	78	76	75	67	45	74	72
RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	70	75	79	82	79	72	57	77	75
ENCOUNTERING ANP	34	43	51	67	53	37	36	47	45
ENCOUNTERING ANA	28	42	46	64	57	36	37	41	42
TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	83	81	77	82	84	78	73	84	82
ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN FORCES ONLY)	76	83	84	88	81	74	60	79	79
ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN	93	94	94	89	92	95	92	93	93
ENCOUNTERING ISIS/DAESH	94	93	97	94	94	94	92	97	95

FIG. 2.3: Q-29. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election; (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration; (c) Running for public office; (d) Encountering ANP; (e) Encountering ANA; (f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country; (g) Encountering international forces (Western military only); (h) Encountering the Taliban; (i) Encountering ISIS/Daesh. (Percent who say some or a lot of fear.)

ISIS/Daesh remains a subject of interest for Afghans. General awareness of ISIS/Daesh has increased, from 74.3% in 2015 to 81.3% this year reporting familiarity with the group. The largest increase took place in regions that in 2015 reported low levels of awareness, resulting in a more even regional distribution in 2016 (Fig. 2.4). The Central/Kabul region (87.7%) remains the region with the highest overall level of awareness.

AWARENESS OF ISIS/DAESH, BY REGION




FIG. 2.4: Q-17. *Have you heard of the group called ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh? (Percent who say yes.)*

District-level perceptions of ISIS/Daesh as a security threat match the common assessment that the group is still largely confined to the East region as it attempts to expand into other parts of the country. Overall, perceptions of ISIS/Daesh as a security threat decreased from 54.2% in 2015 to 47.9% in 2016. Only in the East was there a notable increase (10.4 points), where 75.7% of respondents who were aware of ISIS/Daesh considered the group a security threat to their district (Fig. 2.5). Patterns vary considerably by province. While Helmand respondents most frequently reported ISIS/Daesh as a security threat to their district (93.8%), Afghans in other provinces of the South West region were less concerned (51.7%). Ghor, reporting an 18.6-point increase to 58.8% in 2016, represents a hotspot in a region where ISIS/Daesh is otherwise infrequently considered a security threat. Wardak (42.7%) and Laghman (73.7%) do not stand out within their respective regions, yet they are noteworthy in having a relatively high number of respondents who consider ISIS/Daesh a security threat in their district, but who report less fear of encountering ISIS/Daesh than respondents in other provinces. One possible explanation is that these two provinces have high numbers of residents affiliated with the Taliban, who are in most cases opposed to ISIS/Daesh. Here, reporting low levels of fear may be an expression of pride.

PERCEPTION OF ISIS/DAESH AS A THREAT, BY REGION




FIG. 2.5: Q-18. (If Q-17 answer is yes) In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district? (Percent who say yes, it poses a threat.)

2.2 CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Key Questions

Q-19. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?

Q-20. Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year?

Q-21. (If Q-20 answer is yes) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

Q-22. (If Q-20 answer is yes) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not?

Q-23. (If Q-22 answer is yes) Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?

Q-24. If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that government law-enforcement agencies and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?

Between 2015 and 2016, actual levels of violence and crime experienced by Afghans increased less than general perceptions of insecurity. In 2016, the percentage of Afghans with a family member who was a victim of crime or violence increased by 1.2 points, to 19.4%. Exposure to crime and violence in insecure areas is higher (26.3%).

As expected, rates of reported violence and crime vary widely across regions and years, with respondents in the South West most likely to report personal experience of violence or crime (26.1%) and those in Central/Hazarajat least likely (2.2%) (Fig. 2.6). Exposure to crime and violence does predict an increase in reported

fear for personal safety; however, this relationship is weak.¹³ Among those who have experienced crime, 78.2% report sometimes, often, or always fearing for their personal safety, compared to 67.8% of those who have not. However, this gap in fear between the two groups appears much narrower than last year's gap (10.4 vs.16.0 points). One possible explanation for this narrowing is that feelings of insecurity may be increasingly normative, particularly in highly insecure areas such as the South West region, and not simply responding to specific experiences of violence.

EXPERIENCE OF CRIME OR VIOLENCE, BY REGION




FIG. 2.6: Q-20. Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year? (Percent who say yes.)

Afghans who have experienced crime or violence list primarily crime-related incidents, such as physical assaults (35.8%), livestock theft (19.9%), and racketeering (17.4%). Murder (13.4%) and kidnappings (12.4%) also affect Afghans substantially. Of war-related incidents, suicide attacks (15.2%) are the most frequently reported.

The proportion of respondents who reported their experience of a crime or violence to another party remained stable from previous years, with 64.3% saying they approached an authority outside the family in 2016. The ANP remains the preferred authority, with 50.1% of those who experienced a crime or violence reporting the incident to the ANP in 2016. This is a 5.5-point increase from 2015. The ANA (19.5%) and district authorities (16.6%) also were approached frequently (Fig. 2.7). The findings also show the continued relevance of informal justice for Afghans, as 37.2% of crime victims reported the incident to village shuras/jirgas, and 18.2% turned to the *malek* or other tribal elders.

REPORTING CRIME TO INSTITUTIONS




FIG. 2.7: Q-23. Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?

2.3 PERCEPTIONS OF AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Key Questions

Q-11. There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar?

Q-12. Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference? (a) Afghan National Army; (b) Afghan National Police; (c) Afghan Local Police.

Q-13. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. (a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANA protects civilians.

Q-14. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. (a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes.

Q-15. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) Afghan National Army; (b) Afghan National Police; (c) Afghan Local Police.

Perceptions of the ANP as both a resource for reporting crime and a provider of security in the local area increased. Asked to choose the most relevant security provider from a list of five options, 53.4% opt for the

ANP, up from 47.5% in 2015 (Fig. 2.8).¹⁴ An increase is observed across most regions. Where it does not hold, in the East, North East, and North West, the ANP remains the dominant security actor, even if the Afghan Local Police (ALP) also plays a significant role there.

PERCEPTION OF WHO PROVIDES SECURITY IN THE LOCAL AREA




FIG. 2.8: Q-11. *There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar?*

The ANA and the ALP are perceived as principal providers of security at roughly the same levels as previous years—22.5% for the ANA and 21.2% for the ALP (Fig. 2.8). Both security forces receive higher rankings in rural areas (ANA 26.3%, ALP 24.9%), their primary areas of operation. Foreign armies (0.4%) and AOGs (1.2%) continue to be considered marginal actors in providing security. Only in Zabul (53.7%) and Nuristan (11.2%) do residents see the armed opposition as a relevant security provider (Fig. 2.9).

The profile of security actors differs in insecure districts. In intercept interviews, the ANP was named by far fewer respondents (25.9%) as a provider of security. While the ALP (21.2%) remained at levels similar to the main survey, the ANA (37.2%) received higher ratings. Two provinces have particularly strong ALP components in their local security apparatus: Faryab (58.9%), where the ALP was identified as the dominant security provider, and Kunar, where the ALP, with 41.3%, developed into a substitute for the ANP (9.1%).¹⁵

Armed opposition groups (14.5%) also gained considerably in relevance in these areas. Responses from Helmand (43.3%) and Zabul (61.1%) contributed heavily to the ranking of AOGs, although Nangarhar (26.7%) also reported a considerable increase in security provision by AOGs.

PERCEPTION OF WHO PROVIDES SECURITY
IN THE LOCAL AREA, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 2.9: Q-11. There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar?

Despite the nominal increase in relevance of the ANP as a security provider, perceptions of its capacity and performance reflect growing discontent amongst the population. After a 2015 decline in public perception that it is honest and fair, efficient in arresting criminals, and helping to improve security, the negative trend continues in 2016. The percentage of Afghans who strongly agree that the ANP is honest and fair has dropped 11.4 points since 2014; that it helps to improve security has dropped 7.6 points; and that it is efficient in arresting criminals has dropped 10.0 points (Fig. 2.10).




FIG. 2.10: Q-14. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. (a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. (Percent who strongly agree with each statement.)*

A similar trend can be observed for the ANA. The proportion of Afghans who strongly agree that the ANA is honest and fair fell 5.8 points in 2016 (Fig. 2.11). On the ability of the ANA to provide security, 49.5% strongly agree, 6.8 percentage points less than in 2015. Most notably, the percentage of Afghans strongly agreeing that the ANA protects civilians has dropped from 56.8% in 2015 to 48.7% in 2016.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY




FIG. 2.11: Q-13. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. (a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) The ANA protects civilians. (Percent who strongly agree with each statement.)

Overall confidence levels for the ANA and the ANP are highest in provinces that have been listed as comparatively safe, such as Panjshir, Bamyan, and Kabul (Fig. 2.12). The provinces where ratings are the lowest include high-risk areas (e.g., Helmand) and provinces where significant influence of AOGs has been measured (e.g., Zabol).

CONFIDENCE LEVELS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

HIGHEST CONFIDENCE		LOWEST CONFIDENCE	
ANA	ANP	ANA	ANP
PANJSHIR	PANJSHIR	ZABUL	ZABUL
KABUL	BAMYAN	HELMAND	HELMAND
BADAKHSHAN	BADAKHSHAN	GHOR	GHOR
KHOST	TAKHAR	WARDAK	WARDAK
PAKTIA	JAWZJAN	FARAH	HERAT

FIG. 2.12: Q-13a/c, Q-14a/c. Confidence is measured using a composite scale of three items, including whether the ANA or ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people, whether each helps improve security in Afghanistan, and whether each is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes.

Afghans who express positive views of the ANP and the ANA are still far more numerous than those who express criticism of them. The decline in approval rates since 2014 shows the effect of Afghanistan's security forces assuming control of security decision-making and being measured by their actual achievements. As such, the survey data may say more about the performance of the ANSF as a whole than of its component services.

However, it also implies that the ANSF, especially the ANA, is in the process of gradually losing its status as an unquestioned symbol of national identity.

To verify findings on ANSF approval rates and capture changes in public attitudes in a timely manner, the *Survey* introduced a new question about how Afghans perceive the trends in the job performance of the ANA, the ANP, and the ALP compared to the previous year. In 2016, all three institutions—the ANA, the ANP, and the ALP—were perceived as getting better by a higher percentage of respondents. A narrow majority (53.7%) sees the ANA getting better, while 20.0% say it’s getting worse. On the ALP, 39.6% say it is getting better, 32.6% see no change, and 26.4% say it is getting worse. For the ANP, 34.6% say it got better, while 30.7% say the ANP got worse. At a regional level, views on the trajectory of the ANA were most positive in the East and South East (Fig. 2.13). With the exception of the East, the ANP received uniformly moderate reviews of its improvement over the past year. The East and North East are the areas where the largest proportion of the local population believes the ALP has improved. Consistent with earlier findings, all three security forces receive comparable negative rankings from respondents in the South West, suggesting that none of the branches have managed to generate confidence in this contested area.

PERCEPTIONS OF IMPROVEMENT IN AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES, BY REGION

	ANA	ANP	ALP
	%	%	%
CENTRAL/KABUL	44	28	36
EAST	70	52	48
SOUTH EAST	68	40	31
SOUTH WEST	46	42	32
WEST	48	26	34
NORTH EAST	65	32	51
CENTRAL/HAZARAJAT	33	24	39
NORTH WEST	54	37	46

FIG. 2.13: Q-12. Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference? (a) Afghan National Army; (b) Afghan National Police; (c) Afghan Local Police. (Percent who say getting better.)

Consistent with the data on ANSF performance and performance trends, perceptions that the ANA and ANP need foreign support increased again in 2016. Perceptions that the ANA requires outside support are at 85.5%, 2.9 points higher than 2015 and 8.0 points higher than 2014. Perceptions that the ANP needs outside support are only slightly lower at 81.5%, 1.4 points higher than 2015. Perceptions that the ALP needs external support remained stable at 70.4%.

2.4 PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

Key Questions

Q-37. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?

Q-38. In your opinion, what is the main reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (Interviewer: open ended—write down first answer.)

Q-39a. Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups?

Q-39b. (If Q-39a answer is “a lot”) You said that you have a lot of sympathy. Why do you say that?

Q-39c. (If Q-39a answer is “a little”) You said that you have a little sympathy. Why do you say that?

Q-39d. (If Q-39a answer is “no sympathy”) You said that you don't have any sympathy. Why do you say that?

The confidence of the Afghan population that the peace process can help stabilize the country remained at comparable levels to 2015 (62.9%), yet the data shows growing regional disparities. In the South West region, where the Taliban traditionally have a strong power base, 81.3% of Afghans say that reconciliation efforts can help stabilize the country, the highest value recorded for this region since the *Survey* started collecting data on this question in 2010 (Fig. 2.14). In the East and South East, confidence also grew. Central/Kabul, the West, the North East, and Central/Hazarajat saw public confidence in the peace process decline. As a result, between the region with the highest levels of confidence (South East) and the region with the lowest (Central Hazarajat), the survey records a striking 41-point gap.

CONFIDENCE IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS, BY REGION

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
CENTRAL/KABUL	73	69	69	52	69	57	53
EAST	73	80	82	77	84	74	79
SOUTH EAST	76	75	72	67	73	71	74
SOUTH WEST	71	74	76	78	76	72	81
WEST	73	68	64	51	73	61	57
NORTH EAST	70	76	76	68	74	62	60
CENTRAL/HAZARAJAT	84	68	56	53	56	46	40
NORTH WEST	76	75	72	66	69	58	61
ALL REGIONS	73	73	72	63	73	63	63

FIG. 2.14: Q-37. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not? (Percent who say yes.)

At first glance, this regional disparity suggests ethnicity shapes opinions of reconciliation. Indeed, overall figures for the ethnic groups differ, as Pashtuns (73.6%) prove generally more inclined to express positive views, while Tajiks (56.1%) and Hazaras (54.0%) are below the national average. However, views of the

individual ethnicities differ considerably across the regions. Pashtuns in the Central/Kabul region (59.1%) or the West (58.1%), for instance, express less favorable views than Pashtuns from the East (80.3%) or South East (82.2%). Similar disparities exist among Hazaras from the West (47.7%), Central/Hazarajat (38.0%) and South East (69.1%) regions. Hence, perceptions on reconciliation reflect an overlap between regional and ethnic perspectives of the respondents.

While remaining cautiously optimistic about reconciliation efforts, Afghans seem to have grown wary of the armed opposition and its struggle against the government. Asked about their level of sympathy for the armed opposition groups, the number of Afghans who express a lot or a little sympathy shrank by 10.8 points in 2016 (Fig. 2.15).¹⁶ In 2009, when the question was fielded for the first time, one-third of Afghans reported having no sympathy for the opposition groups, and by 2016 this number has now risen to more than three-quarters (77.2%).¹⁷ Sympathy expressed by respondents in intercept interviews is only marginally greater, with 6.7% saying they have a lot of sympathy, and 13.9% saying they have a little sympathy.¹⁸

SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS




FIG. 2.15: Q-39a. Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups?

Geographically, respondents who express a lot or a little sympathy for the opposition groups are concentrated in provinces that have been opposition strongholds in previous years of the *Survey* as well, such as Zabul (58.2%) and Uruzgan (50.0%) in the South, and Kunar (37.8%) and Laghman (35.4%) in the East (Fig. 2.16). However, even in these areas of traditional support, Afghans have cooled towards AOGs in 2016. In Wardak, sympathy levels dropped from 81.1% in 2015 to 35.9% in 2016. In the same period, Kandahar saw a drop of sympathy levels from almost two-thirds (63.9%) in 2015 to 23.9% in 2016. The heavy clashes in Kunduz do not seem to have benefitted the public image of the opposition groups in the province, as after years of sympathy levels above 40%, the figure dropped to 17.1% in 2016.

SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 2.16: Q-39a. *Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups? (Percent who say a little or a lot of sympathy.)*

The erosion in public support for AOGs becomes further visible in perceptions of why they continue to fight (Fig. 2.17). In 2016, more Afghans perceive armed opposition groups as motivated by the pursuit of power (23.1 %) than was the case in 2015 (18.9%). The notion that armed groups are managed by outside interests, including Pakistan, has also become more popular, increasing from 9.2% in 2015 to 11.8% this year. The presence of foreign troops, which in the past had been the dominant justification for the armed struggle in the eyes of the population, decreased in importance—from 14.8% in 2015 to 11.4% in 2016. In fact, since the completion of the transition phase in 2014, the perception that armed groups are motivated by the pursuit of power has increased strongly, by 7.8 points, while the percentage of Afghans who accept the presence of foreign forces as justification for the armed struggle has declined steadily by a total of 5.0 points. Whether this decrease in sympathy for the armed struggle of the AOGs will have an impact on actual security trends and the political discourse in the country remains to be seen.

REASONS ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS ARE FIGHTING AGAINST GOVERNMENT




FIG. 2.17: Q-38. *In your opinion, what is the main reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (Open-ended question, first response recorded only.)*

End Notes

¹ U.S. force contribution to Operation Resolute Support was put at 6,939 for June 2016. Allocation of personnel to Operation Freedom's Sentinel is not publically available. The overall cap of 9,800 on U.S. forces in Afghanistan suggests that approximately 3,000 troops are assigned to Freedom's Sentinel. As pointed out by the Institute for the Study of War, however, it remains unclear how U.S. units are organized under the two separate commands of Operation Freedom's Sentinel and Operation Resolute Support. See: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* (SIGAR, July 30, 2016), 105, <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2016-07-30qr.pdf>; Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, *Operation Freedom Sentinel: Report to the United States Congress*, Quarterly Report, April 1, 2016–June 30, 2016, 9, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/LIG_OCO_OFS_June2016_Gold_508.pdf; Wesley Morgan, *Afghanistan Order of Battle: Coalition Combat and Advisory Forces in Afghanistan* (Institute for the Study of War–ISAW, July 1, 2015), http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AfghanistanOrbat_July2015.pdf.

² Josh Smith, “U.S. Air Strikes spike as Afghans struggle against Taliban, Islamic State,” *Reuters*, October 26, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-airstrikes-idUSKCN12Q0FH>.

³ For information on the transition in Taliban leadership, see Borhan Osman, *Taliban in Transition: How Mansoor's Death and Haibatullah's ascension may affect the war (and peace)* (Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 27, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/taliban-in-transition-how-mansurs-death-and-hibatullahs-ascension-may-affect-the-war-and-peace/>.

⁴ SIGAR, *Quarterly Report*, 86.

⁵ Borhan Osman, *Peace with Hekmatyar: What does it mean for battlefield and politics?* (Afghan Analysts Network, September 29, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/peace-with-hekmatyar-what-does-it-mean-for-battlefield-and-politics/>.

⁶ For an overview of the evolution of ISIS in Afghanistan, the response of the Taliban and the government to the newly emerging group, and ISIS's failed attempts to expand beyond the East region, see Borhan Osman, *The Islamic State in Khorasan: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar* (Afghan Analysts Network, July 27, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/>.

⁷ In 2013, this question was expanded from a four-point answer scale into a five-point scale by including “somewhat” as an additional answer option. The purpose of this adjustment was to increase variance for statistical power during regression analysis. However, it also had the unintended consequence of shifting percentages due to the tendency of respondents to choose the goldilocks response option (in this case, “somewhat”) between extremes when they do not have an opinion, in lieu of answering with “I don't know.”

⁸ Notably, residents of Panjshir and Sar-e-Pul provinces tend to travel across the country the least, relative to residents of other provinces. Perhaps as a result, Panjshiris report little fear while in Panjshir, but high levels of anxiety when traveling.

⁹ Intercept interviews are interviews with respondents traveling to or from an insecure or inaccessible district. Respondents are “intercepted” at bus stops, in hospitals, and in other places of transit. These are not a random sample, and are therefore excluded from the main statistics. Instead, they are used as a point of comparison to determine the direction of bias between respondents in the main sample, who are accessible for door-to-door survey fieldwork, and respondents living in inaccessible areas.

¹⁰ In Paktika, geographic outreach of the *Survey* was already limited at the province level, as eight of the eleven districts covered by the *Survey* in 2015 could not be revisited, leaving a mere four districts to inform perception trends for 2016. This is a reminder of how methodological constraints can distort perception trends measured by the *Survey*. It also highlights the limitations of the *Survey* in findings on security and all factors related to it.

¹¹ Over the course of 2016, armed opposition achieved the temporary closure of various highways in the country. The road between Lashkar Gah and Kandahar, for instance, was blocked for weeks. The highways connecting Kabul with Kandahar and Nangarhar also saw rising numbers of security incidents, blocking travel along these routes. In the North, the Kunduz-Takhar highway was the most prominent target, with multiple road blockages and kidnappings. But the road connection between Baghlan and Samangan, the road linking Jawzjan and Sar-e-Pul, and the part of the Ring Road crossing through Balkh, Jawzjan, and Faryab also became increasingly insecure. For a brief discussion of road security in 2016, see Lead Inspector General, *Operation Freedom Sentinel*, 25, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/LIG_OCO_OFS_June2016_Gold_508.pdf.

¹² Associated Press, “Afghanistan holds day of mourning after bomb kills at least 80,” *Guardian* (UK), July 24, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/24/afghanistan-holds-day-of-mourning-after-bomb-kills-at-least-80>.

¹³ Running correlation for the questions on fear for personal safety and experience of crime or violence by anyone in the family, using Spearman's rho, produces a weak positive correlation (2-tailed) of 0.142, which is significant at the .01 level.

¹⁴ In order to help respondents identify various armed security forces by their uniforms, survey interviewers showed respondents

a picture of each fighting force, including figures of a foreign soldier, an ANA officer, a member of the village-based self-defense force known as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), an ANP officer, and an anti-government fighter. Respondents were then asked to point to the figure most responsible for providing security in their area.

¹⁵ Although its sample size is too small to be statistically significant this year (n=60), Paktika also is of interest, as the ALP, with 42.2%, appears to be the dominant security force in a province that is one of the few displaying positive trends in the perception of personal safety.

¹⁶ This has significant implications. If the data is accurate, it implies that, especially in very insecure districts, tensions are high between the insurgency and the local population, presenting an opportunity for the government to exploit the gap.

¹⁷ District-level comparison of results raised some concerns about findings of sympathy for the opposition. Individual districts labeled in the SIGAR report as Taliban controlled produced low or no levels of sympathy, especially in Helmand province (e.g., Baghlan district—a lot/a little sympathy: 0%), suggesting evasive behavior in these districts. Nonetheless, the overall trend towards a decrease in sympathy is consistent across the vast majority of provinces, pointing to actual shifts in attitudes taking place in the areas covered by the *Survey*.

¹⁸ To interpret these findings, it should be kept in mind that intercept interviews took place in central locations, possibly discouraging favorable views of the opposition in a context where Afghans seek to adjust their positions to their social environment.



3. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

Roughly one-third of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is attributed to agriculture activity, with the illicit commercial production of poppy equivalent to between 7 and 12% of GDP.¹ Afghanistan's service sector has grown but the economy remains characterized by small-scale export of goods, endemic poverty, and high unemployment. With the infusion of billions of dollars in foreign aid after the fall of the Taliban, GDP growth picked up, reaching a high of 14% in 2012. While the sectoral composition has changed since 2001 and the service sector has expanded, the aid-dependent economy still relies chiefly on agriculture and remains vulnerable to climate shocks, such as droughts or extreme temperatures. Geological surveys have suggested that Afghanistan's mountains may hold several trillion dollars of untapped mineral reserves.² However, the exploration and exploitation of these reserves have faced setbacks due to insecurity and bureaucratic delays.

The Afghan currency has depreciated steeply against the U.S. dollar³ due to an unfavorable business environment, loss of foreign investments, and low export potential. The inflation rate in August 2016 was 7.3%, a substantial increase from last year's 1.2%.⁴ Higher inflation has in turn, reduced household purchasing power, particularly for imported goods. The Afghani depreciated 2.9% relative to the U.S. dollar between the time of fieldwork in 2015 and 2016, and the average monthly household income reported in the *Survey* declined from 11,229 Afghani (\$174 USD) to 10,949 Afghani in 2016 (\$165 USD).⁵

In cities, population growth has outpaced growth in jobs and industries, contributing to high rates of unemployment. Afghanistan's most profitable agricultural crop continues to be opium poppies, which are used to produce more than 90% of the world's annual consumption of heroin and illicit opiate products. By UN estimates, opium production increased 43% between 2015 and 2016. Within Western countries, this supply shock has contributed to lower prices for illicit opiates and higher rates of addiction.⁶

The Afghan economy suffered after the withdrawal of most international troops in 2014. Coupled with worsening security conditions and a drop in foreign investment, GDP growth slowed to 1.5% in 2015.⁷ The National Unity Government (NUG) responded by instituting reforms to reduce corruption, including customs reform initiatives through the Ministry of Finance (MoF), reopening the Kabul Bank corruption case, and reviewing Ministry of Defense (MoD) fuel contracts to reduce waste. To generate government revenue, the NUG established revenue collection targets in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in 2015 it imposed a 10% tax on all mobile phone calls, harnessing the revenue potential of a strong telecommunications sector. The World Bank (WB) currently projects that GDP growth will be 1.9% in 2016.⁸

While the WB projects that the economy will grow at a slower rate in coming years, the commitment of the international community, including donor pledges of USD 15.2 billion at the Brussels Conference for Afghanistan in October, has raised hope that the NUG will be able to stimulate economic growth. A central message of the Brussels Conference was the need to explore regional cooperation by taking advantage of Afghanistan's location as a potential regional transit hub. These opportunities include the transport of electricity from Central Asia to Pakistan and India as well as increased export in the agriculture and extractive mining sectors. In July of this year, Afghanistan became the 164th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁹

Afghanistan's regional connectivity has increased in recent years.¹⁰ In September 2016, the first rail cargo from China reached Afghanistan.¹¹ As part of China's One Belt, One Road initiative to improve Asian transport connectivity, two trains are scheduled to run each month on the route via the Alataw Pass, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The new rail route will provide a 15-day transit time compared with two to three months by sea and reduce the country's dependence on Gwadar port in Pakistan. The train will carry Chinese-made mechanical equipment, IT products and clothes into Afghanistan, and return with Afghan products such as marble, saffron, dried fruit and carpets. In addition, groundbreaking ceremonies were held for several large infrastructure projects of regional importance, including construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and the Central Asia South Asia Project (CASA-1000), a transmission line expected to carry electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Another major regional project under development is the Chabahar Port, the result of a trilateral agreement with Iran and India to construct a shipping and commercial trade route from Herat city through Iran to the Gulf of Oman.

This year, 36.6% of Afghans say their household financial situation has grown worse in the last year, while just 18.8% say their financial situation has improved. These figures reflect an overall worsening since 2015, when 21.0% said their financial situation had improved and 29.7% said it had grown worse.¹² This chapter describes Afghan perceptions of the economy, unemployment, and women's integration into the workforce, as well as self-reported estimates of household income and asset ownership.

3.1 OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMY

Key Questions

Q-4a/b. *In your view, what is going well in your local area?*

Q-5a/b. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area?*

Q-6a/b. *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24.*

Q-7a/b. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today?*

The *Survey* has consistently found that economic concerns are central to Afghan perceptions and national mood. For example, among the 65.9% of Afghans this year who say the country is moving in the wrong direction (see Chapter 1, National Mood), the second-most common reason for pessimism after insecurity is unemployment (27.5%). Other economic reasons for pessimism include a bad economy (10.4%), lack of reconstruction (4.8%), and high prices (2.9%). Afghans also cite the economy when things are perceived to be going well. Among the 29.3% of Afghans who are optimistic about the future of the country, more than half (53.3%) give economic reasons for optimism, including reconstruction and rebuilding (33.0%) and economic revival (9.7%). On a variety of other open-ended questions, economic reasons consistently show up (Fig. 3.1).

ECONOMIC CONCERNS, BY PROBLEM AREA

PROBLEM IN YOUR LOCAL AREA	UNEMPLOYMENT (30.5%), HIGH PRICES (6.9%), POOR ECONOMY (6.4%), POVERTY (6.1%)
PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH	UNEMPLOYMENT (71.2%), POOR ECONOMY (16.0%)
PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN	LACK OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES (22.8%), POVERTY (7.8%)
WHAT IS GOING WELL IN YOUR LOCAL AREA	AVAILABILITY OF JOBS (4.8%)

FIG. 3.1: Q-5a/b. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? Q-6a/b.* *In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. Q-7a/b.* *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? Q-4a/b.* *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (A and b responses combined for each question.)*

3.2 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

Key Question

Q-8. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household; (b) Employment opportunities; (c) Availability of products in the market; (g) electricity supply.*

Perceptions across multiple economic indicators show a growing sense that things have grown worse in the past year at levels not seen since 2008,¹³ (Fig. 3.2) When asked whether they have experienced changes in various aspects of their household welfare since last year, respondents most frequently indicate a worsening condition. Almost two-thirds (59.9%) say that employment opportunities for their household have worsened, while 31.6% say they remain unchanged, and just 8.1% say they have improved since last year. Respondents in the provinces of Panjshir (84.4%), Helmand (76.6%), and Kabul (74.3%) are more likely to report worsening employment opportunities, while respondents most likely to report improvement in employment opportunities are from Zabul (23.7%), Wardak (23.3%), and Uruzgan (23.0%). Overall, residents of urban areas (67.0%) are more likely to say that job prospects have worsened than residents of rural areas (57.6%).

When asked about their household financial situation, 36.6% say their financial situation has worsened this year, compared to 29.7% in 2015. Only 18.8% of Afghans in 2016 say their household financial situation has improved, compared to 21.0% in 2015. The most-affected areas include provinces where the security situation has continued to worsen, and provinces that used to house foreign military camps, notably near Bagram Air Base, where dramatic reductions in spending have impacted supply chains, including the local economy. More than half (62.0%) of Helmand residents say their household financial situation has worsened, followed by 59.9% in Kabul and 57.7% in Parwan. Residents of urban areas (48.1%) are more likely to say their financial situation has worsened than residents of rural areas (32.7%).

When asked about the availability of products in the market, 41.4% of respondents say that availability has grown worse, up from 38.4% in 2015, while 47.5% say it remains unchanged, and 10.4% say it has improved. This perceived decline may reflect a decrease in purchasing power on the demand side, or increased insecurity affecting the trade and supply chains on the supply side. Residents of Helmand (75.2%) and Kunduz (49.4%)

report the most significant declines in availability of products in the market compared to 2015 (31.5% and 34.5%, respectively). Both provinces have also experienced steep declines in security conditions, which may negatively impact product supply chains.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS: WORSE COMPARED TO ONE YEAR AGO



FIG. 3.2: Q-8a/c. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household; (b) Employment opportunities; (c) Availability of products in the market; (g) Electricity supply. (Percent who say each is worse compared to one year ago. No data available for years 2013–2014.)

3.3 EMPLOYMENT

Key Questions

D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money?

D-4. (If D-3 answer is yes) What type of activity is that?

The *Survey* does not ask questions that can be used to produce an official employment or unemployment rate.¹⁴ However, it does ask Afghans if they are involved in any activity that generates money, a question which can be used to understand variations in household welfare across demographic groups, such as by gender, education level, and so on.

In 2016, 45.0% of all respondents say that they are involved in some sort of activity or activities that generate money, which includes 80.6% of men and 9.4% of women. Afghans in urban areas are significantly less likely to report employment than rural Afghans (41.3% vs. 46.2%). In some ways, this gap runs against expectations, since the urban workforce is assumed to include more working women. However, only 9.5% of urban women

report actually earning an income, compared to 9.4% of rural women, a statistically insignificant difference. The gap appears driven by Afghan men: among rural men, 84.2% report earning an income, compared to just 70.3% of urban men (Fig. 3.3).

GENERATING INCOME, BY GENDER AND URBAN VS. RURAL




FIG. 3.3: D-3. *Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes, by gender and urban vs. rural.)*

Men in the North, West, South West, and Central/Hazarajat regions report generating an income at a higher rate than those in the East, South East, and Central/Kabul regions.¹⁵ Women in the South West report the lowest rate of income generation (4.7%) however, consistent with conservative gender norms and attitudes, while those in the Central/ Hazarajat region show the highest rate of income generation (13.5%). The regional differences for women are partly explained by cultural differences. On average, Hazara respondents are more likely to support women working outside the home than are residents of the conservative, Pashtun-majority South West region. The presence of high-yielding poppy crops and the absence of women working in provinces such as Helmand make for what seems like a contradiction—high average household income and low rates of employment. In other regions, this variation may be explained by income rather than ethnicity or culture. In Central/Hazarajat (Fig. 3.4), for example, average income is so low that households have less choice as to whether women should work or not. Nationwide, on average, poorer households are more likely to report women contributing to household income than richer households.

REGIONAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME, MEN AND WOMEN WORKING




FIG. 3.4: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.) **D-7.** For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? (Average income, by region.)

Afghan men are least likely to say they earn income in the Central/Kabul region (Fig. 3.5). The recent downsizing of the Bagram Air Base severely impacted many Afghan men employed in the value chains supplying the Central/Kabul region, particularly Kabul, Kapisa, and Panjshir provinces. Deteriorating security in Paktia and reports of ISIS/Daesh presence in Kunar may have further reduced investments and employment opportunities in those provinces. Meanwhile, provinces that have benefitted from illicit poppy production appear to have high rates of employment in agriculture and related value chains, particularly for rural men. In Helmand, 100% of men surveyed report earning income, as well as 96.6% of men in Uruzgan, the highest among all provinces.

Importantly, these high rates of income generation do not consistently associate with increased optimism. In Helmand province, for example, the number of respondents who say that the country is moving in the right direction fell by more than half, from 62.1% in 2015 to 25.5% in 2016, despite increases in poppy production. In Uruzgan, on the other hand, optimism increased from 24.8% in 2015 to 39.3% in 2016. While economic factors may affect perceptions, reasons for optimism appear to involve multiple, complex factors.

MEN EARNING INCOME, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 3.5: D-3. *Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent of men who say yes.)*

Women in the South and West regions are least likely to report earning income (Fig. 3.6). Insecurity in these areas may contribute to low rates of female employment, particularly for jobs that require travel outside the home. However, Afghan women living in Nuristan (36.5%) and Nimroz (30.3%) report higher levels of employment than women in other provinces. While the Taliban are active in both of these provinces, 26.6% of women who earn an income in Nimroz say they are teachers, 28.0% work in handicrafts or skilled trades, and another 17.8% say they work in farming. Some reports suggest a growing interest in government and police work among women in Nimroz,¹⁶ while in Nuristan, 89.8% of women who earn income say they work in farming, which may include grain production or work on irrigated terraces. For both provinces, however, the small sample size of women respondents means a high margin of error ($\pm 10\%$).

WOMEN EARNING INCOME, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 3.6: D-3. *Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent of women who say yes.)*

Overall, earning income is positively correlated with the respondent's education level, and this correlation is even stronger for Afghan women than for men.¹⁷ Among Afghans who report having some level of formal schooling, 56.6% say they earn an income, compared to just 35.2% of Afghans who say they never attended formal school. Among Afghan women who report some level of formal education, 16.6% say they have a job, compared to just 6.1% of those reporting no formal education.

Among men who report earning income, most are farmers, either on their own land or as tenant farmers of someone else's land (31.4%), while others are involved in informal sales/business (12.9%), skilled trades (10.0%), domestic or unskilled trades (9.2%), and short-term farm labor on someone else's land (9.5%). Among women who report earning an income, most are either schoolteachers (28.8%) or skilled workers/artisans (24.5%), followed by self-employed professionals (11.6%), farmers on their own land or tenant farmers (11.0%), or farm laborers on someone else's land (6.6%) (Fig. 3.7).

OCCUPATION, BY GENDER

	MEN	WOMEN
	%	%
FARMER (OWN LAND/TENANT FARMER)	31	11
FARM LABORER (OTHER'S LAND)	9	7
LABORER, DOMESTIC, OR UNSKILLED WORKER	9	5
INFORMAL SALES/BUSINESS	13	3
SKILLED WORKER/ARTISAN	10	25
GOVERNMENT OFFICE—CLERICAL WORKER	4	5
PRIVATE OFFICE—CLERICAL WORKER	2	3
GOVERNMENT OFFICE—EXECUTIVE/MANAGER	1	< 0.5
PRIVATE OFFICE—EXECUTIVE/MANAGER	< 0.5	< 0.5
SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL	6	12
SMALL-BUSINESS OWNER	8	2
SCHOOL TEACHER	4	29
UNIVERSITY TEACHER	< 0.5	< 0.5
MILITARY/POLICE	2	< 0.5
TOTAL	100	100

FIG. 3.7: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? **D-4.** (If D-3 answer is yes) What type of activity is that? (Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.)

3.4 WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY

Key Questions

D-9. Do female members of the family contribute to this household's income, or not?

Q-59. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?

Beginning in 2009, respondents were asked if any female family members contribute to household income. After a gradual upward trend since 2009, this year marked a decline, with only 19.1% of Afghans saying that a woman contributes to their household's income, down from 22.6% in 2015. This decline may be related to the weaker economy, as well as to heightened fear for personal safety and deteriorating security conditions in many areas. It may also be related to seasonal crop harvests. Fieldwork in 2016 was delayed by Ramadan, and was conducted between August and September, whereas in previous years fieldwork was conducted between June and July, during the wheat harvest.

The percentage of Afghans who say female family members contribute to household income varies across provinces, from highs of 74.1% in Nuristan and 51.8% in Bamyan, to lows of 1.5% in Helmand and 6.5% in Zabul. Regionally, Afghans residing in the Central/Hazarajat region report the highest figure for female family members contributing to household income (45.8%), while respondents in the South West region report the lowest (10.9%) (Fig. 3.8).¹⁸ Differences between ethnic groups are significant. Hazaras (31.9%) are most likely to report women contributing to household income, followed by Uzbeks (25.1%), Tajiks (17.3%), and finally

Pashtuns (13.7%). Some of this variation may again be explained by poverty and the need for multiple earners per household: Hazara-dominant provinces are some of the poorest, while Pashtun-dominant provinces in the South West are the richest.

HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WOMEN CONTRIBUTE TO INCOME

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
CENTRAL/KABUL	7	11	10	12	15	17	19	15
EAST	11	15	13	9	20	21	19	14
SOUTH EAST	13	21	33	23	24	24	24	25
SOUTH WEST	10	10	8	15	12	16	16	11
WEST	19	21	20	16	20	37	29	24
NORTH EAST	9	16	17	10	11	16	17	12
CENTRAL/HAZARAJAT	25	13	37	24	18	29	49	46
NORTH WEST	26	19	20	22	27	28	29	28

FIG. 3.8: D-9. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not? (Percent who say yes.)

In 2016, more respondents than ever before in the *Survey* agree that women should be allowed to work outside home (74.0%). This figure includes 82.5% of Afghan women and 65.5% of Afghan men, and is higher among urban Afghans (84.1%) than among rural Afghans (70.6%). By province, Bamyan (94.5%) and Jawzjan (89.0%) stand out with the highest rates, while residents of Zabul (23.5%) and Wardak (50.0%) are least likely to support women working outside the home (Fig. 3.9). In a pattern consistent with previous years, Hazaras (84.6%) are more likely than Uzbeks (82.6%), Tajiks (75.6%), and Pashtuns (66.2%) to agree with women working outside the home. This year, the *Survey* asked a follow-up question for those who disagree with women working outside the home. The most common reason given is that it is against Islamic law (24.2%), while others cite uncertain conditions (16.7%), bad security (12.0%), and refusal of permission by the family (10.9%), or argue that women are not needed outside the home (10.7%).

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 3.9: Q-59. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this? (Percent who agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home.)

3.5 HOUSEHOLD ASSETS

Key Questions

D-5. How many of the following does your household have? (a) Bicycle; (b) Motorcycle; (c) Car; (d) TV; (e) Refrigerator; (f) Washing machine; (g) Sewing machine; (h) Jeribs of land; (i) Livestock (not poultry).

D-25c. How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?

For the past three years, the *Survey* has asked respondents to list various household assets they may own, including tools, appliances, land, and livestock (Fig. 3.10). While they do not provide a complete picture, household assets can be a supplementary measure of household well-being and prosperity. Asset ownership varies widely by type of settlement (urban or rural). Urban Afghans are more likely than rural Afghans to report having household appliances that require electricity, such as a television (83.2%), a refrigerator (61.4%), or a washing machine (61.4%). Rural Afghans, on the other hand, are more likely to have a bicycle (51.3%), a motorcycle (51.8%), and a sewing machine (70.9%).

HOUSEHOLD ASSET INVENTORY

ITEM	RURAL	URBAN	OVERALL
	%	%	%
BICYCLE	51	45	50
MOTORCYCLE	52	28	46
CAR	21	27	22
TELEVISION	54	83	61
REFRIGERATOR	13	61	25
WASHING MACHINE	17	61	28
SEWING MACHINE	71	67	70

FIG. 3.10: D-5. How many of the following does your household have? (a) Bicycle; (b) Motorcycle; (c) Car; (d) TV; (e) Refrigerator; (f) Washing machine; (g) Sewing machine. (Percent who say they own at least one of each.)

Mobile phone ownership has continued to expand. In 2016, 88.8% of Afghans say that at least one of their family members has a mobile phone (see Fig. 7.2 in Chapter 7, Access to Information). Among urban Afghans, this figure increases to 95.9%, compared to 86.4% of rural Afghans.

More than half Afghans (59.3%) in this year's sample report household ownership of land. The majority of these landowners own relatively small plots of land, from 1 to 10 jeribs (Fig. 3.11). One jerib in Afghanistan is equivalent to 0.49 acres, or 2,000 square meters. Another 40.2% of Afghan households report owning no land, including 80.0% of urban respondents and 27.0% of rural respondents. In 2015, slightly fewer respondents (37.4%) reported owning no land.

HOUSEHOLD LAND OWNERSHIP

JERIBS OF LAND	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
	%	%	%
0	27	80	40
1-10	64	18	53
11-20	6	1	5
21 OR MORE	3	1	2
TOTAL	100	100	100

FIG. 3.11: D-5. How many of the following does your household have? (h) Jeribs of land.

Household livestock holdings, which require land, are more common among rural respondents (74.0%) than urban respondents (13.2%). This rural/urban gap is evident in regional and provincial breakdowns as well (Fig. 3.12). The highest rates of livestock ownership are reported in the South East (90.2%), followed by the Central/Hazarajat (81.0%) and East (74.6%) regions. The lowest rate is reported in the Central/Kabul region (28.0%).

HOUSEHOLDS OWNING LIVESTOCK, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 3.12: D-5. How many of the following does your household have? (i) Livestock (not poultry). (Percent who report owning any number of livestock.)

3.6 HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Key Question

D-7. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?¹⁹

Income can be a useful indicator of purchasing power as well as standard of living. The *Survey* does not publish official income statistics. Instead, self-report measures are used here to highlight demographic trends and understand how income is related to various attitudes and perceptions. This year, respondents report an overall average monthly household income of AFN 10,949 (USD 165),²⁰ with urban areas reporting higher incomes (AFN 14,284/USD 215) than rural areas (AFN 9,845/USD 148).²¹

Regionally, Afghans in the South West report the highest average monthly household income (USD 226), followed by the Central/Kabul region (USD 205), the South East region (USD 187), and the East region (USD 171). Residents of the Central/Hazarajat region report the lowest average monthly household income (USD 62) (Fig. 3.13).

AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY REGION



FIG. 3.13: D-7. *For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? (Average reported monthly income of respondents in each region, in USD.)*

Education also appears to associate with standard of living. Afghans who report higher levels of education tend to report higher monthly household income than those reporting no formal schooling (Fig. 3.14). The biggest differences are seen among those reporting a university education, particularly those living in urban areas.

AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME, BY EDUCATION LEVEL




FIG. 3.14: D-10b. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa? **D-7.** For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? (Average reported monthly income of respondents in each region, in USD.)

3.7 WEALTH AND HAPPINESS

Key Questions

D-7. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

D-24. In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?

The relationship between income and happiness is the subject of widespread interest and debate, both in Afghanistan²² and in other countries.²³ Since 2014, when the *Survey* first introduced the question about happiness, a simple association between the two has been apparent (Fig. 3.15). However, this relationship may be curvilinear. The association is strongest at lower levels of monthly household income, but becomes both weak and insignificant above USD 650 per month.

Results of multivariate regression suggest that other factors may play a more significant role in happiness than income. Specifically, a higher household standard of living, a higher level of education, a lower fear for personal safety, and a higher degree of confidence in one's ability to influence local (district or provincial) government decisions all appear to explain increases in happiness.²⁴ Notably, the positive relationship with perceived ability to influence local government decisions is consistent with other research on political participation finding that individual participation in politics is robustly associated with increased happiness.²⁵

INCOME AND HAPPINESS




FIG. 3.15: D-7. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? D-24. In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy? (Average income of respondents for each level of happiness.)

End Notes

- ¹ The UNODC estimates that the potential net value of opiates in 2015 was \$1.49 billion USD, or 7.1% of the 2015 GDP, and over 12% in 2014. This figure is expected to have increased considerably in 2016. The 2016 UNODC report estimates a 43% increase in potential production of opium, from 3,300 tons in 2015 to 4,800 tons in 2016, while poppy eradication decreased 91% from 3,750 hectares to only 355 hectares. With a weakened economy, the contribution of poppy to the overall GDP is expected to have increased for 2016.
- ² James Risen, “U.S. identifies vast mineral riches in Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, June 13, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html>.
- ³ “Afghan Afghani,” historical USD/AFN exchange rates, Trading Economics website, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/currency>.
- ⁴ “Afghanistan Inflation Rate,” Trading Economics website, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/inflation-cpi>.
- ⁵ Estimates are based on self-report measures within the survey and do not constitute an official household income calculation. USD estimates assume an average July 2015 exchange rate of 64.6 Afghanis to 1 USD and an average September 2016 exchange rate of 66.54 Afghanis to 1 USD.
- ⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016* (Kabul: UNODC and MCN, 2016), <https://www.unodc.org/documents/press/releases/AfghanistanOpiumSurvey2016.pdf>.
- ⁷ World Bank, “Overview: Afghanistan,” World Bank website, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview>.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ World Trade Organization (WTO), “DG Azevedo welcomes Afghanistan as 164th WTO member,” WTO website, July 29, 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/acc_afg_29jul16_e.htm.
- ¹⁰ Koushik Das, “Air Corridor to Boost India-Afghanistan Trade Ties,” *InSerbia News*, September 26, 2016, <https://ins Serbia.info/today/2016/09/air-corridor-to-boost-india-afghanistan-trade-ties/>.
- ¹¹ “Chinese freight train reaches Hairatan,” *Railway Gazette*, September 7, 2016, <http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/freight/single-view/view/chinese-freight-train-reaches-hairatan.html>.
- ¹² Almost two-thirds (59.9%) of respondents say their employment opportunities have worsened, meaning lower income and decline in family welfare. Regionally, the South West has overtaken Central/Kabul, reporting both the highest average monthly income (\$226) and the highest number of respondents reporting no income (67.4%) of all regions. These findings may appear contradictory, but are not. Fewer women in the South West report earning income than in other provinces, due largely to cultural reasons, while the average household income is driven up largely by poppy farmers who have high-value yields. The UNODC/Ministry of Counter Narcotics 2016 report on opium production estimates a 43% increase in this year’s total production due to an increase in the number of farms and higher yield per hectare. See: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016*; “Afghanistan opium production up by 43%—UN drugs watchdog,” *BBC News*, October 23, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37743433>.
- ¹³ Beginning in 2008, Afghan GDP growth fell, while the Afghan currency, the afghani, pegged to the U.S. dollar, depreciated in value during the global financial crisis. Most aid to Afghanistan is pledged in terms of U.S. dollars. The United States “surge” in foreign troops started shortly thereafter, in 2009, and GDP peaked in 2012 as the surge reached its apex.
- ¹⁴ Employment rates are typically calculated as the proportion of working-age respondents who are employed, and employed persons are defined as age 16 or older (the *Survey* excludes respondents under age 18), who work for an employer or are self-employed, are not volunteers, and are not engaged in self-service such as homemaking. Unemployment rates include persons age 16+ who are not engaged in any employment, who are available for work, and who are actively seeking work.
- ¹⁵ Overall, Afghans living in the South West region (67.4%) are most likely to report not engaging in any activity that generates money, but this average incorporates provinces with the highest rates of male employment found in the country and the lowest rates of female employment. While no men in our sample from Helmand, and 87.5% of men from Zabul, say they are doing something that generates money, no women from Zabul, and only 0.6% from Helmand, say they are doing something that generates money. The South West’s conservative culture and dependence on opium poppy production together may contribute to this region having the highest average monthly income (\$226), \$32 higher than in 2015, and the highest level of income inequality of all regions, along with the lowest percentage of the population engaging in activities that generate money. Agriculture jobs in opium poppy production are both seasonal and high-paying.
- ¹⁶ Ramin, “Nimroz women enthusiastic to join police force,” *Pajwok Afghan News*, June 23, 2016, <http://www.pajhwok.com/>

en/2016/06/23/nimroz-women-enthusiastic-join-police-force.

¹⁷ Afghans' employment status is positively correlated (0.2241) with their education level. For Afghan women, the correlation (0.2645) is even stronger.

¹⁸ Another difference here is household vs. individual income-generating activity. In Pashtun families, particularly in homes in the South West and East regions, the average number of persons per household is significantly higher than in Tajik and Hazara areas. Asking whether women contribute to household income depends on how many people are in that household, whereas asking whether the individual respondent generates income is concerned only with that respondent. We still expect these figures to be similar, using assumptions of random sampling. However, it is expected that the percentages will be slightly different based on whether the household size is larger (i.e., more women and therefore more chance that women contribute to household income, relative to asking about individual income generation) or smaller.

¹⁹ Income is a continuous variable created from D-7 and D-8. Each income category in D-8 is replaced by mean values that corresponds with income ranges from D-7.

²⁰ The exchange rate used here is based on the September 2016 day-average buy rate of AFN 66.54 to USD 1.00.

²¹ Survey figures are based on self-reported monthly income at the time of survey fieldwork (August–September) for respondents age 18 and older.

²² Carol Graham and Soumya Chattopadhyay, *Well-Being and Public Attitudes in Afghanistan: Some Insights from the Economics of Happiness*, Working Paper Number 2 (Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_afghanistan_happiness_graham.pdf.

²³ Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human Well-Being* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

²⁴ An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model was used to regress the self-reported level of happiness (D-24) on a variety of factors including gender (D-1), age (D-2), income (a composite of D-7 and D-8), education (D-10b), direction of the country (Q-1), standard of living (scale: Q-8a–h), urban/rural settlement (M-6b), perception of influence over district/provincial government decisions, being a member of Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, or Hazara ethnic groups (D-14a), using TV as a source of news and information (Q-77b), and perception of ISIS as a threat (Q-18). The full model explains 11.9% of the variance in self-reported happiness.

²⁵ Chris Barker and Brian Martin, "Participation: The Happiness Connection," *Journal of Public Deliberation* 7 no. 1 (2011): Article 9, <http://www.publicdeliberation.net/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=jpd>.



4. DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan experienced a surge in development projects targeting health, infrastructure, education, and economic growth. To date, the international community has invested approximately \$130 billion in this nationwide reconstruction plan.¹ Notable results of these development projects have been increased electrification and connectivity by roads and bridges, an increase in life expectancy at birth from 45.3 years in 2000 to 60.4 years in 2016, and an increase in expected schooling at birth from 2.5 to 9.3 years. Girls, barred from education under the Taliban, now account for 39% of public school students in Afghanistan.²

Afghanistan still ranks low among nations in most development indicators, however. The latest ranking by the United Nations Human Development Index, which measures health, education, and income, ranks Afghanistan 171st out of 187 countries, a decline from its standing of 169th in 2015. It remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a poverty rate of 36%.³

Progress has been slow and geographically uneven, with areas in the North East, East, and Central/Hazarajat regions of the country disadvantaged by remoteness, climate, lower levels of aid, and fragility. Afghanistan still relies heavily on donor support for survival, and 80% of its budget is financed by international aid.⁴ In many areas, development has stagnated due to a resurgence of violence, the fiscal crisis, and poor oversight.

A light economic recovery is expected for 2017. Government revenue has improved significantly, which may reduce the need for emergency budgetary assistance, but the country will continue to require significant outside aid to sustain government services, including technical support to build local capacity, salaries for the police and army, and infrastructure projects.⁵

Each year, the *Survey* asks Afghans about awareness of development projects, as well as household indicators of development and well-being. Significantly more Afghans this year than last year report that their household situation has worsened in terms of employment opportunities (59.9%), electricity supply (43.4%), and the availability of products in markets (41.4%). Meanwhile, awareness of development projects in one's local area has not significantly increased since 2015. Notably, awareness of development projects in one's local area (excluding awareness of government-supplied electricity in the city of Kabul) robustly predicts increased confidence in the National Unity Government (NUG), as well as increased national optimism about the future of the country, compared to a lack of awareness. In other words, the awareness of service delivery appears to have a strong positive effect on public perceptions.

This chapter reviews several perception measures related to service delivery, including access to electricity and healthcare, disability, education, and awareness of different types of local development projects.

4.1 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

Key Questions

Q-8. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (g) Electricity supply.*

X-352c. *Does your family have access to electricity always, often, seldom, or never in your area?⁶*

X-353c. *Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. ...Electricity.⁷*

When the *Survey* asks respondents to evaluate their household electricity supply compared to 12 months ago, 43.4% say their household electricity has worsened, slightly more than last year (40.3%), while only 13.9% say it has improved (down from 15.0% in 2015). Since the national electric grid continues to expand, this perception of worsening electricity may reflect the overall stagnation in the economy. A drop in average household income (see Chapter 3, Economic Growth and Employment), affects purchasing power, particularly for fuel for private generators. However, Afghans in urban areas are significantly more likely to report improvement in access to electricity (22.4%) than are Afghans in rural areas (11.1%). Regional differences also appear important. Those in the North West region are most likely to say that electricity supply improved (25.4%) (Fig. 4.1), while those in the South East region are most likely to say it worsened (4.2%).

**PERCEPTION OF IMPROVED ELECTRICITY SUPPLY,
COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, BY PROVINCE**




FIG. 4.1: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (g) Electricity supply. (Percent who say better.)

As of June 2015, the World Bank estimated that 38% of the population was connected to the electric grid, including more than 75% of the population in urban areas like Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif, compared to less than 10% of the overall rural population.⁸ Growth in access has been significant for a large number of Afghans, and major efforts are underway to increase Afghanistan’s power production and distribution infrastructure. Two notable projects due for completion in coming years include the Afghanistan Power System Development Project and the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade, Community Support Project (CASA-1000). The Power System Development Project is expected to increase electricity for Parwan and Baghlan provinces, while CASA-1000 will distribute surplus hydroelectricity to approximately 700 communities over 23 districts in six provinces. Other projects include the development of three main distribution lines, financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the rehabilitation of the Naghlu Dam, completion of the Salma Dam in Herat province,⁹ and expansion of the Kajaki power plant in Helmand province.¹⁰

The Asian Development Bank estimates that less than 5% of Afghans were connected to the electric grid in 2001, compared to 25% in 2012.¹¹ Despite expansion of the national electric grid, the majority Afghans rely on alternate sources as either their primary or secondary method of power. The Central Statistics Organization

(CSO) reports that the number of Afghans having some form of access to electricity, including private generators, solar power, and micro-hydropower schemes, has increased from 68.9% in 2011–2012 to 89.0% in 2013–2014 (Fig. 4.2).¹²

SOURCES OF ELECTRICITY USED IN PAST MONTH




FIG. 4.2: Has your household had electricity at any time in the past month from any of these sources? (Percent who say they used each source of electricity, based on weighted Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey data, Q-4.11a/i and Q-4.12a/i in the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment.)

The *Survey* did not ask about satisfaction with services this year due to space constraints in the questionnaire.¹³ However, for context, it is important to consider that rates of satisfaction with electricity provision have increased steadily over time, from a low of 25.3% in 2008 to a high of 42.8% in 2013 (Fig. 4.3). Satisfaction rates are not perfectly correlated with actual electricity provision,¹⁴ such as that reported in the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS), but as access increases, satisfaction rates do rise.¹⁵

SATISFACTION WITH ELECTRICITY SUPPLY, OVER TIME




FIG. 4.3: X-353c. *Next I would like you to rate your satisfaction with the quality of goods and services in your area. For each item I list, please tell me if you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of the good or service. ...Electricity. (Percent who say somewhat or very satisfied.)*

The broad disparity between urban and rural electricity supply is worthy of note. In the most recent (2013–2014) ALCS, 88.8% of urban respondents said they have access to the government’s electricity grid, compared to just 11.7% of rural respondents.¹⁶ Comparing all sources of electricity in the same year (2014), the *Survey* found that half as many rural respondents (40.7%) as urban respondents (88.2%) report sometimes, often, or always having access to electricity (Fig. 4.4).¹⁷

ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (ANY TYPE), URBAN VS. RURAL RESPONDENTS IN 2014




FIG. 4.4: X-352c.¹⁸ Does your family have access to electricity always, often, seldom, or never in your area?

4.2 HEALTH

ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE AND NUTRITION

Key Question

Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (d) Quality of food in your diet; (e) Physical condition of your house/dwelling; (f) Health/well-being of your family members.

Access to health services has increased significantly in Afghanistan. Over 57% of the respondents in the CSO's 2007–2008 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment said they lived within a one-hour walk of a health facility, compared to an estimated 9% in 2002.¹⁹ In the 2014 *Survey*, which asks several questions about health access, respondents reported an average distance of 37 minutes between their home and a local health facility, nearly half traveling by foot, but others traveling by car, motorcycle, donkey, bicycle, or bus. Overall, 83.4% of Afghans in the sample said they live within one hour's travel of a health facility.

The Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has two contracting systems in place with a number of NGOs to deliver health services, including mental health, disability, and nutrition. There have been improvements in the scope and quality of services provided, with notable reductions in maternal and child mortality rates. However, Afghan health indicators remain below average, even among low-income countries, and the health system is strained by challenges of terrain and access, insecurity, shortage of trained health professionals, and rapid population growth.²⁰

Healthcare access and nutrition remain two central areas of concern. The World Bank estimates that 2.7 million Afghans, including nearly one million children under the age of five, are chronically malnourished.²¹ Afghan children experience stunting (low height for age) and wasting (low weight for height) at one of the highest rates in the world.²² In this year's *Survey*, when asked to describe the quality of food in their household diet compared to 12 months ago, 16.1% of Afghans say it improved. This figure represents a nearly 25-point decline from five years ago, when 40.9% reported an improvement in household food quality.

Poor nutrition appears particularly severe in provinces with high rates of insurgent violence.²³ This year in Helmand province, for example, 75.9% of respondents indicate that the quality of food in their diet has declined in the past year, the worst of any province, followed by 48.9% in Kabul (Fig. 4.5).²⁴ An overall worsening can be seen in Kunduz and many other provinces.

**PERCEPTION OF DECREASED QUALITY OF FOOD IN DIET
COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, BY PROVINCE**




FIG. 4.5: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (d) Quality of food in your diet. (Percent who say worse.)

Respondents are also asked whether the health and well-being of family members has changed over the past year. Overall, 18.8% report an improvement, reflecting no significant difference from last year's figure for the same response (18.2%). In 2012, during a period of relatively greater economic prosperity, perceptions of improved family health were significantly higher (41.6%) than in 2015 and 2016.

DISABILITY

Key Questions

D-18. *Do you have difficulty seeing, even if wearing glasses?*

D-19. *Do you have difficulty hearing, even if using a hearing aid?*

D-20. *Do you have difficulty walking or climbing steps?*

D-21. *Do you have difficulty remembering or concentrating?*

D-22. *Do you have difficulty with self-care such as cleaning yourself?*

D-23. *Using your usual language, that is to say the language you use most often, do you have difficulty communicating, for example understanding or being understood?*

In 2003, the Comprehensive National Disability Policy was submitted to the Afghan Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled in an effort to guide national programs to meet the needs of disabled persons and raise awareness about disability.²⁵ Two years later, in 2005, the Afghan government commissioned Handicap International to conduct the National Disability Survey in Afghanistan to measure the prevalence of disabilities. The study estimated that 2.7% of Afghans are disabled.²⁶ However, these estimates appear to be conservative and based on a conservative definition of disability. The inclusion of mental disabilities and milder impairments increases disability estimates, but they are also more difficult to identify. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan estimates that more than three million Afghans currently live with some form of disability, and suggests that armed conflict and minefields are the predominant causes of physical disability.²⁷

Afghans with disabilities are often stigmatized, and relatives may keep family members with disabilities inside the home or otherwise out of public view. In addition to social exclusion, many persons with disabilities are economically marginalized, most being unemployed and denied access to formal education.²⁸ Those who participate in the economy often have less visible roles within family-run businesses, or perform handicraft work in tailoring or carpet weaving. Access to health and social services is also limited. Even in many recently constructed health facilities, accessibility for the disabled has not been taken into account.²⁹ Meanwhile, gender is a crosscutting concern, as women with disabilities tend to face more social isolation than men. Providing support for disabled persons continues to be a policy priority for both the Afghan government and its partners.

The *Survey* added a short set of questions on disability this year, the six-item Washington Group Short-Form Disability Questionnaire.³⁰ For each question, respondents are asked to evaluate their abilities using a response range from “no difficulty” to “cannot do at all,” for a set of abilities that includes seeing, hearing, walking, remembering or concentrating, self-care, and communication. There are three popular calculations of the disability prevalence rate.³¹ Overall, 35.8% of Afghans report at least some difficulty in one of the six ability domains (Prevalence Rate 1). This includes 14.1% for seeing/vision, 10.9% for hearing, 18.4% for walking or climbing steps, 16.6% for remembering or concentrating, 9.4% for self-care, and 13.7% for communicating. Using a more conservative approach, 10.1% of the sample report a lot of difficulty or no ability in at least one of the six categories (Prevalence Rate 2), while 1.0% say they have no ability at all in at least one category (Prevalence Rate 3). Prevalence Rate 2, which shows a higher rate of disability in the South West region, is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Caution is advised in interpreting data from Zabul and Paktika. In Zabul, a high

percentage of respondents refused the disability questions, particularly regarding self-care, possibly due to sensitivities in interpretation, while in Paktika the sample size is too small to generalize.

DISABILITY PREVALENCE RATE, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 4.6: D-18 to D-23. Disability Prevalence Rate 2, by province, using the Washington Group Short-Form Questionnaire, which assesses disability in six domains: seeing, hearing, walking or climbing, remembering or concentrating, self-care such as cleaning, and communication. (Percent who say a lot of difficulty or can't do at all in at least one of the six ability domains.)

For each ability, male respondents and urban respondents are less likely than female and rural respondents to report any level of difficulty. The gender disparity is greatest for walking or climbing stairs, with 22.1% of women indicating at least some level of difficulty, compared to 15.1% of men. The most significant rural/urban disparity appears in the ability to communicate, with 15.4% of rural respondents expressing some level of difficulty, compared to just 9.2% of urban respondents. A more detailed report on each of these abilities is available upon request from The Asia Foundation.

4.3 EDUCATION

ATTAINMENT AND TYPES OF EDUCATION

Key Questions

D-10a. *How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa?*

D-10b. *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling at an Islamic madrasa? (Calculate the highest level in years.)*

The public education system in Afghanistan has undergone major change since 2001. During the Taliban regime, girls were forbidden to attend school, and fewer than one million boys were estimated to be enrolled in any formal education. By 2013, estimates of school enrollment had increased to 9.1 million, including 3.75 million girls.³² Public university enrollment has increased from an estimated 7,800 students in 2001 to 174,425 students in 2015, 21% of them women.³³ Despite this growth, average levels of educational attainment remain low, and illiteracy rates remain high. The CSO's 2009 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) estimated nationwide literacy rates at 32% for men and less than 20% for women, including just 7% of rural women.³⁴ These women's literacy estimates are slightly lower than 2013 *Survey's* estimate of 19.9%, including 28.9% of urban women and 16.6% of rural women.³⁵

More recently, the NUG and its development partners have shifted focus from expanding access to education to strengthening education quality. Several reforms have been implemented, including knowledge assessments for different grades, technical and vocational education and training reforms,³⁶ and the approval of a National Education Strategic Plan (2014–2020).³⁷ The Ministry of Education is also exploring community-based education to expand educational programs, by using community homes as schools and improving capacity among local parents to be teachers.

As in previous years, more than half of Afghans in this year's *Survey* (52.0%) report having no formal or informal, government or private education, including two-thirds (66.4%) of women and 37.7% of men. A further 15.4% say they have attended primary school, while 25.0% have attended secondary school and 5.7% have at least some university education. Overall, respondents report an average of 3.8 years of formal education. Importantly, these education figures only represent Afghanistan's adult population, because the *Survey* conducts interviews with Afghans age 18 or older.

Disaggregated by gender (Fig. 4.7), the education gap favors men at all levels of educational attainment. The number of women reporting no formal education decreased nearly 3 percentage points, however, from 69.3% in 2015, while there was no significant change among men (37.8%). While the national average is 3.8 years of formal education, women average 2.5 years, compared 5.8 years for men. Rural Afghans average 3.4 years, compared to 6.4 years for urban Afghans.

HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION, BY GENDER




FIG. 4.7: D-10b. *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling at an Islamic madrasa?*

Outside the formal education system, religious schools, known as madrasas, provide many Afghans with practice in Arabic-language memorization and an adult mentor for informal religious study. While a small segment of the population attends madrasas in lieu of government or private schools, it is more common to attend a madrasa in tandem with formal schooling.³⁸ The number of respondents who report spending at least one year studying at a madrasa dropped to 45.1% this year, from 50.5% in 2015. More than half of these respondents (24.6% of total respondents) spent between two and three years in a madrasa (Fig. 4.8). Notably, there is no association this year or in previous years between number of years spent at a madrasa and stated sympathy for armed opposition groups such as the Taliban.³⁹

YEARS STUDIED IN ISLAMIC MADRASA




FIG. 4.8: D-10a. *How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa?*

Considering both forms of education at once, just over half (51.0%) of women say they have never been to a government school or a madrasa for any type of education, compared to less than a quarter of men (23.4%). Men are also more likely to have studied at a madrasa than women, by a significant margin (57.3% to 33.0%). The average length of madrasa study among men is two years, compared to slightly less than one year for women. While urban respondents are more likely to report some level of formal education than rural respondents (61.6% and 41.0%, respectively), there is no significant difference in years of madrasa education between urban and rural Afghans.

Age appears to strongly associate with educational attainment (Fig. 4.9). Respondents in the youngest cohort (18–25 years old) report an average of 6.2 years of formal education, which declines incrementally to 2.5 years as age of respondent increases to over 55 years. This trend is not observable in madrasa education, where respondents from the youngest cohort have an average of 1.7 years of religious education, compared to 1.6 years among those at or above age 55.

FORMAL VS. MADRASA EDUCATION, BY AGE OF RESPONDENT




FIG. 4.9: D-10a. How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa? **D-10b.** What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling at an Islamic madrasa?

Regionally, the Central/Kabul region reports the highest overall rate of formal education (62.0%) as well as the highest number of respondents with some level of higher education (10.5%) (Fig. 4.10). By contrast, the South West region has the lowest rate of higher education, at 1.3%. The Central/Hazarajat region notably features both the highest concentration of respondents reporting no formal education (70.6%) and the lowest average number of years of madrasa education (0.7), with only 17.1% of respondents having any madrasa education. The percent of Afghans who attended a religious madrasa is highest in the North East (60.9%) (Fig. 4.10).

RESPONDENTS WITH HIGHER/UNIVERSITY EDUCATION, BY REGION




FIG. 4.10: D-10b. What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling at an Islamic madrasa? (Percent within each province reporting one or more years of university education after high school.)

AVERAGE YEARS OF ISLAMIC MADRASA EDUCATION, BY REGION




FIG. 4.11: D-10a. How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa?

4.4 AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Key Question

Q-9. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Construction or repair of roads or bridges; (b) New government school; (c) New private school; (d) New private university; (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir); (f) Irrigation project; (g) Government-supplied electricity; (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.); (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements; (j) Agricultural programs; (k) New factory opened; (l) New mosque.

Development in Afghanistan includes a diverse set of infrastructure projects, including the electric grid, healthcare, water for irrigation to support the agrarian economy, and roads or bridges for transportation routes to places of employment, healthcare, and education.⁴⁰ This year, public awareness of new development projects has increased over last year in every category of the *Survey*. The highest rate of awareness is of projects to build or repair roads and bridges (34.3%), which has increased by four points since last year (30.3%). The biggest increase in awareness is of new mosque construction, which rose from 21.9% in 2015 to 30.8% in 2016. Across all categories of development, levels of awareness are well below peak levels in 2011, which coincided with high levels of international and military aid expenditure (Fig. 4.12).

**AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN LOCAL AREAS,
2006-2016**




FIG. 4.12: Q-9. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Construction or repair of roads or bridges; (b) New government school; (c) New private school; (d) New private university; (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir); (f) Irrigation project; (g) Government-supplied electricity; (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.); (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements; (j) Agricultural programs; (k) New factory opened; (l) New mosque. (Percent who say yes.)

ELECTRICITY

While major electrification projects are underway, less than one-fifth (17.0%) of respondents say they are aware of a government project to provide electricity within the past 12 months. Awareness of new projects is greatest in the provinces of Kunduz (37.7%), Laghman (37.6%), Faryab (37.3%), and Kabul (28.5%) (Fig. 4.13). In Helmand province, which has the highest rate of respondents reporting a worsening in electricity service over the past year, only 6.9% report awareness of a new electricity project in the past 12 months. The Kajaki dam is still under construction, with the first turbine completed in 2005, the second turbine completed in 2009, and the third phase underway. Nationally, urban Afghans are much more likely to report awareness of an electricity project than are rural Afghans (29.9% vs. 12.8%, respectively).

AWARENESS OF ELECTRICITY PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 4.13: Q-9g. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (Percent who say yes.)

HEALTH

The MoPH’s National Health Policy (2015–2020) prioritizes public health education, improved access to healthcare, and improved capacity within the healthcare sector.⁴¹ Though hampered in 2016 by the resurgence of violence, international and humanitarian organizations remain involved in Afghanistan. Notable efforts include World Bank support for projects implemented by the Ministry of Public Health, and other health projects funded by the United Nations and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).⁴²

This year, a fifth (21.3%) of respondents were aware of healthcare projects in 2016, up significantly from 15.1% in 2015. At the provincial level (Fig. 4.14), awareness of healthcare programs appears uneven, however, with highest rates of awareness in Samangan (56.0%), Laghman (52.8%), and Kunar (50.8%), compared to low rates in Panjshir (3.8%), Bamyan (6.2%), and Daikundi (9.7%).

AWARENESS OF HEALTHCARE PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 4.14: Q-9h. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) (Percent who say yes.)

IRRIGATION AND AGRICULTURE

Availability and quality of irrigation water are critical for Afghanistan’s drought-afflicted agriculture sector.⁴³ A 2016 report by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan estimates that agriculture provides a livelihood to more than 80% of the population, either directly, or indirectly through value chains.⁴⁴ This year the World Bank extended the Irrigation Restoration and Development Project for Afghanistan, started in 2011 and implemented by the Ministry of Energy and Water to improve access to irrigation and strengthen capacity for water resources management.⁴⁵ The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock continues to implement the Agriculture Production and Productivity Program, which is estimated to have resulted in a 10% increase in productivity of wheat and other crops in irrigated areas, the establishment of 175 irrigation associations, and the rehabilitation of 100 existing irrigation systems.⁴⁶

Awareness of agriculture programs increased from 16.5% in 2015 to 19.8% in 2016, while awareness of irrigation projects increased from 13.1% in 2015 to 17.0% in 2016. Laghman reports the highest awareness of both irrigation projects (50.2%) and agriculture projects (52.5%), followed by Wardak (43.8%) for irrigation projects, and Logar (42.2%) for agriculture projects (Figs. 4.15, 4.16).

AWARENESS OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE



FIG. 4.15: Q-9f. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (f) Irrigation project. (Percent who say yes.)

AWARENESS OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE



FIG. 4.16: Q-9j. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (j) Agricultural programs. (Percent who say yes.)

ROADS

The World Bank estimates that over 40,000 kilometers of rural roads and over 5,000 km of highways in Afghanistan have been rehabilitated or improved over the past 13 years. In 2015, USAID invested more than USD 2 billion to build and rehabilitate more than 2,000 km of roads, including Afghanistan's Ring Road and the Gardez-Khost Highway.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, in July 2016, the World Bank launched the Trans-Hindukush Road Connectivity Project, a USD 250 million project to improve road transport links across the Hindukush mountain range.⁴⁸

More than one-third of respondents (34.3%) say they are aware of a project to build or repair roads and bridges in their community, a significant increase from last year's rate of 30.3%. Awareness is greatest in Wardak (69.4%) and Laghman (68.6%), and lowest in the Central/Hazarajat area.

AWARENESS OF ROAD OR BRIDGE PROJECTS IN THE AREA, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 4.17. Q-9a. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Construction or repair of roads or bridges. (Percent who say yes.)

AWARENESS OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES, CONFIDENCE IN THE NUG, AND OPTIMISM

Using regression modeling, awareness of services appears to be a robustly positive predictor of confidence in the NUG.⁴⁹ Importantly, other factors play strong roles as well, particularly security and the economy, and are accounted for here. Of the various types of projects discussed in this chapter, Afghans who say they know of a reconciliation project or a new factory in their area are most likely to say that the NUG is going a good job, while awareness of an electricity project has no significant correlation with confidence in the NUG.

Awareness of reconciliation projects also appears to predict increased national optimism about the future of the country. Afghans are most likely to say the country is moving in the right direction if they also report awareness of a reconciliation/peace project in their local area (Fig. 4.18), whereas the lowest levels of optimism correspond with awareness of new mosque construction, private schools, or electricity supply. However, across all types of development projects, being aware of a development project is strongly associated with a net positive benefit to national mood.

Disaggregating by region, Afghans in Central/Kabul who report awareness of reconciliation projects and new factories are the most likely to report optimism and the least likely to be affected by awareness of a new private

university or a new private school. By contrast, awareness of a new private school or private university in the Central/Hazarajat region predicts significantly more national optimism and confidence in government than does awareness of other development categories.

**EFFECT OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ON NATIONAL MOOD:
CHANGE IN OPTIMISM, BY PROJECT**




FIG. 4.18: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? Q-9a/l. Please tell me if there has been a project of this type in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Construction or repair of roads or bridges; (b) New government school; (c) New private school; (d) New private university; (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir); (f) Irrigation project; (g) Government-supplied electricity; (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.); (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements; (j) Agricultural programs; (k) New factory opened; (l) New mosque. (The percentage difference in how many say the country is moving in the right direction, comparing those aware vs. not aware of a development project in each category. A positive number indicates a positive impact of awareness on optimism.)

End Notes

¹ “Afghanistan aid: Donors promise \$15.2bn in Brussels,” *BBC News*, Oct 5, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37560704>.

² Annica Holmberg, Daud Kohi, Jessica Rothman, and Leo Schellekens, *Review of the UNICEF programme Basic Education and Gender Equality in Afghanistan 2013-2015: Final Report* (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, July 2016), <http://www.sida.se/contentassets/ba213e5f6e30477f9341cb9ce153a34c/f579c32f-5ee5-4e4a-ac3d-0a33abab8c4c.pdf>.

³ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development* (New York: UNDP, 2015), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report_1.pdf.

⁴ “Afghanistan aid,” *BBC News*.

⁵ Asian Development Bank (ADB) “Afghanistan: Economy,” ADB website, <https://www.adb.org/countries/afghanistan/economy>, accessed October 28, 2016; William A. Byrd and M. Khalid Payenda, *Afghanistan’s Revenue Turnaround in 2015*, Peace Brief 201 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February, 2016), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB201-Afghanistans_Revenue_Turnaround_In_2015.pdf.

⁶ Question not asked in the 2016 *Survey*, and included in this chapter as a point of comparison (data available for 2014 only). Variable names beginning with “X” refer to data from past years, in merged 2006–2016 data rather than in 2016 data.

⁷ The question was not included this year due to space constraints within the questionnaire.

⁸ World Bank Public Opinion Research Group, *FY15 Afghanistan Country Opinion Survey Report* (World Bank Group, February, 2015), <http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2585>.

⁹ “Ghani, Modi Inaugurate Slama Dam,” *ToloNews*, June 4, 2016, <http://tolonews.com/en/salma-dam-project/25637-ghani-modi-inaugurate-salma-dam>.

¹⁰ World Bank, *FY15 Afghanistan Country Opinion Survey*.


¹¹ Asian Development Bank (ADB), “Afghanistan: North-South Power Transmission Enhancement Project/Project Data Sheet,” ADB website, <https://www.adb.org/projects/documents/project-agreement-north-south-power-transmission-enhancement-project>.

¹² Central Statistics Organization (CSO), *National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment/Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey*, data file and codebook for 2011–2012 and 2013–2014 surveys (Kabul, Afghanistan: Retrieved in person from CSO, November 15, 2016).

¹³ Going forward, these questions will be asked every other year, in rotation with other trend line questions to maximize use of space.

¹⁴ Some readers may find it counterintuitive that satisfaction with electricity can fluctuate from year to year even when actual coverage by the government electric grid increases each year. The fluctuation is even wider among urban respondents than rural respondents. The discrepancy may be due to two factors. First, most Afghans use sources of electricity other than the government electric grid, and these alternative sources are affected by economic factors such as the ability to afford petrol. Second, Afghans’ expectations of their government may increase over time. Those in cities such as Kabul, for example, may grow accustomed to having reliable electricity and come to expect it. Once a service is expected or taken for granted, basic access no longer generates the same level of public satisfaction. Opinions among rural Afghans, by contrast, may be shaped by perceptions of inequality, such as the perception of unequal service to cities and rural areas, to a home village and a neighboring area, or to one ethnic group and another. Despite fluctuations in satisfaction over time, however, the *Survey* shows that increased government provision of electricity corresponds with increased satisfaction with that service.

¹⁵ Overlaying electricity access data from the CSO's 2012 and 2014 *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey* (ALCS) suggests a robust positive association between access and satisfaction.



¹⁶ For purposes of comparison, the ALCS sample includes 4.95% Kuchi (nomadic) respondents, whereas the *Survey of the Afghan People* is limited to settled households for random sampling (no refugee camps and no Kuchis living in tents or temporary housing).

¹⁷ This question was asked in 2014 and will reappear in the 2017 *Survey*. In other years, questions have addressed “satisfaction” with access rather than access itself, in order to measure sentiment. Future questionnaires will include additional measures of fact along with measures of sentiment or perception, for cross-referencing.

¹⁸ Question handles in the 2016 *Survey* begin with “Q” and “D,” while question handles that begin with “X” are only in the merged 2006–2016 *Survey of the Afghan People* data file that is publicly available on the website for researchers.

¹⁹ USAID, “Where We Work/Afghanistan/Health,” USAID website, accessed November 19, 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/health>.

²⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Malnutrition: the silent killer in Afghanistan,” *Humanitarian Bulletin: Afghanistan* 54 no.1 (July 31, 2016), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afg_monthly_hum_bull_july_2016.pdf.

²¹ World Bank, *Afghanistan: Systematic Country Diagnostic* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, February 1, 2016), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/302911468190767498/Afghanistan-Systematic-country-diagnostic>.

²² Sherin Varkey, Ariel Higgins-Steele, Taufiq Mashal, Bashir Ahmad Hamid, and Zulfqar A. Bhutta, “Afghanistan in transition: call for investment in nutrition,” *The Lancet* 3, no. 1 (2015): e13–e14, [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X\(14\)70362-6/fulltext?rss=yes](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(14)70362-6/fulltext?rss=yes).

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ The province of Helmand is a Taliban stronghold and a major center of opium production in Afghanistan. Since 2006, it has been the scene of a series of military operations conducted by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) against insurgents. As a result of the ongoing conflict, living conditions are stark, and access to basic services is difficult.

²⁵ Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, *Comprehensive National Disability Policy in Afghanistan* (Kabul: Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, June 4, 2005), <http://www.who.int/disabilities/policies/documents/Afghanistan.pdf>.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Handicap International, *The Challenge Ahead: The National Disability Survey in Afghanistan, 2005; Executive Summary Report* (Lyon: Handicap International, 2006), http://www.cbm.org/article/downloads/82788/National_Disability_Survey_in_Afghanistan.pdf.

²⁸ Ahmad Masoud, “Most of 800,000 People with Disabilities in Afghanistan are Uneducated and Unemployed,” *Khaama Press*, February 3, 2013, <http://www.khaama.com/most-of-800000-people-with-disabilities-in-afghanistan-are-uneducated-and-unemployed-7854325>.

²⁹ Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, *2015 Annual Report and Final Accounts* (Kabul: Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, 2015), https://swedishcommittee.org/sites/default/files/media/sca_ar_2015.pdf.

³⁰ The following questions are part of the Washington Group Short Questionnaire for Disability, and measure whether the respondent has any difficulty with seeing/vision (D-18), hearing (D-19), walking/climbing steps (D-20), remembering or concentrating (D-21), self-care or cleaning themselves (D-22), and communicating in the language they most often use (D-23). There are several limitations to using the short form of this questionnaire in Afghanistan, including cultural sensitivities, particularly when asking about self-care and communication. In some cases, respondents found these questions uncomfortable and refused to answer, or gave answers that were socially desirable rather than factually correct. As a result, responses to this question set should be considered with caution. For more on the scale construction, see the Washington Group on Disability Statistics website, <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/citygroup.htm>.

³¹ Estimates use recommendations for calculating disability prevalence in Daniel Mont, “Analysis Plan for Pre-testing the WG Short Measurement Set on Disability,” updated 7/31/2006, U.S. National Center for Health Statistics website, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/washington_group/meeting6/appendix6_analytic_plan.pdf. Prevalence Rate 1: In at least one ability, respondent has “some difficulty,” “a lot of difficulty,” or “can’t do at all.” Prevalence Rate 2: In at least one ability, respondent has “a lot of difficulty” or “can’t do at all.” Prevalence Rate 3: In at least one of the abilities, respondent “can’t do at all.”

³² Innes Leighton, “Access to Education for Girls in the Rural Regions of Afghanistan Following the Fall of the Taliban,” *Interstate—Journal of International Affairs* 2014/2015, no.1: 1, <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1071/access-to-education-for-girls-in-the-rural-regions-of-afghanistan-following-the-fall-of-the-taliban>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and Central Statistics Organization (CSO), *National risk and vulnerability assessment 2007/8: A profile of Afghanistan* (Kabul: Icon-Institute, October 2009), 66, cited in Morten Sigsgaard, ed., *On the road to resilience: Capacity development with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan* (Paris: International Institute for Education Planning, 2011), <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001915/191583e.pdf>.

³⁵ Respondents were asked, in two separate questions, if they could read and write a letter without assistance. These two questions were then jointly used as a basic indicator for literacy based on self-report. As such, these figures cannot be used as an official literacy rate, and are provided here as a point of comparison only.

³⁶ World Bank, *Afghanistan: Systematic Country Diagnostic*.

³⁷ USAID, “Where We Work/Afghanistan/Education,” USAID website, <https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education>, accessed November 16, 2016.

³⁸ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People* (The Asia Foundation, 2015), <http://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/>.

³⁹ There is considerable debate over what link, if any, exists between armed opposition groups such as the Taliban and madrasa education in Pakistan and Afghanistan. See Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Myth,” *New York Times*, June 14, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/14/opinion/the-madrassa-myth.html?_r=0; and Kaja Borchgrevink, *Pakistan’s Madrasas: Moderation or Militancy? The madrasa debate and the reform process* (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, June 2011), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/137870/Pakistan%E2%80%99s%20Madrasas.pdf>.

⁴⁰ USAID, “Where We Work/Afghanistan/Infrastructure,” USAID website, <https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/infrastructure>, accessed November 15, 2016.

⁴¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health, *National Health Policy 2015–2020* (Government of Afghanistan, 2015), <http://moph.gov.af/Content/files/National%20health%20policy%202015-2020.pdf>.

⁴² United Nations Secretariat’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Malnutrition: The Silent Killer in Afghanistan,” *Humanitarian Bulletin, Afghanistan* 54, no. 1 (2016): 1–3, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/node/131346>.

⁴³ Asian Development Bank (ADB), “ADB Helps Enhance Crop Diversification and Food Security in Afghanistan,” ADB website, October 27, 2016, https://www.adb.org/news/adb-helps-enhance-crop-diversification-and-food-security-afghanistan?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+adb_news+%28ADB.org+News+Releases+RSS%29.

⁴⁴ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Rule of Law Unit, *Water Rights: An Assessment of Afghanistan’s Legal Framework Governing Water for Agriculture* (UNAMA, October 2016), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2016_19_10_water_rights_final_v2.pdf.

⁴⁵ Toru Konishi, *Afghanistan - AF Irrigation Restoration and Development Project : P122235 - Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 11* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/947611477058270461/Afghanistan-AF-Irrigation-Restoration-and-Development-Project-P122235-Implementation-Status-Results-Report-Sequence-11>.

⁴⁶ World Bank, *FY15 Afghanistan Country Opinion Survey*.

⁴⁷ The Ring Road Project seeks to connect the country's five major cities, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar City, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif, providing transportation access to the more than 80% of Afghans living within 50 kilometers of the road. USAID, "Where We Work/Afghanistan/Infrastructure."

⁴⁸ World Bank, *Afghanistan: Systematic Country Diagnostic*.

⁴⁹ Awareness of Services is a scale that combines all responses to Q10. Control variables used in regression models include age, gender, household income, education, ethnicity, urban/rural status, province, and fear for personal safety.



5. GOVERNANCE

In 2014, following a protracted presidential election, Afghan political leaders announced the establishment of a National Unity Government (NUG). The two candidates for president agreed to share power in the NUG, with Ashraf Ghani serving as president and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah assuming the newly created role of chief executive officer (CEO). Since then, the leaders have struggled to reach consensus on many issues, including the appointment of government ministers and provincial governors.¹ The NUG's founding promise, to introduce electoral reforms and outline a long-term government structure within two years, remains stalled.

Corruption is still a persistent problem for Afghans. Afghanistan was ranked 166th out of 168 countries on Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index.² In this year's *Survey*, 61.0% of Afghans say corruption is a major problem in daily life, an insignificant change since last year (61.1%). However, the NUG has stepped up investigations of corruption, including probes of the Kabul Bank case, Ministry of Defense fuel contracts, and the Customs Department within the Ministry of Finance. Among respondents who report having contact with government authorities, the corruption rate³ has measurably decreased. For example, among urban respondents, the corruption rate for municipal/district authorities dropped 4.1%, while overall corruption rates for provincial governors' offices dropped by 5.5%. Corruption rates for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police dropped 5.6% and 4.7% respectively. However, the perception of corruption in government appears high, despite a decrease in reported experiences of corruption.

Afghanistan continues to struggle to develop a strong rule of law and a credible judicial system. Despite training and funding from international donors, members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) often respond to local threats from the Taliban and ISIS by supporting local warlords and militia commanders rather than their distant commanders in the national government. The national government has made efforts to reform the court structure, but corruption there persists. Despite a 3.8% decrease in the rate of reported corruption, compared to last year, the judicial system still has the highest rate of reported corruption among the government institutions addressed in the *Survey*.⁴

This chapter explores the issue of corruption, the perceptions of local justice and dispute resolution systems, and the level of confidence Afghans have in government institutions, officials, and authorities. It pays special attention to the changes in public opinion over time and the challenges that remain.

5.1 SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

Key Question

Q-36. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) National Unity Government; (b) Provincial government; (c) Municipal authorities (ask urban residents only); (d) District government (ask rural residents only).*

Following a sharp decline in 2015, Afghan perceptions of how well government institutions do their job again declined to historically low levels in 2016 (Fig. 5.1). Fewer than half (49.1%) of Afghans surveyed say the National Unity Government is doing a good job, down from 57.8% in 2015. A similarly low percentage of

Afghans (52.9%) report satisfaction with provincial governments. The percentage of urban residents who are satisfied with municipal government performance (42.4%) and rural residents who are satisfied with district government performance (50.7%) also declined slightly from 2015.

Pashtuns (57.1%) are more likely than Tajiks (43.5%), Uzbeks (49.6%), and Hazaras (41.3%) to say they are satisfied with National Unity Government performance. Women (52.7%) are slightly more likely to express satisfaction with the National Unity Government than are men (45.4%). Residents of rural areas (51.8%) are more likely than their counterparts in urban areas (40.7%) to say the National Unity Government is doing a good job.

Afghan perceptions of their provincial government, and by extension their provincial governors, are of particular interest in 2016. Provincial governors can be very powerful in the Afghan political system, and they play a central role in coordinating services provided by the national government. President Ashraf Ghani has expressed a strong interest in improving governance at the provincial level.⁵

In many ways, Afghan perceptions of provincial government align with perceptions of national government, including across gender and ethnic categories. Yet, while perceptions of national government performance are almost evenly split among residents of urban and rural areas, rural residents (55.6%) are more likely than urban residents (44.6%) to express satisfaction with their provincial government. Residents report the highest levels of satisfaction with provincial governments in Laghman (82.4%), Samangan (77.4%), and Nangarhar (75.7%). Residents report the lowest levels of satisfaction in Helmand (32.7%), Zabul (29.9%), and Kabul (29.8%).

SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE




FIG 5.1: Q-36. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) National Unity Government; (b) Provincial government; (c) Municipal authorities (ask urban residents only); (d) District government (ask rural residents only). (Percent who respond “somewhat good job” or “very good job.”)

5.2 CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Key Questions

Q-32. In the last two years, has the member of Parliament for your province ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affected you?

Q-33. In your opinion, which of the following does your member of Parliament care about most? (a) National issues; (b) Provincial issues; (c) District or municipality issues; (d) Ethnic issues; (e) Personal interests.

Q-35. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's OK, just say you have no opinion. (c) The Independent Election Commission; (d) Community development councils; (e) Community shuras/jirgas; (f) Government ministers; (g) International NGOs; (h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV; (i) National NGOs; (j) Parliament as a whole; (k) Provincial councils; (l) Religious leaders; (m) Your member of Parliament.

In 2016, Afghans continue to express low confidence in governmental and non-governmental institutions. In most categories, the 2016 nationwide confidence rates were the lowest recorded in the 10-year history of this survey (Fig. 5.2). Overall, Afghans express the highest levels of confidence in religious leaders (66.1%), the media (64.5%), and community shuras/jirgas (62.1%). Afghans say they have the lowest levels of confidence in

national government institutions, including parliament as a whole (37.0%) and government ministers (35.6%). Some of the greatest differences in Afghan confidence in government institutions were between residents of rural and urban areas. Rural residents are more likely to express confidence in community development councils (56.2%), provincial councils (49.5%), and community councils (65.7%) than are urban residents (44.9%, 39.8%, and 51.5%, respectively).

OVERALL CONFIDENCE IN OFFICIALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION		57	67	54	59	60		66	36	34
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	64	65	64	61	68	66	63	65	61	53
COMMUNITY SHURAS/JIRGAS	72	69	67	66	70	68	65	69	64	62
GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	57	51	53	54	56	55	46	47	42	36
INTERNATIONAL NGOS	64	64	66	54	56	53	51	53	44	44
MEDIA	62	63	62	57	69	71	67	73	67	65
NATIONAL NGOS	60	62	61	55	54	54	52	57	50	48
RELIGIOUS LEADERS					74	73	65	70	64	66
PARLIAMENT				59	62	62	50	51	42	37
PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	70	65	62	62	67	66	58	58	52	47
YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT							47	52	43	35

FIG. 5.2: Q-35. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read each one, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's OK, just say you have no opinion. (Percent who respond "some" or "a lot" of confidence in each.)*

Only 24.3% of Afghans report that their members of Parliament (MP) has done something positive for their province. Rural residents (28.0%) are more likely to say their MP has helped their province than urban residents (13.4%), and Pashtuns (32%) are more likely to say the same compared to Tajiks (21.0%), Uzbeks (19.4%), and Hazaras (17.2%). The provinces with the highest opinions of their MPs are Samangan (63.8%), Laghman (53.1%), and Badghis (53.0%), while the lowest opinions are found in Kabul (4.5%), Parwan (5.2%), and Bamyan (7.3%). Furthermore, survey respondents say MPs care more about themselves and their ethnic group than the area they represent or the country as a whole. When asked which issues they believe their MP cares about most, 34.7% of Afghans say personal interests, 22.2% say ethnic interests, 18.7% say provincial issues, 12.0% say district or municipal issues, and 9.8% say national issues.

5.3 CORRUPTION

Key Questions

Q-25. *Next, I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations. Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (a) Officials in the municipality/district office (urban respondents only); (b) Provincial governor's office; (c) Customs office; (d) Afghan National Police; (e) Afghan National Army; (f) Judiciary/courts; (g) Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (national power company); (h) Hospitals/clinics; (i) When applying for a job; (j) When seeking admission to school/university.*

Q-26. *Now I want to ask some questions about corruption. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas: (a) In your daily life; (b) In your neighborhood; (c) Among your local authorities; (d) In your provincial government; (e) In Afghanistan as a whole.*

Each year, the *Survey* asks Afghans about the extent to which they experience corruption in daily life, in government, and in Afghanistan as a whole. In addition, the *Survey* asks Afghans at which levels of government they believe corruption is a problem. In 2008, the Afghan Parliament ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which outlaws bribery and embezzlement by public- and private-sector officials. However, corruption remains a prevalent and complex feature of daily life in Afghanistan. Afghans may be asked to pay bribes, or feel compelled to give “gifts,” to members of law enforcement, customs, the medical profession, and universities.⁶ The bribes or gifts may involve money or exchanges of non-monetary items such as carpets, livestock, and automobiles.

In 2016, nearly all Afghans say corruption is a problem in all areas of their lives, with 61.0% of Afghans saying corruption is a major problem in daily life, while 28.2% say corruption is a minor problem. Corruption is also a problem in Afghans’ neighborhoods (54.9% major problem, 34.5% minor problem), among local authorities (57.7% major problem, 33.1% minor problem), in provincial government (67.5% major problem, 25.7% minor problem), and in Afghanistan as a whole (75.2% major problem, 18.9% minor problem). Notably, while Afghans over the past 10 years have consistently rated corruption a serious problem for Afghanistan as a whole, the percentage of Afghans who believe corruption is a problem in daily life and in neighborhoods has increased steadily over that time (Fig. 5.3).

In 2016, as in 2015, the provinces with the highest perception of everyday corruption as a major problem are Badghis (87.5%), Helmand (86.7%), Kunduz (82.5%), Uruzgan (81.7%), and Kabul (80.5%). Urban residents (72.1%) are significantly more likely than rural residents (57.3%) to see everyday corruption as a major problem.

PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION: MAJOR PROBLEM




FIG. 5.3: Q-26. Now we want to ask some questions about corruption. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas: (a) In your daily life; (b) In your neighborhood; (c) Among your local authorities; (d) In your provincial government; (e) In Afghanistan as a whole. (Percent who say major problem.)

However, while the perception of corruption remains unchanged, the corruption rate based on personal experiences of corruption show a different trend. The rate at which respondents say they paid a bribe or experienced corruption with specific institutions has decreased in nearly every case since 2015. Overall, Afghans report encountering corruption most commonly when dealing with the courts and judiciary (59.5%) and with municipal and district governors' offices (58.9%), but corruption rates decreased for both, and for all institutions listed in Fig. 5.4. While this decrease is encouraging, it remains unclear whether it is a reversal of a trend or a temporary fluctuation. Corruption rates have dropped in the past, such as between 2013 and 2014, before reverting upward again.

EXPOSURE TO CORRUPTION

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
MUNICIPALITY/DISTRICT GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	46	43	41	44	43	56	51	58	55	66	59
CUSTOMS OFFICE	40	34	36	37	42	52	49	57	47	61	55
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	53	43	40	46	49	54	48	52	45	53	48
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY		24	21	25	30	34	30	39	33	43	38
JUDICIARY/COURTS	55	47	49	51	52	62	60	62	55	63	60
NATIONAL POWER COMPANY	44	46	37	41	41	48	46	53	47	55	50
WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	59	51	47	52	50	58	57	55	52	59	56
ADMISSION TO SCHOOLS/UNIVERSITY		33	32	37	39	45	42	46	39	43	39
HOSPITALS/CLINICS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	61	55

FIG. 5.4: Q-25. *Next, I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations. Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (a) Municipality/district governor's office; (b) Provincial governor's office; (c) Customs office; (d) Afghan National Police; (e) Afghan National Army; (f) Judiciary/courts; (g) Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (national power company); (h) Hospitals/clinics; (i) When applying for a job; (j) When seeking admission to school/university. (Percent who say they experienced corruption "some," "most," or "all of the time," among those who say they had contact with each institution or situation.)*

Afghan perceptions of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in 2016 are of particular interest, as the force transitions from a military role to that of community protection. Professionalization of the ANP has become a top priority for the Afghan government and international donors, but progress towards this goal has been slow and uneven.⁷ Reports of encounters with ANP corruption are highest in Helmand (86.6%), Laghman (81.3%), and Uruzgan (71.3%). ANP corruption is lowest in Badakhshan (1.8%), Panjshir (9.2%), and Bamyan (15.5%) (Fig. 5.5).

EXPERIENCE OF CORRUPTION WITH NATIONAL POLICE, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 5.5: Q-25. Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations. Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (d) Afghan National Police. (Percent having contact with the ANP who indicate that they paid a bribe, gave a gift, or performed a favor for an ANP member in all, most and some cases in past 12 months.)

Analysis of the data finds that while the percentage of Afghans who experience corruption is high, that experience does not appear to affect their confidence in government institutions as a whole (Q-35).⁸ Considered alongside the prevalence and persistence of corruption reported in the *Survey*, however, this result suggests that corruption is so normalized that Afghans do not use it as a measure of their confidence in government institutions.

5.4 JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Key Questions

Q-40. *Within the last year, have you or anyone you know been represented by a defense lawyer in a criminal case?*

Q-41. *(Ask if code 1, yes, at Q-40.) Did you or the person you know pay for those services?*

Q-42. *To the best of your knowledge, what does a defense lawyer do? You can choose up to three options from the list. (a) Manage marriage proposals; (b) Help people who have been arrested or detained; (c) Work in the Parliament.*

Q-43. *Do you think a person arrested for a crime should have the right to a lawyer, even if they are guilty?*

Q-44. *(Ask if code 2, no, at Q-43.) Why do you say that a guilty person should not have the right to a lawyer?*

Q-45. *If you were ever arrested, which of these types of lawyers would you trust to fight for your rights? You can say yes to more than one. (a) A defense lawyer employed by the government; (b) A defense lawyer employed by an international organization; (c) A defense lawyer employed by a civil society organization; (d) An independent lawyer not employed by either the government or an organization.*

Q-47. *In the past two years, have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it?*

Q-48. *(Ask if code 1, yes, in Q-47.) What kind of a case or dispute was it?*

Q-50. *(Ask if code 1, yes, in Q-47.) Where have you taken this case or dispute?*

Q-51. *(Ask if code 1, Huquq Department, in Q-50.) And now let's turn to the local Huquq Department. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department? (a) Your local Huquq is fair and trusted. (b) Your local Huquq follows the norms and values of our people. (c) Your local Huquq is effective at delivering justice.*

Q-52. *(Ask if code 2, state courts, in Q-50.) Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts? (a) State courts are fair and trusted. (b) State courts follow the norms and values of our people. (c) State courts are effective at delivering justice.*

Q-53. *(Ask if code 3, shura/jirga, in Q-50.) And now let's turn to village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas? (a) Local shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted. (b) Local shuras/jirgas follow the norms and values of our people. (c) Local shuras/jirgas are effective at delivering justice.*

For the first time in 2016, the *Survey* asked Afghans about the role that defense lawyers (*vakil-e-modoaifa*) play in their lives. Defense lawyers are a recent addition to the justice system in Afghanistan, and they play a critical role in protecting the rights of the accused. However, the word “*vakil*” has a number of meanings including “parliamentary representative” (*vakil-e-parliman*) and the person who represents families in marriage negotiations (*vakil-e-agh-d-e-nika*). When asked what kind of work defense lawyers generally do, responses indicate varying levels of awareness. Afghans are mostly able to correctly identify defense lawyers as professionals who help people who have been arrested or detained (74.3%). Still, there are many who believe that they manage marriage proposals (47.0%) or work in Parliament (35.3%). Some variation follows

ethnic and linguistic lines. For example, Pashtuns are less likely to say that defense lawyers manage marriage proposals (38.4%) than are Tajiks (51.5%), Uzbeks (59.8%),⁹ and Hazaras (46.5%). In a subsequent question, respondents are asked about defense lawyers in the context of defending a person accused of a crime. A majority of Afghans (79.3%) say that individuals arrested for a crime should have the right to a defense lawyer, regardless of whether they are guilty or not.

While the defense bar and the legal profession in general have expanded in recent years,¹⁰ national case-management systems indicate that legal defense services are still used in only a small fraction of criminal cases.¹¹ However, roughly one in five Afghans (21.0%) say that they or someone they know has been represented by a defense lawyer in a criminal case. This challenges the perception that defense services are rare, and appears to support the view advocated by the defense bar and legal aid providers that case-management systems are not capturing the extent of defense services being provided.

Of those who say that a defense lawyer has represented them or someone they know in a criminal case, over half (54.5%) state that the defense lawyer received compensation from the defendant or the defendant's family. The Afghan Ministry of Justice and NGO legal aid providers suggest that most criminal defense is provided through legal aid services, pointing to a lack of private defense lawyers in most areas of Afghanistan. However, this year's survey data suggests that a significant proportion of legal aid lawyers may be receiving some compensation from their indigent clients in addition to their salaries.

When respondents are asked what kind of lawyer they would trust to defend their rights, roughly two-thirds (64.0%) say that they would trust government defense lawyers, followed by an independent lawyer (58.4%), a lawyer from a civil society organization (49.0%), and a lawyer from an international organization (40.1%). Levels of confidence in each category of lawyer vary greatly by province, however, with Zabul reporting the lowest trust in government defense lawyers (36.1%) and Badakhshan reporting the highest (84.1%), for example.

Use of national and local judicial institutions for dispute resolution has remained steady over the past 10 years (Fig. 5.6). Approximately one in five Afghans report that they have turned to the *Huquq* (rights) Department or a neighborhood shura/jirga to resolve a dispute in the past two years. The Huquq Department was established by the Afghan Ministry of Justice to facilitate the resolution of local-level disputes, such as those arising from debts, property, or rights violations. Residents of rural areas (25.6%) are more likely to say they have used Huquqs, shuras, or jirgas than are residents of urban areas (12.8%). Use of these institutions is highest in Ghor (43.5%), Samangan (43.0%), and Baghlan (40.9%) and lowest in Kabul (7.2%), Panjshir (6.8%), and Bamyan (6.0%).

DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USE OF HUQUQS OR SHURAS/JIRGAS




FIG. 5.6: Q-47. *In the past two years, have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or a village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it? (Percent who say yes.)*

Of those Afghans who report using a dispute resolution institution, 43.5% report using a neighborhood shura or jirga, 36.8% report using state courts, and 23.6% say they went to the Huquq Department. Residents of rural areas are much more likely to use shuras/jirgas (89.6%) than urban residents (10.4%). The *Survey* asked Afghans their opinion of the institutions that they used for dispute resolution. Users of neighborhood shuras/jirgas are more likely than users of other institutions to say that the court is fair and trusted (83.6%), follows the norms of the people (71.7%), and is effective at delivering justice (70.7%) (Fig. 5.7).

OPINIONS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION INSTITUTIONS

	HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	STATE COURT	LOCAL SHURA/JIRGA
	%	%	%
FAIR AND TRUSTED	69	62	84
FOLLOWS NORMS OF THE PEOPLE	56	57	72
EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	55	49	71

FIG. 5.7: Q-51A/C to 53. *And now let's turn to [institution]. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about [institution]. (a) It is fair and trusted. (b) It follows the norms and values of our people. (c) It is effective at delivering justice. (Percent who respond "agree strongly" or "somewhat" with each statement, among those who took their cases to each institution.)*

The most common types of disputes brought before these institutions were land disputes (43.3%), family problems (18.3%), property disputes (14.4%), and commercial disputes (9.5%) (Fig. 5.8).

TYPES OF CASES TAKEN FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION




FIG. 5.8: Q-48. (Ask if answered code 1, yes, in Q-47) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single Response: if more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent.)

End Notes

- ¹ Timor Sharan and Srinjoy Bose, “NUG One Year On: Struggling to Govern.” *Foreign Policy* 29 (September 2015), <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/afghan-national-unity-government-one-year-on-struggling-to-govern/>.
- ² Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” Transparency International website, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>.
- ³ The corruption rate is limited to respondents who have a direct experience with each government institution listed in Q-25, and is calculated as the percent of respondents who report having to pay a bribe, perform a favor, or give a gift in exchange for a service from each in some, most, or all cases of contact.
- ⁴ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), *Rule of Law in Afghanistan: U.S. Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs Costing More Than \$1 Billion* (SIGAR, July 2015), <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-68-AR.pdf>.
- ⁵ Dipali Mukhopadhyay, *Provincial Governors in Afghan Politics* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, January 2016), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR-385-Provincial-Governors-in-Afghan-Politics.pdf>.
- ⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends* (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf.
- ⁷ Michelle Hughes, *The Afghan National Police in 2015 and Beyond* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, May 2014), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR346_The_Afghan_National_Police_in_2015_and_Beyond.pdf.
- ⁸ Using an OLS regression, confidence in government institutions was regressed on a variety of demographic and economic variables including income, geographic location, and fear for personal safety.
- ⁹ This high percentage could be explained by the fact that Uzbeks also refer to defense lawyers as *dawa jalab*.
- ¹⁰ The Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA), which licenses private practice and defense lawyers, was established in 2008. In 2010, the membership was still fewer than 1,000 lawyers. By August 2016, there were 2,997 licensed lawyers and a constantly growing pool of applicants.
- ¹¹ The Case Management System (CMS) of Afghanistan is a database deployed in the majority of provinces and jointly managed by the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), funded by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), and a monitoring board made up of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the Supreme Court, the Attorney General’s Office, the AIBA, and the National Directorate for Security. Out of a dataset of 108,435 cases, CMS reported that only 627 proceeded with a defense lawyer.



له جنایته حمایت، جهالت دی جهالت
حمایت از جنایت، جنایت است جنایت

6. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In 2016, the Afghan political system was enveloped in gridlock and uncertainty. The brokered political settlement of the disputed 2014 presidential election resulted in the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG), in which Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah share power as president and chief executive officer (CEO), respectively. The 2014 NUG agreement stipulated that within two years, the government would convene a *loya jirga* to decide whether to institutionalize the CEO position as an “executive prime minister.” Two years on, however, the complicated process of convening a *loya jirga*, including parliamentary and district council elections to choose delegates, has been postponed.¹

The NUG agreement also outlined steps to reform Afghanistan’s electoral process. A Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) has proposed multiple reforms, including measures to strengthen political parties, thus reducing the power of Afghanistan’s many small parties to represent the interests of a small minority. Parliament rejected many of the SERC’s proposed changes, however, including changes to the structure and membership of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).² Meanwhile, ethnic and religious tensions have undermined government efforts to distribute electronic identity cards (*e-tazkeras*), a program designed to prevent voter fraud.

During the 2014 presidential election, Afghans defied Taliban threats of violence to vote in record numbers. It remains to be seen, however, if Afghans will maintain their enthusiasm for the political process despite the political stalemate. In the 2016 *Survey*, Afghans report greater fear for safety while voting (53.7%) than in 2014, less ability to influence local government decisions (43.3%), and lower satisfaction with democracy (55.9%).³ At the same time, Afghanistan is home to a vibrant media that has allowed Afghans to view and express satire and criticism of their political system.⁴ This year, 54.5% of Afghans say they feel comfortable criticizing their government in public, down from 60.5% in 2015.

The role of women in the Afghan political system continues to evolve. The Afghan Parliament sets aside 69 of its 249 seats in the lower house for women (27.7% of total seats), and currently includes 67 active female MPs⁵, while the upper house includes an additional 27 female MPs out of its 102 members. Some female MPs have successfully campaigned against and beaten male challengers to win their seats outright.⁶ In this year’s *Survey*, nearly all Afghans (88.2%) say they approve of women voting, while 31.6% say they prefer to be represented in Parliament by a woman, and a further 33.0% say the gender of their MP makes no difference to them. Experts say that cultural and religious norms, along with low levels of education among women, continue to prevent women from fully participating in the political process and taking responsibility for their own electoral decision-making.⁷

This chapter examines Afghan views of the democratic process, including attitudes towards participation in a variety of political activities and the role of women in Afghan politics, during this critical time of political change in Afghanistan.

6.1 EXERCISING BASIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS

Key Questions

Q-29. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election; (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration; (c) Running for public office.

Q-30. In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government, while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. Thinking back to a year ago, how safe did you feel expressing your opinions about the government in public?

The percentage of Afghans who say they felt fear while voting in a national or provincial election (53.7%) fell slightly in 2016 compared to 2015 (Fig. 6.1). The rate at which Afghans report feeling fear while participating in an election has been above 50% since 2009. The one exception is the 2014 *Survey*, conducted just after the presidential election in which Afghans defied threats of violence to vote in record numbers.⁸ The survey data shows that women (57.5%) and rural residents (56.9%) are more likely to express fear while voting than men (50.0%) and residents of urban areas (44.4%).

The greatest determinant of fear while voting, however, appears to be the geographic region in which respondents live. Fear while voting is highest in the South West (78.3%), the South East (65.1%), and the East regions (60.7%) and lowest in the Central/Hazarajat region (29.9%). More specifically, fear while voting is highest in Helmand (91.5%), Wardak (80.2%), and Faryab (80.1%) and lowest in Panjshir (0.4%), Samangan (21.5%), and Takhar (21.5%). Similarly, Pashtuns, who live in high concentrations in the South West, South East, and East regions, are more likely (64.0%) than Tajiks (45.1%), Uzbeks (49.9%), and Hazaras (50.0%) to say they feel some fear or a lot of fear while voting.




FIG. 6.1: Q-29. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election. (Percent who respond “some fear” or “a lot of fear.”)

A similarly high percentage (71.6%) of Afghans say that they would feel some fear or a lot of fear while participating in a peaceful demonstration. A higher percentage (74.7%) of Afghans say they would experience some level of fear while running for political office. However, unlike fear while voting, fear while participating in a peaceful demonstration and fear while running for political office do not display sharp differences across gender, ethnic, or geographic variables (Fig. 6.2). One exception is the Central/Hazarajat region, where residents regularly express comparatively low levels of fear while participating in all three types of political activity. This region remains one of the country's safest. Notably, in the Central/Kabul region, fear while participating in a peaceful protest jumped from 54.9% in 2015 to 70.6% in 2016. This change may be a response to high-profile suicide attacks on peaceful protests within Kabul city, where stated fear around such participation increased from 53.0% to 70.9%.

FEAR WHILE PARTICIPATING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, BY REGION




FIG. 6.2: Q-29. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election; (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration; (c) Running for public office. (Percent who respond “some fear” or “a lot of fear.”)

The *Survey* also asks Afghans how safe they feel criticizing their government in public. Just over half (54.5%) of Afghans say they feel safe criticizing their government in public (12.5% very safe, 42.0% somewhat safe), while 44.2% say they feel somewhat unsafe or very unsafe. Residents of urban areas (61.7%) are more likely than residents of rural areas (52.1%) to say they feel safe expressing critical opinions in public. However, perceived safety while criticizing the government ranges widely from province to province, from 77.6% in Panjshir and 76.6% in Bamyan, to 19.2% in Helmand and 32.3% in Faryab.

Residents of the most insecure areas, who were surveyed through intercept interviews, express high rates of insecurity while participating in political activities. These survey respondents—all of whom are male—report fear while voting (65.1%), while participating in a peaceful demonstration (74.9%), while running for public

office (77.8%), and while criticizing the government in public (58.0%). While these rates of insecurity among residents of the most insecure areas are higher than those of the greater Afghan public, they are often lower than the rates of insecurity reported in provinces such as Helmand and Wardak.

6.2 ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS

Key Question

Q-31. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions—a lot, some, very little, or none at all?*

In 2016, the percentage of Afghans who believe they or someone like them can affect local government decisions remains very low at 43.3%. This continues a decreasing trend since a recent high in 2014, just after the presidential election, and is the lowest percentage recorded in the past decade (Fig. 6.3).

INFLUENCE OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS




FIG. 6.3: Q-31. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions—a lot, some, very little, or none at all? (Percent who respond “a lot” or “some.”)*

The low percentage of Afghans who feel they can influence government decisions is similar among women (41.7%) and men (45.0%), as well as among residents of urban areas (40.2%) and rural areas (44.4%). There are some differences by region, however, ranging from 33.7% in the Central/Kabul region to 48.0% in the West region. The provinces where Afghans are most likely to say they can influence local government decisions are Samangan (76.6%), Laghman (75.4%), and Uruzgan (73.3%). This perception is lowest in Helmand (22.3%), Parwan (24.9%), and Panjshir (26.4%) (Fig. 6.4). Pashtuns (47.0%) and Uzbeks (48.4%) are slightly more likely than Tajiks (41.2%) and Hazaras (37.1%) to say they can influence government decisions.

PERCEPTION OF ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 6.4: Q-31. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions—a lot, some, very little, or none at all? (Percent who respond “a lot” or “some.”)*

Multivariate analysis that controls for gender, age, income, and geographic differences reveals a variety of tendencies that correspond with perceptions of the ability to influence local government decisions (Fig. 6.5).⁹ While this analysis reveals correlations, not causation, among specific variables, it produces a valuable portrait of Afghans who are more likely to believe that individual citizens can participate effectively in the political system.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED LOCAL INFLUENCE

AFGHANS WHO REPORT SOME OR A LOT OF ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS, ON AVERAGE, ARE:	AFGHANS WHO REPORT VERY LITTLE OR NO ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS, ON AVERAGE, ARE:
MORE LIKELY TO BE URBAN AFGHANS.	MORE LIKELY TO BE RURAL AFGHANS.
MORE LIKELY TO REPORT A LOW LEVEL OF FEAR WHILE PARTICIPATING IN SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTIVITIES.	MORE LIKELY TO REPORT A HIGH LEVEL OF FEAR WHILE PARTICIPATING IN SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTIVITIES.
MORE LIKELY TO REPORT EXPOSURE TO CORRUPTION IN THE PAST YEAR.	LESS LIKELY TO REPORT EXPOSURE TO CORRUPTION IN THE PAST YEAR.
MORE CONFIDENT IN PRESIDENT ASHRAF GHANI TO DO HIS JOB.	LESS CONFIDENT IN PRESIDENT ASHRAF GHANI TO DO HIS JOB.
MORE CONFIDENT IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.	LESS CONFIDENT IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.
MORE LIKELY TO REPORT SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS IN AFGHANISTAN.	LESS LIKELY TO REPORT SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS IN AFGHANISTAN.
MORE LIKELY TO FEEL SAFE CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT IN PUBLIC.	LESS LIKELY TO FEEL SAFE CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT IN PUBLIC.
MORE LIKELY TO BE A MEMBER OF PASHTUN OR UZBEK ETHNIC GROUPS.	LESS LIKELY TO BE MEMBER OF PASHTUN OR UZBEK ETHNIC GROUPS.
MORE LIKELY TO EXPRESS HAPPINESS WITH THEIR LIFE.	LESS LIKELY TO EXPRESS HAPPINESS WITH THEIR LIFE.

FIG. 6.5: Q-31. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions—a lot, some, very little, or none at all? Comparison of factors significantly associated with perceived influence over local government, using ordinary least square OLS regression analysis.*

6.3 POLITICS AND RELIGION

Key Question

Q-27. *Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion, and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?*

A majority of Afghans (57.2%) say that religious leaders should be involved in politics. This is the lowest rate in the last 10 years of the *Survey*, down from a high of 69.5% in 2011 (Fig. 6.6). Men (58.4%) and women (56.1%) report similar views about the role of religious scholars in politics, although residents of rural areas (58.9%) are slightly more likely to support an active role for religious leaders in politics than residents of urban areas (52.1%).

ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN POLITICS




FIG. 6.6: Q-27. *Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not be mixed. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view? (Percent who give each response.)*

Residents of the East region are notably more likely (71.6%) than those in other regions to say religious leaders should be involved in politics, followed by residents of the South West (63.3%) and the North East (61.8%). This view is most prevalent in Panjshir, where nearly all residents (98.1%) say religious leaders should be involved in politics (Panjshir is consistently high across years in the *Survey*), followed by Kunar (79.5%) and Parwan (74.2%). Pashtuns (60.5%) are slightly more likely than Uzbeks (57.5%), Tajiks (55.3%), and Hazaras (51.8%) to express this view.

6.4 WOMEN AND POLITICS

Key Questions

Q-63. *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in Parliament, or does it make no difference to you?*

Q-66. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in elections?*

Q-67. *If women vote, do you think that they should decide for themselves whom to vote for, or should men decide for women whom they should vote for?*

An overwhelming majority of Afghans (88.2%) say that women should be allowed to vote in elections. This represents a small increase from 83.4% in 2009, the last time this question was included in the *Survey*. Women are slightly more likely (90.6%) to hold this view than men (85.8%), and residents of urban areas (94.0%) more likely than residents of rural areas (86.3%). Support for women voting is high among Afghans at all

levels of education and across regions of the county, ranging from 73.2% in the South West to 97.2% in the Central/Kabul region. In all provinces, more than 70% of Afghans say women should vote, with the exception of Kandahar (63.2%), Wardak (54.6%), and Zabul (35.0%).

In 2016, 56.8% of Afghans say that women should make electoral decisions independently. By comparison, 21.3% of respondents say men should decide for women, and 20.8% say women should decide in consultation with men. The percentage of respondents who say women should decide for themselves has varied somewhat over the past eight years of the *Survey*, ranging from a high of 57.6% in 2008 to a low of 50.1% in 2014. The percentages of Afghans who say men should decide for women or women should decide in consultation with men have remained fairly steady over the same period (Fig. 6.7).

WOMEN AND ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING




FIG. 6.7: Q-67. *If women vote, do you think that they should decide for themselves whom to vote for, or should men decide for women whom they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men. (Percent who give each response.)*

Female respondents (59.9%) are slightly more likely than male respondents (53.8%) to say women should decide for themselves whom to vote for. A greater determinant of variance in Afghan opinions about women and electoral decision-making appears to be geographic locale. An overwhelming majority of urban residents (72.0%) say women should make their own electoral decisions, compared to only 51.8% of rural residents (Fig. 6.8). Afghans with a university education (who are more likely to live in urban areas) are also more likely to support women making electoral decisions independently than are Afghans with a high school education or less.

WOMEN AND ELECTORAL DECISION-MAKING, BY GENDER AND URBAN VS. RURAL




FIG. 6.8: Q-67. *If women vote, do you think that they should decide for themselves whom to vote for, or should men decide for women whom they should vote for? (a) Women should decide for themselves. (b) Men should decide for women. (c) Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men. (Percent who give each response.)*

Pashtuns are notably less likely (46.7%) than Tajiks (62.4), Uzbeks (61.4%), or Hazaras (69.4%) to support women making electoral decisions independently. Similarly, the lowest percentages of residents who say women should make electoral decisions on their own are found in the regions where Pashtuns are most concentrated—the South West (37.6%), the East (41.1%), and the South East (55.0%). In the South West in particular, residents are more likely to say that men should decide for women (39.3%) than that women should decide in consultation with men (21.9%). The provinces with the highest percentages of Afghans who say women should decide for themselves are Bamyan (86.9%), Panjshir (77.3%), and Kabul (76.0%). The provinces with the lowest percentages of Afghans who express that opinion are Zabul (21.8%), Nuristan (24.9%), and Helmand (29.0%).

The *Survey* also asked whether respondents would prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in Parliament. One-third of Afghans (34.5%) say they prefer to be represented by a man, 31.6% say they prefer to be represented by a woman, and 33.0% say it makes no difference whether they are represented by a man or a woman. Interestingly, male respondents (37.3%) are more likely than female respondents (25.9%) to say they prefer to be represented by a woman, though female respondents are more likely than male respondents to say the gender of their representative makes no difference to them (35.5% vs. 30.6%, respectively). However, the survey data shows that Afghans who live in the South West (58.1%), East (52.9%), and South East (44.4%) are more likely than Afghans who live in the North East (18.6%) and North West (26.9%) to say they prefer a male representative in Parliament.

6.5 ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Key Questions

Q-28. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? By democracy, we mean choosing the president and Parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*

Q-34. *Members of the Parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? (a) Listening to constituents and representing their needs.*

In 2015, the percentage of Afghans who expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works fell sharply, from 73.1% in 2014 to 57.2%. This sudden change in attitudes probably reflected the protracted political conflict that followed the 2014 presidential election, which ultimately resulted in a recount and the establishment of the National Unity Government. In 2016, Afghans continue to express lukewarm opinions about how democracy works in their country (Fig. 6.9). Specifically, 42.0% of Afghans say they are somewhat satisfied and 13.9% say they are very satisfied with how democracy works in their country. Women (57.9%) are slightly more likely to express satisfaction with democracy than are men (53.9%).

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY




FIG. 6.9: Q-28. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and Parliament by voting, rather than by appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (Percent who respond “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied.”)*

The 2016 survey data suggest that satisfaction with democracy may be a reflection of satisfaction with local and provincial government. While there are no significant differences in satisfaction with democracy among different ethnic groups, or between rural and urban areas, there are notable differences from one province to the next. Satisfaction with democracy is highest in Samangan (79.1%), Laghman (77.9%), and Kunar (75.8%). Satisfaction with democracy is lowest in Zabul (31.1%), Kapisa (33.7%), and Helmand (39.0%) (Fig. 6.10).

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 6.10: Q-28. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and Parliament by voting, rather than by appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (Percent who respond “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied.”)*

The *Survey* also asks Afghans to rate how well members of Parliament perform key duties. Overall, Afghans express poor opinions of their MPs’ performance. Just over half (54.9%) say their MPs do a good job of listening to constituents and representing their needs. While the *Survey* asked Afghans about all MPs in Parliament, it is likely that their opinion of the MP representing their area influences their response to this question. Examination of the responses to this question reveals that those provinces where residents are most likely to express satisfaction with democracy are the same provinces where they are most likely to express satisfaction with their MP’s performance.

End Notes

¹ Barnett Rubin and Georgette Gagnon, *The U.S. Presence and Afghanistan's National Unity Government: Preserving and Broadening the Political Settlement* (New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, August 2016), http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/national_unity_government_final.pdf.

² Martine van Bijlert and Ali Adwar Adili, *Pushing the Parliament to Accept a Decree: Another Election without Reform?* (Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 10, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/pushing-the-parliament-to-accept-a-decree-another-election-without-reform/>.

³ In 2014, 45.8% reported “some” or “a lot” of fear when voting, while in 2015, 44.5% reported “some” or “a lot” of ability to influence local government decisions, and 57.2% reported some level of satisfaction with democracy.

⁴ Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016: Afghanistan,” Freedom House website, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/afghanistan>.

⁵ The 2009 Parliamentary election resulted in 69 female MPs. Since then, one female member resigned, and one passed away. See also World Bank, “Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments,” World Bank website, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS>.

⁶ National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Afghan Women Take Seats In Parliament, Prepare For Road Ahead,” NDI website, February 9, 2011, https://www.ndi.org/afghan_women_seated_in_parliament.

⁷ Idrees Ilham, “As Election Nears in Afghanistan, Women’s Political Participation Is Critical,” *InAsia*, September 18, 2013, <http://asiafoundation.org/2013/09/18/as-election-nears-in-afghanistan-womens-political-participation-is-critical/>.

⁸ Joshua Partlow and Kevin Sieff, “Afghan voters defy Taliban, casting ballots for president on a relatively peaceful day,” *Washington Post*, April 5, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-voters-defy-taliban-cast-their-ballots-for-a-new-president-regional-councils/2014/04/05/c092f260-bc7b-11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_story.html.

⁹ Using OLS regression, Afghans’ perceptions of their degree of influence on local government decisions were regressed on a variety of demographic and attitudinal measures, including age (d2), income (d7 & d8), geographic location (m6b), fear of participating in political activities (scale), confidence in ANA (scale), exposure to corruption (scale), confidence in President Ashraf Ghani (q35a), confidence in Chief Executive Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (q35b), confidence in government institutions (scale), access to information (scale), confidence that guilty party would be punished (q24), satisfaction with the way democracy works (q28), safety while criticizing government in public (q30), sympathy with armed opposition groups (q39a), education (d10b), ethnic group (d14a), female contribution to income (d9), and overall life happiness (d24). The full model explains 23.6% of the variance in whether or not an Afghan expresses ability to influence local government decisions. (n=10,218; R²=0.236; F(21)=150.03; p<0.0001). To replicate the full model, contact the survey team; all code for analysis is available in Stata.



7. ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Afghans get news and information about current events from multiple sources—radio, TV, friends and family, local shuras and mosques. The news and information landscape continues to evolve, with new technology changing the way Afghans learn about current events and culture, politics and their government, and the broader world.

Afghanistan's media sector operates within a constitutional framework that codifies freedom of the press and freedom of expression and includes the Mass Media and Access to Information Laws that prohibit government censorship.¹ But the free flow of information is often impeded by restrictions on content deemed anti-Islamic or a threat to national security, and implementation of existing media laws protecting the free press is inconsistent.² As the National Unity Government (NUG) strives to make good on its inaugural promise of an open, transparent government, journalists say there is uneven enforcement of laws governing access to information and freedom of the press.³

The telecommunications industry has been the fastest-growing segment of Afghanistan's media sector in the past decade and a half.⁴ When the Taliban regime ended, the country had some 20,000 working phone lines to serve a population of 27 million. In 2001, the Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC) introduced wireless technology in the city of Kabul,⁵ and telecommunications networks now cover some 90.0% of the national population.⁶ Five mobile operators serve 25 million subscribers, and 3G service, launched in 2013, serves two million mobile broadband users. Mobile subscribership has grown 5.0% to 10.0% every year.⁷

In rural areas, radio remains the most common source of news and information, used by 74.4% of rural respondents in the *Survey*. The use of radio has declined over time, however, among both rural and urban respondents. The use of television for news and information, on the other hand, has grown. In urban areas, 92.4% of respondents say they use the television for news and information, and 57.8% in rural areas say the same.

Use of the Internet for news and information has grown as well. In 2013 only 1.1% of rural Afghans and 10.6% of urban Afghans said they used the Internet for news and information; this year, 7.2% of rural respondents and 24.9% of urban respondents say they do. This growth in Internet use has increased the role that Afghanistan's media sector plays in shaping public perceptions. In addition to the rising use of social media such as Facebook, the country now has 174 radio stations, 83 private television stations, and 22 state-owned provincial channels, including Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), the country's oldest media outlet.⁸

This year showed a small but significant decrease in confidence in the media, from 66.6% to 64.5%, and in community shuras, from 64.1% to 62.1%. A slight increase in trust in religious leaders, from 64.3% to 66.1%, makes them the most trusted of all categories of officials, institutions, and organizations, including the media. Afghans tuned into television tend to express less confidence in the performance of the National Unity Government and more confidence in the media.

Among TV viewers, 30.7% have “a lot of confidence” in the media to do their job, while 20.4% of non-viewers say they feel the same. Most TV viewers (37.1%) and most non-viewers (38.2%) have “some confidence” in

the media, while 11.1% of viewers and 15.5% of non-viewers have “no confidence at all” in the media. Radio listeners (27.4%) and non-listeners (27.3%) have “a lot of confidence” in media, while 13.0% of listeners and 12.1% of non-listeners have “no confidence at all” in media.

This chapter explores Afghans’ media consumption habits and the role of media and information in shaping public opinion and behavior regarding women’s rights, the national government, and security.

7.1 SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION

Key Questions

Q-77. *Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? (a) Radio; (b) TV set; (c) Mobile phone; (d) The Internet; (e) Mosque; (f) Community shuras.*

Q-70. *Do you listen to radio programs?*

Q-71. *You said you listen to the radio. On days when you listen to the radio, how many hours do you listen to it on average?*

Q-72. *Do you watch television programs?*

Q-73. *You said that you watch television. On days when you watch television, how many hours do you watch on average?*

D25a. *Do you personally use a mobile phone or not?*

D-25c. *How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?*

As in previous years, radio is one of the most common sources of information, with 70.5% of respondents saying they receive news and information from the radio, followed by television (66.4%), mosques (47.5%), and community shuras (39.0%). Mobile phones, used as a source of information in 2013 by 57.0% of respondents, are now used by only 42.1%, possibly an effect of the 10.0% tax on all phone calls introduced in 2015. Meanwhile, use of the Internet to obtain news and information has increased 8.4 points, from 3.2% in 2013 to 11.6% in 2016. Many Afghans continue to obtain news and information through mosques (46.9% in 2014, 47.5% in 2016) or community shuras (36% in 2014, 39% in 2016) (Fig. 7.1).

Among respondents who say they listen to radio programs, 18.1% listen less than 30 minutes daily, 35.4% listen from 31 minutes to one hour each day, and 32.4% listen up to two hours daily. Among television viewers, 7.1% say they watch TV less than 30 minutes daily, 15.8% say they watch between 31 minutes and one hour each day, and 37.5% watch up to two hours daily.

SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION, 2013-2016




FIG. 7.1: Q-77. Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information? (a) Radio; (b) TV set; (c) Mobile phone; (d) The Internet; (e) Mosque; (f) Community shuras. (Percent who say they use each.)

This year, respondents are asked how many members of their household have mobile phones (Fig. 7.2). On average, these households comprise 10.3 persons in rural areas and 8.8 persons in urban areas. In many cases, a single household has more than one phone. Men are twice as likely as women to have access to a mobile phone. Roughly one-third (36.8%) of survey respondents report that there are three or more mobile phones in their household, including 33.3% of those in rural areas and 47.3% of those in urban areas. Only 4.0% of urban respondents say they have no mobile phone in their household, compared to 13.4% of rural respondents.

When respondents are also asked if they personally own a mobile phone, 55.9% say yes, including 74.3% of urban and 49.9% of rural respondents. Nearly one-third (32.1%) of respondents who own a mobile phone say that they cannot personally access the Internet. However, the 2016 *Survey* does not ask whether these personal phones are “smart phones” with Internet or not.⁹

MOBILE PHONE OWNERSHIP, BY HOUSEHOLD

NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WITH MOBILE PHONES	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
	%	%	%
0	13	4	11
1	24	16	22
2	29	32	30
3 OR MORE	33	47	37
TOTAL	100	100	100

FIG. 7.2: D-25c. How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?

The second-fastest area of growth has been in TV ownership, which has grown steadily from 36.9% in 2007 to over 60.0% in 2015, where it remains this year. Notably, TV ownership has not increased this year, possibly the consequence of a sluggish economy. Ownership is concentrated in urban areas, where electricity is more dependable, and corresponds to increased household income. TV ownership is highest in the Central/Kabul region, with 53.3% of households saying they own one set and 3.7% saying they own three, followed closely by ownership in the North West and West regions.

TV OWNERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN




FIG. 7.3: D-5. How many of the following does your household have? (d) TV. (Percent who own at least one TV in their household.) Note: trend line uses X-1b in the merged variable list, 2007–2012, for comparison with D-5d.

Nearly two-thirds (64.5%) of Afghans report watching TV programs. Of those, 7.1% watch less than 30 minutes daily, 24.5% watch between 31 minutes and one hour, 37.5% watch one to two hours daily, and 30.2% watch more than two hours of television a day. Tolo TV is the most-watched network in Afghanistan, with 36.3% of viewing respondents. The next-most watched networks are Ariana TV (9.6%), Shamshad TV (8.9%), and Lemar TV (8.2%).

7.2 ACCESS TO INTERNET AND USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Key Questions

Q-75. *Do people in your area have access to the Internet, either through a cable connection, wireless connection, or cellular data (2G or 3G)?*

Q-76. *Do you personally have access to the Internet?*

D-25d. *(Ask if 1 or more mobile phones in D-25c) And how many members of your household own mobile phones that can access the Internet, such as the ability to access email, websites, or Facebook?*

Use of social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter has increased in Afghanistan among politicians, youth, the private sector, and insurgents alike.¹⁰ They have become primary vehicles for disseminating information in a country where power or news blackouts can impede circulation.¹¹ For instance, when a young woman named Farkhunda was killed by a mob in Kabul city in March 2015, despite a power outage, smartphone videos of the incident were posted on YouTube and shared extensively, galvanizing large numbers of Afghan protesters and drawing significant media attention.¹²

Nationwide, 40.0% of respondents say they live in an area or location that has access to the Internet, which includes 32.6% of respondents in rural areas and 62.2% of respondents in urban areas. This access varies widely from province to province, from as little as 2.4% of respondents in Nuristan to 66.1% in Kabul province. When asked if they personally have access to the Internet, which might include a personal mobile phone with cellular Internet or some other personal means of access, only 11.2% of respondents say yes. A higher number—27.4% of respondents—indicate that they have one or more mobile phones in their household that have the ability to access to the Internet (Fig. 7.4). While family members may have an Internet-enabled mobile phone, they may not share these with other family members. Notably, three times as many men (17.0%) as women (5.5%) say they have personal access to the Internet. Barriers to Internet access include affordability, electricity, network coverage, conservative cultural views, and illiteracy.

HOUSEHOLD INTERNET ACCESS ON MOBILE PHONES




FIG. 7.4: D-25d. (Ask if 1 or more mobile phones in D-25c) And how many members of your household own mobile phones that can access the Internet, such as the ability to access email, websites, or Facebook?

7.3 ROLE OF TELEVISION IN PUBLIC OPINION AND BEHAVIOR

Key Questions

Q-72. Do you watch television?

Q-70. Do you listen to radio programs?

Q-74. What TV station would you say you watch the most?

Q-35. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? (h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV.

Q-64. In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.

Q-59. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?

Q-57. Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?

Q-62. Thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to leadership roles?

Q-36. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that, overall, the following is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) National Unity Government.

Q-18. *In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district?*

Q-39a. *Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups (AOGs)?*

As the media sector has expanded, one key question is whether and how television viewership affects public perceptions. Interactions with three areas of public perception are briefly explored here: (a) attitudes of support for women's rights, (b) levels of confidence in government, and (c) perceptions of insecurity. These areas are selected based on expectations that television may play a role in shaping perceptions of each. For example, perceptions of women may be affected by the rising popularity of Turkish dramas or Indian films that often cast women in a wide variety of roles, while perceptions of insecurity may be affected by viewing the sometimes graphic imagery from Taliban attacks or ISIS/Daesh.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Television stations in Afghanistan feature women in a variety of roles, from newscasters to singers, to both housewives and working women in TV dramas. As respondents watch television, they are exposed to women in nontraditional roles and mixed-gender environments. Does this exposure affect perceptions of women's rights? Multivariate regression analysis strongly supports this association, both in 2016 and in previous national samples. Respondents in the *Survey* who watch more hours of television appear more likely to support women's rights,¹³ after controlling for demographic and geographic factors such as gender, age, education level, income, province, and whether or not the respondent lives in an urban area.

Notably, the association also holds true in “intercept interviews,” conducted with respondents from highly insecure or inaccessible areas, and it appears robust, not only when examining hours of TV watched, but also when examining household TV ownership and use of TV for news and information. TV viewership appears to increase support for women's voting rights, women in positions of leadership, equal access to education, women's right to work outside the home, more liberal attitudes towards appropriate dress for women in public,¹⁴ a higher ideal age for women to marry, and women's legal right to inheritance.

CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT

Television viewership appears to interact with how respondents perceive their government. As respondents report watching more television, they are more likely to say that the National Unity Government is doing a very bad job, for example (Fig. 7.5). Using multivariate analysis to control for demographic and geographic factors, this association remains robust. Afghans who watch more hours of television are significantly less likely to report having confidence in various levels of the Afghan government.¹⁵ The association holds across years and across several measures of TV consumption. Other factors appear to carry a stronger association, however, particularly access to services, which predicts increased confidence in government, as well as measures of geographic location (province, region, and whether the sampling point is an urban or rural settlement), which strongly correlate with variations in confidence.¹⁶

CONFIDENCE IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, BY HOURS OF TV WATCHED




FIG. 7.5: Q-36a. Do you think that overall the following is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job...National Unity Government; **Q-73.** (Filtered. Ask those who watch TV in Q-72) You said that you watch television (mention response in Q-4). How many hours do you watch it on an average day every time when you watch television?

Listening to radio appears to have the opposite association, however. Those who listen to radio appear less likely to say that the NUG is doing a very bad job, compared to who do not listen to radio (Fig. 7.6). Because radio and TV consumption also correlate strongly with urban and rural differences, among other possible explanations, it is important to control for demographic and geographic variables.

CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, BY RADIO LISTENERSHIP




FIG. 7.6: Q-36a. Do you think that overall the following is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job...National Unity Government; **Q-70.** Do you listen to radio programs? (Percent who say yes or no.)

SECURITY

In the 2015 *Survey*, respondents reported watching the 6 o'clock news more than any other program. Through news programs in particular, viewers are often exposed to reports of crime and violence. These frequently include attacks from armed anti-government groups, making the violence seem more frequent, near, and graphic than if one were listening to the same reports on a radio, for example.

TV consumption appears to have an effect on the perception of insecurity even after accounting for factors such as income, gender, place of residence, ethnicity, and education level. Respondents who watch or own a TV are significantly more likely to say that ISIS is a threat to their area than are those who do not watch or own a TV, and significantly more likely to report higher levels of fear for their personal safety, even within relatively safe urban areas. Watching or owning a TV also appears to associate with reduced agreement with the statement that reconciliation efforts with antigovernment groups can help to stabilize the country. Despite increased perception of ISIS/Daesh as a threat, and growing fear for personal safety, however, watching more hours of TV per day appears to also predict increased confidence in the Afghan National Army.

Further analysis of the association between access to information and desire to migrate can be found in Chapter 9, Migration.

End Notes

¹ Media workers were optimistic in December 2014 when the president signed the Access to Information Law, but almost two years later, amendments to the bill remain with the Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC), awaiting review by the Ministry of Justice. According to the media watchdog Nai Supporting Open Media in Afghanistan (Nai), the same is true of the Media Law. A monitoring commission has been established according to the terms of the law, but it is not yet fully implemented. At present, the MoIC is responsible for monitoring the media, leaving open the possibility of government censorship of the country's constitutionally "inviolable" free press.

² Interview with Mujeeb Khalvatgar, Nai managing director, October 2016.

³ Ibid. Acts of violence committed against media—not only by insurgents, but as some media report, by government and police—increase yearly. Nai tracks incidents and threats of violence against journalists across the country. According to Nai's March 2016 report, the past year was "the bloodiest year for Afghanistan's journalists." In collaboration with InterNews, Nai has gathered data showing 722 incidents of violence against journalists between 2001 and 2016, ranging from beatings to killings. The Committee to Protect Journalists reports that 29 journalists have been killed in Afghanistan since 1992, "motive confirmed," and an additional six were killed in that time period, "motive unconfirmed."

⁴ Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC), *A Nation on the Line: The Story of the Afghan Wireless Communication Company* (Kabul: AWCC, 2002), <http://www.afghanwireless.com/images/AWCC%20Brochure%20012703.pdf>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Broadcasting Board of Governors/Gallup, *Media Watch Report*, 2014, <https://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2015/01/Afghanistan-research-brief.pdf>.

⁷ BuddeComm, *Afghanistan—Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband—Statistics and Analyses* (BuddeComm, May 2016), <https://www.budde.com.au/Research/Afghanistan-Telecoms-Mobile-and-Broadband-Statistics-and-Analyses>.

⁸ Reporters Without Borders, "2016 World Press Freedom Index," Reporters Without Borders website, <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>. Freedom House ranks press freedom in 199 countries based on three primary criteria: legal environment, political environment, and economic environment. Observing that "press freedom [in Afghanistan] declined to its lowest point in 12 years in 2015 as political, criminal, and terrorist forces sought to co-opt or silence the media in their broader struggle for power," Freedom House assigns Afghanistan a press freedom score of 62/100 (0 = best, 100 = worst). Freedom House, "2016 Freedom of the Press Report: Afghanistan," Freedom House website, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016>.

⁹ The 2017 *Survey* will add a question to clarify.

¹⁰ Political candidates in two previous election cycles created Facebook pages where they posted promotional items. Businesses maintain websites to promote their services and goods. And insurgents propagandize through websites such as Nunn Asia and El Amarah.

¹¹ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), *Social Media in Afghanistan: Measuring the usage & perceptions of the Afghan population* (GIZ, June 2014),

http://ez-afghanistan.de/fileadmin/content/news/Social_Media_251114.pdf.

¹² Joshi Herrmann, "How social media is empowering young Afghan women: The Facebook effect," *Independent* (UK), July 10, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/features/how-social-media-is-empowering-young-afghan-women-the-facebook-effect-10375022.html>.

¹³ Support for women's rights is a scale ($\alpha=.877$) that consists of 11 questions in the 2016 survey (Q-56a, Q-56b, Q-56c, Q-57, Q-58e, Q-59, Q-61e, Q-62a, Q-62b, Q-62c, Q-62d, Q-62e, Q-66, and Q-67).

¹⁴ This is based on responses to Q-64, *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places?* (See Chapter 8, Women in Society). Most men who watch TV believe that the burqa conservative dress is most appropriate for women (image 1, 29.9%; image 2, 29.4%). Women who watch TV favor image 4 (25.1%) followed closely by images 1 (21.9%) and 2 (23.6%). Men and women who do not watch TV say that women should be maximally covered in public, selecting images 1 (53.4% of men and 43.6% of women) and 2 (26.9% of men and 29.1% of women). Among men who watch TV, 16.1% select image 3, and 16.2% select image 4 for appropriateness. Only 6.8% of male TV viewers approve of image 5, and just 1.3% select image 6. Among women who watch television, 25.1% believe that image 4 depicts appropriate public dress for women, while 21.9% and 23.6% select images 1 and 2, respectively. Only 9.2% approve of image 5, and 1.4% select image 6. Men (53.3%) and women (43.6%) who do not watch television select image 1 as the most appropriate dress for women in public. Of male nonviewers, 26.9% select image 2, as do 29.1% of female nonviewers.

¹⁵ Confidence in government was regressed on amount of TV watched, along with age, gender, urban/rural, province, education, and income, to determine whether the amount of television watched has a robust impact on confidence in government after demographic controls. Confidence in government is a scale (alpha=0.85), constructed from questions Q-35a, Q-35b, Q-35c, Q-35f, Q-35j, Q-35k, Q-35m, Q-36a, and Q-36b, which measures confidence in President Ghani, CEO Abdullah, the Independent Election Commission, government ministries, Parliament, provincial councils, and members of Parliament, and measures perceptions of central and provincial governments. In all models tested, each level increase in the amount of television watched predicts a significant decrease in confidence.

¹⁶ Using OLS regression, a confidence-in-government scale was regressed on hours of TV watched. The full model controlled for access to services (another scale) as well as demographic factors that included gender, education, income, province, rural vs. urban, age, and ethnicity. The full model explained 21.3% of the variance. Those who watch more TV are significantly less likely to report confidence in government ($\beta = -.054$, $p < .0001$, $t = -6.4$).



8. WOMEN IN SOCIETY

As Afghan and international stakeholders met for the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016, a side event was held on women's empowerment at which donors, led by the European Union, pledged continued emphasis on assistance to women in Afghanistan. Among all stakeholders there remains anxiety that the deteriorating security situation, including Taliban territorial advances and waning international attention, will put the modest but hard-won progress in women's status at risk. Many criticize the exclusion of women from peace negotiation efforts to date,¹ and the lack of a specific work plan or timeline for the country's new National Action Plan for Women.

While support for women's rights gradually declined prior to the National Unity Government (NUG), 2016 marks a second year of incremental growth in acceptance of women working outside the home. In 2016, three-quarters (74.0%) of Afghans say they agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home, a significant increase from 64.0% in 2015 and the low of 62.5% in 2011. Notably, more men this year say women should decide for themselves whom to vote for (53.8%, compared to 48.3% in 2015), and significantly more Afghans agree this year than in 2013 that women should be allowed to vote, an increase seen especially among rural Afghan men. Other indicators, however, such as support for women in leadership positions, have shown little change.

Due to social desirability bias, stated support may exceed actual support. For example, the overwhelming majority of respondents in 2016 (80.7%) say they agree that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. However, when asked about equal access to education at specific levels, support tapers off. Most Afghans support women receiving basic education, such as in an Islamic madrasa (93.6%), but far fewer say women should receive higher levels of education, such as at a university (72.1%). Support drops further when there is an expectation of travel between the home and school. Only 47.1% of respondents support women studying outside of their home province. Overall, in keeping with previous years, women and urban residents are more likely to support women's equal access to education, freedom to work outside the home, and other opportunities than are men and rural Afghans.²

One factor that may explain the gap between stated support and actual support is the growing awareness that protecting women's rights is a government priority. This year, the NUG made public statements in support of advancing women's rights,³ and Afghanistan's first lady, Rula Ghani, took an active public role advocating for gender equity.⁴ For the first time, a woman was appointed to a leadership role in the Attorney General's Office, and Afghanistan appointed a woman as its representative to the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The two members of Parliament from Nimroz province are women, and notably, Nimroz also has a female prosecutor in its appellate court who focuses on cases of domestic violence against women. More women have taken up posts in provincial government departments, and the NUG announced its intention to allocate 30% of government posts to Afghan women by the year 2018.⁵

As institutions like the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission continue to improve data collection on violence against women, the growing use of social media in Afghanistan has enabled Afghans to share stories and express reactions to coverage of gender issues.⁶ Reporting of individual incidents has increased this year, including notable cases such as Nafisa Nouri, a young mother doused in acid while walking in the street

during Eid in Kabul,⁷ the shooting of a 19-year-old battered runaway by the Taliban in Sar-e-Pul, a pregnant 14-year-old from Ghor burned to death by her husband's family,⁸ and a pregnant 20-year-old in Takhar who was mutilated and beaten by her husband and in-laws while pregnant, resulting in the death of the fetus.⁹

The year 2016 was also marked by many firsts for Afghan women. A women's university opened in Kabul,¹⁰ Khost province opened its first women's park,¹¹ a Kabul restaurant owned and operated by women opened its doors,¹² a family cinema was established where women can watch movies,¹³ the first women's yoga center opened,¹⁴ and a women's library began operations in the capital.¹⁵ More women graduated from the army cadet school and the police academy than ever before, and once again, a female athlete competed for Afghanistan in this year's Olympics. Afghan women software developers launched an app to fight street harassment,¹⁶ and girls enrolled in courses in coding and computer science courses in several universities offering the subject.

This chapter discusses attitudes and opinions on Afghan women in society and perceptions of gender as it relates to justice, customs and tribal practices, political participation, education, and economic activities.

8.1 WOMEN'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Key Questions

Q-47. *In the past two years, have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?*

Q-50. *(If Q-47 answer is yes) Where have you taken this case or dispute?*

Q-52E. *(If Q-50 answer is state courts) Please tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts? (e) State courts treat men and women equally.*

Q-53E. *(If Q-50 answer is shura/jirga) Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas? (e) There should be local women's jirgas and shuras.*

Q-54. *In your area, is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?*

Q-55A. *(If Q-54 answer is yes) What organization, institution, or authority is that?*

Q-55B. *(If Q-54 answer is yes) Have you ever contacted this or another organization, institution, or authority that helps solve women's problems in your area?*

The number of Afghans who say they know of an organization, institution, or authority in their area where women can go to have problems solved increased significantly between 2014 and 2015, from 19.2% to 23.4%, and remains roughly the same in 2016 (23.9%). Most Afghans (73.4%) still say they are not aware of any such organization, institution, or authority in their area.

Among those who say there is a place for women to resolve their problems, half cite the Directorate of Women's Affairs (51.1%), followed by the Human Rights Council (8.6%), a district office (6.9%), a women's shura (5.4%), or elders (4.5%). Only 2.1% say the Afghan National Police (ANP), and a small number of others

say that women could go to the court (3.1%), the attorney general (1.3%), or government organizations in general (0.5%). Of these respondents, 41.2% (47.5% of women and 35.1% of men) say they have contacted one of these organizations before, including slightly more rural Afghans (43.6%) than urban Afghans (33.2%).

However, women seek different places to resolve their problems depending upon the type of problem. Based on a separate set of questions about the use of shuras and jirgas, state courts, and local *Huquq* (rights) Departments, women who seek formal dispute resolution are more likely to take a family problem to a shura/jirga for resolution, while for divorce they are more likely to take their case to a state court or a Huquq Department for resolution.¹⁷ When examining the distribution of problems by institution used for dispute resolution, shuras and jirgas are significantly more likely to be used by women for family problems than are other institutions (Fig. 8.1).

TYPE OF DISPUTE, BY LOCATION: WOMEN




FIG. 8.1: Q-47. *In the past two years, have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not? Q-48.* (If Q-47 answer is yes) *What kind of a case or dispute was it? (a) Dispute over land; (b) Other property dispute, not land; (c) Commercial dispute; (d) Divorce; (e) Family problems; (f) Traffic accident. (Single response: if more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one.) (Percent of dispute types within each dispute resolution destination, based on women's cases only.)*

Just over one-fifth of respondents (22.4%) say that in the past two years they have taken a case to the Huquq Department or local shura/jirga to resolve it,¹⁸ an increase from 16.3% in 2013. More men than women say they have used the Huquq Department or a shura/jirga to resolve a dispute, and reported rates of use by women sharply increased between 2011 and 2013, with rates this year similar to the past three years (see Chapter 5, Governance).

Among women who report using formal dispute resolution services, when asked which specific institutions they used, 43.7% say they used a village or neighborhood shura/jirga, 39.1% say they took their case to state court, and 23.2% say they took it to the Huquq Department, while small numbers reported their case to the

police, a district office, or elsewhere. Among women who took their case to a local shura/jirga, 62.2% agree with the statement that there should be local women's shuras and jirgas, a rate comparable to men (63.8%).

Consistent with other surveys, women tend to report more favorable views of state courts than of shuras/jirgas. When asked if state courts treat men and women equally, women who took their case to a state court (55.5%) are more likely to agree than are men (45.3%). This appears somewhat surprising, since women are often poorly treated across different dispute mechanisms. However, state courts are often associated with protection of formal women's rights, such as those protected by constitutional law, while traditional dispute mechanisms such as shuras and jirgas are associated with a reliance on local norms and customs.

8.2 CUSTOMS AND TRIBAL PRACTICES

Key Questions

Q-56. *Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? (a) The practice of baad is acceptable. (b) The practice of baddal is acceptable. (c) A daughter is entitled to part of her deceased father's inheritance (miras).*

Q-64. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.*

Q-68. *What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married?*

Q-69. *What do you think is the best age for a man to get married?*

BAAD, BADDAL, AND MIRAS

Each year, the *Survey* assesses perceptions of three cultural practices that relate to women: *baad*, *baddal*, and *miras*. *Baad* is a traditional dispute resolution practice wherein a family gives away a daughter to another party as penalty or payment to settle a debt, grievance, or conflict between families. *Baddal* is the exchange of daughters between families for marriage. This is often, but not always, a form of forced marriage, and may be driven by economic incentive (avoiding a bride price through exchange). *Miras* is a portion of a deceased father or husband's inheritance or estate passed down to the daughter.

ACCEPTABILITY OF BAAD AND BADDAL, OVER TIME




FIG. 8.2: Q-56. *Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? (a) The practice of baad is acceptable. (b) The practice of baddal is acceptable. (Percent who agree somewhat or strongly with each.)*

Overall, most Afghans (65.4%) strongly disagree¹⁹ that the practice of baad is acceptable, including slightly more men (67.1%) than women (63.7%). An additional 16.2% somewhat disagree, while 12.5% somewhat agree, and 5.4% strongly agree that baad is acceptable (6.3% of women and 4.6% of men). However, once the impact of education and region are accounted for, gender appears to have no impact on perceptions of baad. On average, those who agree with baad tend to have no formal education, tend to be older, and are more likely to be Pashtun.²⁰ Income has no significant association with attitudes towards baad.

More urban respondents (81.6%) strongly disagree with the practice of baad than rural respondents (60.1%). Strong disagreement with baad is highest in Central/Kabul, at 82.0%, followed by the North East (73.3%), and lowest in the West (47.9%). Disagreement with baad is fairly consistent across ethnic groups, with the majority of Pashtuns (79.2%), Uzbeks (80.6%), Hazaras (81.8%), Turkmen (81.7%), and Tajiks (83.5%) disagreeing with the practice.²¹

Overall, fewer respondents strongly disagree with baddal (45.1%) than with baad. Instead, they express more ambivalence (22.8% somewhat disagree, 21.6% somewhat agree), while 10.1% strongly agree with baddal. In urban areas, women (4.9%) are less likely than men (10.4%) to strongly agree with baddal, while in rural areas this difference is statistically insignificant (11.4% vs. 10.4%). Education appears to play a role. On average, educated respondents are less likely to agree with the practice of baddal compared to respondents with no education or only a primary education. This association holds even after controlling for urban or rural status (urban Afghans tend to be more educated, while the practice of baddal is simply more common in rural areas than in urban areas).

A majority of respondents (63.0%) agree that a daughter is entitled to miras, including 24.9% who somewhat agree, while 7.6% somewhat and 4.2% strongly disagree, with little difference between female and male respondents at each level. Urban respondents are more likely than rural respondents to strongly agree that a daughter is entitled to miras (73.5% vs. 59.6%). Rural respondents are more likely than urban respondents to somewhat disagree (8.9% vs. 3.7%). Strong agreement is highest in Central/Kabul (72.3%) and the North East (71.6%), and lowest in the South East (50.9%) and the East (53.9%). Support for miras rises as education increases, with 58.3% of those with informal schooling strongly agreeing with miras, compared to 85.4% of university graduates. Support for miras has remained stable since the question was introduced in the *Survey*, ranging from 87.3% in 2014 to 87.9% in 2016.

PERCEPTIONS OF WOMEN'S ATTIRE

Since 2014, respondents have been shown images on a show-card of six women wearing different types of dress (Fig. 8.3) and asked to point to the woman they think is most appropriately dressed for public places. Overall, 33.9% of respondents in 2016 point to the woman wearing a burqa in Image 1, while 27.1% point to the woman wearing a niqab in Image 2, and 15.2% prefer the *chador* (headscarf) in Image 3. Only 1.1% say that wearing no head covering is acceptable for women in public. Male and female respondents differ slightly, however, as indicated in Figure 8.3. The greatest gender differences appear in responses to Image 1, which is selected by significantly more men (38.0%) than women (29.9%), and to Image 4, which is preferred by more women (19.4%) than men (12.9%). Rural/urban differences are even greater than gender differences: 38.5% of rural respondents prefer Image 1, compared to only 20.3% of urban respondents, while twice as many urban as rural Afghans prefer Image 4 (24.9% vs. 13.3%) and Image 5 (10.3% vs. 5.0%).

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC:
PERCEPTIONS OF MEN VS. WOMEN




FIG. 8.3: Q-64. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.*

Preference for the two most conservative styles of dress decreases with rising education levels: respondents with no education prefer Image 1 at twice the rate of university graduates (36.7% vs. 18.5%). Meanwhile, 1.0% of those with no education and 0.8% of those with some primary education prefer the woman with no head covering (Image 6) compared to 2.3% of university graduates (Fig. 8.4).

PERCEPTION OF APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC

	NEVER WENT TO SCHOOL	PRIMARY SCHOOL COMPLETE	SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETE	HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETE	UNIVERSITY EDUCATION COMPLETE
	%	%	%	%	%
IMAGE 1	37	34	28	28	19
IMAGE 2	25	29	33	26	33
IMAGE 3	16	16	16	13	19
IMAGE 4	16	14	11	22	21
IMAGE 5	5	5	10	10	7
IMAGE 6	1	1	3	1	2

FIG. 8.4: Q-64. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (Percent who choose each image.)*

Since dress is a cultural practice, ethnicity explains some of the differences in attitudes towards women's dress in public. Overall, Pashtuns are most likely to choose the burqa in Image 1 (49.6%), while Hazaras are most likely to choose Image 3, 4, or 5 (Fig. 8.5). Over time, attitudes towards women's dress have changed slightly, but the change appears concentrated among Hazara and Tajik respondents rather than Pashtun respondents, who report fairly consistent views (Figs. 8.6 and 8.7). In 2015, Hazaras, and to a lesser extent Uzbeks, appeared to shift towards more conservative preferences in women's dress, possibly related to rising political insecurity and uncertainty following the inception of the National Unity Government, which occurred after the 2014 *Survey*.

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENT




FIG. 8.5: Q-64. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (Percent who choose each image.)*

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, PASHTUNS OVER TIME




FIG. 8.6: Q-64. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (Percent who choose each image.)*

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, HAZARAS OVER TIME




FIG. 8.7: Q-64. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (Percent who choose each image.)*

IDEAL AGE FOR A WOMAN TO MARRY

Each year, respondents are asked what they think is the best age for a woman or a man to get married.²² Overall, respondents think the ideal age for a woman to marry is significantly younger than the ideal age for a man to marry (Fig. 8.8). The most common response for the ideal age for a woman to marry is 18 (32.4%), followed by age 20 (24.4%). Most Afghans (81.6%) say that a woman should marry between ages 18 and 32, with 18.6% citing ages younger than 18 (age 14, 1.5%; age 15, 2.8%; age 16, 9.1%; and age 17, 5.2%).

For comparison, when Afghans are asked about the ideal age for a man to marry, very few respondents (3.5%) cite an age below 18. The most common responses are age 20 (22.0%) and age 25 (20.4%). While the highest ideal age for a woman to marry is 32, the highest ideal age for a man to marry is 40. Female and urban respondents are more likely than male and rural respondents to say that a man should marry at an older age.

IDEAL AGE FOR MARRIAGE




FIG. 8.8: Q-68. What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married? Q-69. What do you think is the best age for a man to get married? (Percent citing each age.)

There appears to be a difference between the ideal versus the actual age that women marry. The Central Statistics Organization (CSO) and UNICEF report that 46% of Afghan women are married before the age of 18, and 15% are married before the age of 15.²³ Where the actual marriage age is lower than the ideal age, it suggests that factors other than personal preference, such as economic pressures or perceptions of uncertainty, may affect actual marriage decisions. Families may want their daughter to marry young as a measure to achieve financial or social security. In addition to the economic benefit of receiving *gala* (a gift traditionally in the form of money paid by the groom to the bride’s family), it is often easier for Afghan families to find a husband for a daughter who is young, due to social attitudes about sexual chastity. Political context may play a role as well. Respondents in 2015 were significantly more likely to cite age 16 as the appropriate age for a woman to marry than were respondents in years 2014 and 2016 (Fig. 8.9), an increase that coincides with the NUG’s renewed efforts to reconcile with the Taliban.

IDEAL AGE FOR A WOMAN TO MARRY, ACROSS TIME




FIG. 8.9: Q-68. *What do you think is the best age for a woman to get married? (Percent citing each age. Question first asked in 2014.)*

In a pattern consistent with previous years, twice as many rural as urban respondents this year choose 16 as the best age for a woman to get married, while more than twice as many urban as rural respondents choose age 25. Disaggregated by gender, men are more likely than women to choose a younger ideal age for women to marry. Just 15.6% of women choose an age under 18, compared to 21.2% of men. As respondents' education levels increase, the age preferences for marriage also appear to increase. For example, no respondent with a master's degree in 2016 chooses an age below 18. Among those with only informal schooling, 13.7% choose age 16, compared to just 5.8% of those who had completed high school.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, those who report younger ideal marriage ages for women are likely to report conservative attitudes towards other traditional practices related to women as well. For example, those who agree with the practices of baad and baddal are on average more likely than those who disagree to say that women should be married at a younger age. The reverse is also true. Those who support women's right to inheritance and right to work outside the home prefer an older age for women to marry than do those who do not support these rights.

8.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Key Questions

Q-62. *Do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (a) Member of a community development council; (b) Governor of a province; (c) CEO of a large company; (d) Minister or cabinet member; (e) Candidate for president of Afghanistan.*

Q-65. *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?*

Q-66. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in elections?*

Q-67. *If women vote, do you think they should decide for themselves whom to vote for, or should men decide for women whom they should vote for?*

Despite many gains, public attitudes towards women's role in political life and leadership are mixed. When the Afghan Constitution was approved in early 2004, it established quotas for women's representation in the Parliament and Senate. After a period with no role in the country's political system under the Taliban regime, women under the new government took seats in the lower house (*Wolesi Jirga*) and the upper house (*Meshrano Jirga*), in the president's cabinet, in provincial councils, and, to a lesser extent, in subnational governance institutions such as offices of provincial line ministries.²⁴ Support for women's right to vote in elections has increased significantly over time, from a low of 83.4% in 2009 to 88.2% in 2016. However, women's presence in these and other political forums has been contested, and there have been both gains and setbacks in the years since quotas were instituted.²⁵

Afghans are divided in their attitudes towards women in political leadership positions. This year, only 42.3% of Afghans say that political leadership positions should be for men and women equally, while 44.5% say that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, reflecting no significant change since last year (Fig. 8.10). Overall, men are significantly more likely than women to say that political leadership roles should be for men (58.3% vs. 30.6%). In turn, women (50.5%) are more likely than men (34.0%) to say these roles should be for both men and women.

Attitudes towards women's role in society differ significantly between urban and rural Afghans. In urban areas, 53.3% of respondents say that political leadership should be for both men and women, compared to 38.6% in rural areas. Only 34.8% of urban Afghans say leadership positions should be mostly for men, compared to 47.7% of rural Afghans. Regionally, the number of Afghans who say that political leadership roles are mostly for men is highest, by a wide margin, in the South West region (68.7%) and lowest in the Central/Hazarajat region (28.0%).

PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS




FIG. 8.10: Q-65. *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership? (Percent of Afghans who give each response.)*

A slight decline in support for women in leadership appears across a variety of positions other than political leadership (Fig. 8.11). When asked about the acceptability of women in different leadership roles, respondents expressed greater acceptance of women assuming local-level leadership positions than national-level positions such as cabinet member or president. Using multivariate analysis, respondents who report higher levels of fear for personal safety are found to be significantly more likely to disagree with women in leadership, especially local leadership, after applying demographic and geographic controls. This finding appears robust, suggesting that perceptions of insecurity may play a primary role in the year-over-year decrease in support for women in leadership roles.

STRONG SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY YEAR




FIG. 8.11: Q-62. Do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (a) Member of a community development council; (b) Governor of a province; (c) CEO of a large company; (d) Minister or cabinet member; (e) Candidate for president of Afghanistan. (Percent who agree strongly.)

Notable differences appear between urban and rural responses. Nearly twice as many urban respondents as rural strongly agree that women can be cabinet members (36.8% vs. 19.4%). More educated respondents are more likely to agree with women in all leadership positions suggested in the survey question. For example, 100% of Afghans who have earned a master's degree say they would accept women as cabinet members, versus, just 12.7% of those with informal schooling only.

In all cases, women are more likely than men to support the acceptability of women in leadership. For instance, 75.5% of women say they somewhat or strongly agree that a woman can be a member of a community development council (CDC), compared to 64.4% of men, while 55.6% of women somewhat or strongly agree that it is acceptable for a woman to be a candidate for president of Afghanistan compared to just 41.5% of men.

Figure 8.12 features those expressing strong opinions in favor of, and against, women in leadership positions. Overall, the highest levels of support are for women serving on a CDC, with 29.6% expressing strong agreement. Nearly one in four Afghans express strong agreement with the acceptability of a woman being governor of a province (25.6%), and slightly fewer strongly support the idea of a woman as CEO of a large company (23.7%), a cabinet member (23.7%), or president of Afghanistan (22.4%).

STRONG OPINIONS ON WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS




FIG. 8.12: Q-62. *Do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (a) Member of a community development council; (b) Governor of a province; (c) CEO of a large company; (d) Minister or cabinet member; (e) Candidate for president of Afghanistan. (Percent who strongly agree or strongly disagree.)*

The *Survey* also asks Afghans about attitudes towards women's independence in deciding how they vote. In the aftermath of the 2014 presidential elections, which were marred by voter fraud that included women's ballots, favorable attitudes towards women's electoral independence fell in 2015, but appear to have rebounded this year (Fig. 8.13).

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S INDEPENDENCE IN VOTING




FIG. 8.13: Q-67. *If women vote, do you think they should decide for themselves whom to vote for, or should men decide for women whom they should vote for? (Percent of men and women who say that women should decide for themselves.)*

Nationally, 56.8% say women should decide for themselves, while 20.8% say women should decide in consultation with men, and 21.3% say men should decide for women. Slightly more women (59.9%) than men (53.8%) say that women should decide for themselves. There has been a modest rise in the number of men who say women should decide for themselves, from 45.2% in 2011 to 53.8% in 2016, but there has been little change among female respondents from 2008 to 2016.

Urban Afghans (72.0%) are significantly more likely than rural Afghans (51.8%) to say that women should decide for themselves. Regionally, Afghans from Central/Hazarajat are most likely to say that women should decide for themselves (78.1%), followed by those in Central/Kabul (67.3%), while those from the East (41.1%) and the South West (37.6%) are least likely. These regional lines correspond with ethnic differences as well. Hazaras are most likely to say that women should decide for themselves (69.4%), followed by Tajiks (62.4%), Uzbeks (61.4%), Pashtuns (46.7%), and Turkmen (46.3%).²⁶ More-educated Afghans, including 72.4% of university graduates, are significantly more likely to support women deciding for themselves than those with no formal schooling (39.4%).

8.4 EDUCATION

Key Questions

Q-57. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities for education as men. Do you somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with this opinion?*

Q-58. *And for each of the following levels of education, do you somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? (a) Islamic madrasa education; (b) Primary school; (c) High school; (d) University in your province; (e) Studying in another province; (f) Studying abroad on scholarship.*

This year, 80.7% of Afghans say they agree that women should have the same educational opportunities as men, with 38.5% expressing strong agreement. This represents a marginal increase over 2015 (78.2%), but a significant long-term decrease since 2006 (91.5% in 2006) (Fig. 8.14). This decrease may be related to rising insecurity, as support for equal education opportunities tends to decrease as fear for personal safety and fear when traveling increase.

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION




FIG. 8.14: Q-57. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities for education as men. Do you somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with this opinion? (Percent who agree somewhat or strongly.)*

Women are significantly more likely to agree (45.1% strongly agree and 39.8% somewhat agree) than men (32.0% strongly agree and 44.5% somewhat agree). Similarly, more than twice as many men as women say they strongly disagree with equal educational opportunities for women (6.5% vs. 2.8%, respectively). Generally, as education levels rise, support for equal educational opportunity for women also rises. For instance, 56.5% of those who completed university education agree with women's equal access to education, compared to 25.3% of those with only informal schooling and 26.0% of those with some primary education. Support for women's equal access to education is highest in the Central/Kabul region (52.4%) and the Central/Hazarajat region (51.3%), and lowest in the West region (28.0%) (Fig. 8.15).

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION, BY PROVINCE



FIG. 8.15: Q-57. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities for education as men. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat? (Percent who strongly agree.)*

When asked about support for women’s access to specific levels of education, early education receives the most support, and higher education the least. Overall, 69.6% of Afghans strongly agree, and a further 24.0% somewhat agree, with women having equal access to Islamic madrasa education. There appears to be a high degree of consensus here, with only 2.0% of Afghans strongly disagreeing, and no significant differences by gender of respondent. Similarly, for equal access to primary education, 60.3% strongly agree, and 26.2% somewhat agree.

Gender disparities begin to emerge in support for equal access to high school education. Women (59.6%) are significantly more likely than men (53.0%) to say they strongly agree. Equal access to a university within one’s own province earns more agreement from women (47.8% strongly, 28.7% somewhat) than men (37.4% strongly and 30.2% somewhat).

Overall support for equal access to education appears to drop when travel is involved, whether for study in another province or a scholarship abroad. Equal access to a university in another province earns strong agreement from 25.6% of women, but just 16.2% of men. For studying abroad on a scholarship, just 20.6% of women and 12.5% of men strongly agree. However, since the question set was introduced in 2014, there

appears to have been a nominal rise in support for women’s access to education at several levels (Fig. 8.16). Whether these reflect meaningful change in public opinion requires further investigation.

Regionally, support for women studying abroad is lowest in the East, where 51.8% strongly disagree and 20.2% somewhat disagree, followed by the South West, where 49.2% strongly disagree and 26.4% somewhat disagree. Variation by ethnicity is evident as well. Hazaras are most likely to agree (60.0%), followed by smaller numbers of Uzbeks (38.1%), Tajiks (36.8%), and Pashtuns (28.3%).²⁷ Support for women’s access to education at all levels is higher among urban and educated Afghans than among rural Afghans with no formal education.

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ACCESS TO EDUCATION, OVER TIME




FIG. 8.16. Q-58. And for each of the following levels of education, do you somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? (a) Islamic madrasa education; (b) Primary school; (c) High school; (d) University in your province; (e) Studying in another province; (f) Studying abroad on scholarship. (Percent who agree somewhat or strongly.)

8.5 ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

Key Questions

Q-59. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?*

Q-60. *(If Q-59 answer is women should not be allowed to work outside the home) Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?*

Q-61. *For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work there? (a) Government offices; (b) Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); (c) Hospitals or clinics; (d) Female-only schools; (e) Co-ed schools; (f) Army/police; (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only; (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room.*

D-9. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?*

In 2016, three-quarters (74.0%) of Afghans say they agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home, a significant increase from 64.0% in 2015 and the low of 62.5% in 2011 (Fig. 8.17). More women (82.5%) than men (65.5%), and more urban Afghans (84.1%) than rural Afghans (70.6%) support women working outside the home. Support rises with education as well. Among university graduates, 81.9% support women working outside the home, compared to 71.6% of those with no formal schooling.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME




FIG. 8.17: Q-59. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this? (Percent who agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home.)*

The 24.6% of Afghans who say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home give a variety of reasons. The most common is religious ideology (24.2%), followed by a mix of security concerns and conservative social attitudes (Fig. 8.18).

REASONS WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME

	%
IT IS AGAINST ISLAMIC LAW	24
UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS	17
BAD SECURITY	12
THE FAMILY DOESN'T ALLOW	11
THEY ARE NOT NEEDED OUTSIDE THE HOME	11
DON'T KNOW	7
IT PREVENTS MORAL CORRUPTION	6
WOMEN SHOULD NOT WORK BESIDE MEN	4
THEY NEED TO HELP RAISE CHILDREN	2
THEY DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT	1
THE GOVERNMENT NEVER SUPPORTS THEM	1
CRIMINALS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THEM	1
IT IS CONSIDERED SHAMEFUL	1
LACK OF EXPERIENCE	1
THEY ARE ILLITERATE	1

FIG. 8.18: Q-60. (If Q-59 answer is women should not be allowed to work outside the home) Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home? (Percent citing each reason.)

Respondents were then asked whether they agree with women having various types of employment (Fig. 8.19). Afghans widely accept women working in female-only schools (65.2% strongly agree) and in hospitals or clinics (59.4% strongly agree), while most accept women working in government offices (68.1% strongly or somewhat agree) and co-ed schools (66.6% strongly or somewhat agree). Just under half accept women working in private companies where all employees are female, and at NGOs. There is significantly less support for women in the police or army (36.5% agree somewhat or strongly) and in private companies where men and women work together (32.9% somewhat or strongly agree).

Consistent with earlier findings, women are significantly more likely than men to say it is appropriate for women to work in all of these positions. The gender difference is most prominent for NGOs, with 52.8% of women agreeing that these are an appropriate place for women to work, compared to just 38.8% of men. Gender differences are also strong for government offices (74.8% of women agree, vs. 61.4% of men).

Regionally, 82.2% of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region express approval of women working in government offices, compared to only 60.0% in the South West region. Half as many respondents in the South West region as in the Central/Kabul region agree with women working in private companies where male and female employees work in the same room (19.6% vs. 42.1%), while respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region are most likely to support women working in a co-ed company (56.8%).

Consistent with the findings of regional variance, ethnicity explains significant differences in attitudes towards women in the workplace. Half of the Qezelbash (53.4%), Hazaras (49.2%), Arabs (49.3%), and Sadats (49.4%) say it is acceptable for women to work in the army or police, and even more of the Pashayes (72.5%). Fewer agree among the Pashtuns (31.3%), Baloch (31.9%), Turkmen (34.6%), Tajiks (37.3%), or Uzbeks (38.8%). Considering smaller minorities, all respondents from the Gujar, Wakhi, and Aimaq ethnic groups agree with women working in hospitals and clinics, compared to 82.5% of Pashtuns.

ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYMENT VENUES FOR WOMEN




FIG. 8.19: Q-61. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work there? (a) Government offices; (b) Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); (c) Hospitals or clinics; (d) Female-only schools; (e) Co-ed schools; (f) Army/police; (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only; (h) A private company outside the homes (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who agree or disagree.)

Despite rising support for women working outside the home, the percentage of Afghans who say that women contribute to household income has decreased slightly, from 22.6% to 19.1% (Fig. 8.20), reflecting a worsening of economic opportunities and a modest rise in unemployment, particularly in urban centers (see Chapter 3, Economic Growth and Employment).²⁸ However, the rate of women’s contribution to household income has increased 5.5% since 2009.

Slightly more rural Afghans (20.3%) than urban Afghans (15.5%) report that women contribute to household income. Regionally, the highest rate of women contributing to household income is in the Central/Hazarajat region (45.8%), while lower rates are reported in the North West (28.2%), Central/Kabul (14.9%), East (13.6%), North East (12.4%), and South West (10.9%).

WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTION TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME




FIG. 8.20: D-9. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not? (Percent who say yes.)

8.6 GENERAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Several social and demographic factors may help explain why some Afghans are more supportive of women's rights than others. Among these factors, gender and education have the strongest relationship to support for women's rights. Women are more likely than men to be supportive, while more-educated Afghans are more likely to be supportive than less-educated Afghans. Both findings hold true across all years of the *Survey*. Meanwhile, urban Afghans are more likely to support women's rights than rural Afghans. Figure 8.20 highlights robust associations with other factors. These associations are not intended to be interpreted as causes of support for women's rights.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

AFGHANS WHO ARE SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE, ON AVERAGE:	AFGHANS WHO ARE NOT SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE, ON AVERAGE:
MORE LIKELY TO BE WOMEN.	MORE LIKELY TO BE MEN.
MORE EDUCATED.	LESS EDUCATED.
MORE LIKELY TO FEEL SAFE WHILE PARTICIPATING IN SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTIVITIES.	MORE LIKELY TO FEEL UNSAFE WHILE PARTICIPATING IN SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTIVITIES.
MORE LIKELY TO BE URBAN AFGHANS.	MORE LIKELY TO BE RURAL AFGHANS.
MORE LIKELY TO USE RADIO, TV, PHONE, INTERNET, MOSQUE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION.	LESS LIKELY TO USE RADIO, TV, PHONE, INTERNET, MOSQUE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
LIKELY TO HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE IN THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF).	LIKELY TO HAVE LESS CONFIDENCE IN THE ANSF.
MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN AND LIVE SOMEWHERE ELSE.	LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN AND LIVE SOMEWHERE ELSE.
MORE LIKELY TO SAY THAT A FEMALE MEMBER OF THE FAMILY CONTRIBUTES TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME.	LESS LIKELY TO SAY THAT A FEMALE MEMBER OF THE FAMILY CONTRIBUTES TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME.

FIG. 8.21: *Factors associated with support for women's rights, using OLS regression analysis on a five-item scale for women's rights.*²⁹

End Notes

¹ See Heather Barr, “Afghanistan’s Mysterious Vanishing Plan on Women and Peace Talks: Donors Should Press Kabul to Live Up to Commitments,” Human Rights Watch website, October 27, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/afghanistans-mysterious-vanishing-women-and-peace-talks>. The High Peace Council includes 68 members in total, of which only eight are female. There are seven members on its Leadership Committee, including only one female (former Bamyán Governor Habiba Sarobi).

² For instance, 56.5% of those who completed their university education agree with women’s equal access to education, compared to 25.3% of those with only informal schooling and 30.6% of those with some primary education.

³ See for instance: Anne-Sophie Brändlin, “Ashraf Ghani: ‘This is part of our shame,’” *Deutsche Welle*, December 12, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/ashraf-ghani-this-is-part-of-our-shame/a-18894203>.

⁴ “Afghanistan’s first lady Rula Ghani: ‘It’s time to take the training wheels off the bike and let women ride,’” *Women in the World/New York Times*, October 6, 2016, <http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2016/10/06/afghanistans-first-lady-rula-ghani-its-time-to-take-the-training-wheels-off-the-bike-and-let-women-ride/>.

⁵ Current estimates are around 20%. For a detailed look at women in leadership, see Aarya Nijat and Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Women’s Leadership Roles in Afghanistan,” Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2015. For an earlier review, see also: Harjot Kaur and Najla Ayubi, “Status of Women in Afghanistan,” The Asia Foundation, January 21, 2009, <http://asiafoundation.org/2009/01/21/status-of-women-in-afghanistan/>.

⁶ For example, in August, a video circulated of a six-year-old girl in Ghor crying as she encountered her husband, an elderly cleric, prompting outrage from many Afghans. Afghan women have found many ways to speak out on gender issues. In 2016, several new blogs were launched, and women’s publications like *Negah-e-zan* grew in readership. Zarghona Hassan returned to the airwaves with her women’s, Pashto-language radio station, Radio Shaesta, in Kunduz shortly after the Taliban’s short-lived occupation of the city. Sonita Alizadeh, a rapper, won accolades for her songs criticizing child marriage and violence against women. Sharhbanoo Sadat’s film, *Wolf and Sheep*, won an award at the Cannes Film Festival, while disabled teenage artist Rubaba won praise for the artworks she produces by painting with a brush held in her mouth. Aryana Sayeed, a pop music superstar and a judge on the popular show *Afghan Star*, was both revered by thousands of Afghans and reviled by others for not wearing a veil and appearing on television. See: Frud Behzan and Abdul Qadir Ghafoori, “Afghan Mullah Arrested After ‘Marriage’ To 6-Year-Old Girl,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, July 29, 2016, <http://www.rferl.mobi/a/afghan-mullah-marriage-/27888999.html>; Lynne O’Donnell, “Afghan women’s radio returns after Taliban attack,” *Associated Press*, March 8, 2016, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9b96db6919b6448aa2a6c5b4553e3969/afghan-womens-radio-returns-after-taliban-attack?nc=1457423750651>; “Afghan singer fighting against child marriage wins award,” *Pajhwok Afghan News*, July 1, 2016, <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/07/01/afghan-singer-fighting-against-child-marriage-wins-award>; “Disabled young Afghan artist dreams to become professional teacher” *Khaama Press*, April 14, 2016, [http://www.khaama.com/disabled-young-afghan-artist-dreams-to-become-professional-teacher-0661?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:khaama+\(KHAAMA+PRESS+|+Afghan+Online+Newspaper+%26+Magazine\)](http://www.khaama.com/disabled-young-afghan-artist-dreams-to-become-professional-teacher-0661?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:khaama+(KHAAMA+PRESS+|+Afghan+Online+Newspaper+%26+Magazine)); Yalda Hakim, “Threatened with death for working on TV,” *BBC News*, April 28, 2016, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-36149688>.

⁷ Fariba Nawa, “Kabul’s women seek refuge indoors after a series of acid attacks,” *Women In The World/New York Times*, October 8, 2016, <http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2016/08/10/kabuls-women-seek-safety-indoors-after-a-series-of-acid-attacks/>.

⁸ Mujib Mashal, “Clash of Values Emerges After Afghan Child Bride Burns to Death,” *New York Times*, July 18, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/world/asia/afghanistan-zahra-child-marriage.html>.

⁹ Katie Forster, “Pregnant Woman in Afghanistan Loses Child and is Genitally Mutilated by Husband in Horrific Attack,” *The Independent*, July 29, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/pregnant-woman-attack-afghanistan-takhar-husband-genitally-mutilated-lost-child-violence-against-a7163101.html>.

¹⁰ Anisa Shaheed, “Rula Ghani Inaugurates First Women’s University,” Tolo News, May 31, 2016, <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/25577-rula-ghani-inaugurates-first-womens-university>.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² “Kabul’s First Restaurant Run by Women for Women,” *Outside Source*, BBC, September 9, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0479wh0?ocid=socialflow_twitter.

¹³ Wadia Samadi, “Escaping the Taliban’s Legacy With a Trip to the Movies,” *News Deeply*, September 2, 2016, <https://www.newsdeeply.com/womenandgirls/escaping-the-talibans-legacy-with-a-trip-to-the-movies/>.

- ¹⁴ “First Yoga Center for Afghan Women Opens in Kabul,” *Wadsam*, October 23, 2016, <http://wadsam.com/afghan-business-news/first-yoga-center-afghan-women-opens-kabul-232/>.
- ¹⁵ C.M. Rubin, “The Global Search for Education: A New House of Books for Kabul,” *Huffington Post*, October 20, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-m-rubin/the-global-search-for-education-a-new-house-of-books-for-kabul_b_12411538.html.
- ¹⁶ “Afghan Women Develop App to Combat Street Harassment,” *Wadsam*, October 26, 2016, <http://wadsam.com/afghan-business-news/afghan-women-develop-app-to-combat-street-harassment-456/>.
- ¹⁷ Out of 116 divorce cases mentioned by respondents this year, 49 cases went to a state court for resolution, compared to 36 to a Huquq Department and 41 to a local shura/jirga. Out of 562 cases of family problems cited by respondents who sought formal dispute resolution, 298 cases were taken to a village shura/jirga (53%), compared to 137 to state courts (24%) and 112 to Huquq Departments (20%).
- ¹⁸ A *jirga* (Dari) or *shura* (Arabic) is a traditional conflict resolution council. These can be small, village-level meetings of a relatively informal nature, or large, involving elders from across the country.
- ¹⁹ “Strongly disagree” is reported separately here because it conveys the strongest sentiments and categorically excludes those who may choose “somewhat agree” or “somewhat disagree” as a way of giving a neutral opinion.
- ²⁰ Based on results from OLS linear regression of perceived acceptability of baad (Q-56a) on gender (D-1), age (D-2), education (D-10b), region (M-4), and income (D-7, D-8). A simple model using gender (D-1), education (D-10b), and region (M-4) renders the impact of gender on support for baad insignificant. Across all predictor variables, achieved level of education carries the strongest significance and explanatory power: as education level rises, respondents are more likely to disagree with baad.
- ²¹ While their samples are too small to be representative, all respondents of Gujar ethnicity disagree with baad, while 95.5% of Sadats, 93.7% of Aimaks, and 89.7% of Peshayes disagree.
- ²² The legal age of marriage in Afghanistan is 16 years for females and 18 for males, though the internationally recommended standard for minimum marriage age for both males and females is 18 years old.
- ²³ Afghanistan Central Statistics Organization (CSO) and UNICEF, *Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2010–2011: Final Report* (Kabul: CSO and UNICEF, 2012). At the time the AMICS survey was carried out, one in five young women aged 15–19 were currently married. Early marriage leads to early childbearing. AMICS found that one in four Afghan women age 15–19 had already had a birth, 4% were pregnant with their first child, and 14% had begun childbearing; 6% of women aged 15–49 had had a child before age 15, and 29% had had a child before age 18.
- ²⁴ Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (CW4WAfghan), “Women’s Political Participation 2014 Factsheet,” CW4WAfghan website, accessed November 16, 2016, <http://www.cw4wafghan.ca/sites/default/files/attachments/pages/cw4wafghan-womenpoliticalparticipation-factsheet2014.pdf>.
- ²⁵ These are itemized in Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Events of 2015/Women’s Rights,” Human Rights Watch website, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/afghanistan>. See also Orzala A. Nemat, *Women and the Elections: Facilitating and Hindering Factors in the Upcoming Parliamentary Elections* (Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2015), <http://www.areu.org.af/uploads/EditionPdfs/1519E%20Women%20and%20the%20Elections-%20Facilitating%20and%20Hindering%20Factors%20in%20the%20Upcoming%20Parliamentary%20Elections.pdf>.
- ²⁶ Among the ethnic Qezelbash, 87.3% of respondents said women should decide for themselves, followed by 85.5% of the Sadat ethnic group, 55.8% of Baloch, 57.8% of Arabs, 77% of Temoris, and 65.1% of Aimaks. Agreement was lowest among the Wakhis (0%), Nuristanis (20%), Gujaris (20.9%), and Peshayes (31.8%).
- ²⁷ Among the Qezelbash, 80.6% agree that women can study abroad on scholarship (46.6% strongly agree and 34% somewhat agree), whereas only 1% of Nuristanis agree.
- ²⁸ The International Labor Organization reports rising unemployment since 2012 for ages 15–24. See World Bank, “Indicators/Unemployment, youth male/Afghanistan,” World Bank website, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS?locations=AF>.
- ²⁹ Support for women’s rights is a scale (alpha=.877) that consists of 11 questions in the 2016 survey (Q-56a, Q-56b, Q-56c, Q-57, Q-58e, Q-59, Q-61e, Q-62a, Q-62b, Q-62c, Q-62d, Q-62e, Q-66, and Q-67).



9. MIGRATION

Since 2011, the *Survey* has asked Afghans whether, given the opportunity, they would leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else. Between 2011 and 2015, there was a steady increase in the number of Afghans saying yes to this question. This year that trend is reversed. The percentage of Afghans willing to leave their country if given the chance dropped from 39.9% in 2015 to 29.6% in 2016. This represents a significant decrease over the past year.

Migration in Afghanistan is described as “mixed,” with complex population flows, both internal and external, driven by a range of factors. These flows include the emigration of refugees and asylum seekers; seasonal and permanent economic migrants; internal displacements due to conflict, environmental changes, and persecution; and voluntary and forced returnees from neighboring countries.¹ The consequences of migration for Afghanistan are also mixed. Migration can create opportunities, for example through increased education and income through remittances: in 2014, remittances to Afghanistan from abroad were estimated at USD 636 million.² On the other hand, it can lead to the flight of intellectual and skilled labor, and a perception that extremism is being exported.³

There is no single trigger for the movement of Afghans,⁴ but Afghan migration experts tend to agree that insecurity, economic inequality, and governance issues are key drivers of emigration from Afghanistan.⁵ In 2015, almost 13.0% of all Afghans lived outside their country of origin,⁶ and the Afghan refugee population was estimated at 2.7 million people worldwide.⁷ Historically, Afghanistan has been the world’s largest source of refugees. The majority of Afghan refugees reside in Pakistan (1.6 million) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (951,100).⁸ It is now the second-largest source of refugees, next only to Syria.⁹

This year, the *Survey* again reports on the willingness of Afghans to leave their country. For the first time, however, it explores this willingness in detail. This chapter sets out the demographic and geographic variations among Afghans who would leave their country if given the opportunity and those who would not. It examines a range of “push” and “pull” factors¹⁰ traditionally associated with migration, and it explores the significant decrease since 2015 in the number of Afghans indicating a willingness to leave.

9.1 WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE

Key Question

Q-78a. *Tell me, if given opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

In 2011, 33.8% of Afghans indicated a willingness to leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This proportion rose to 38.4% in 2012, and then to 39.9% in 2015.¹¹ This year, it dropped to 29.6%.

GEOGRAPHY AND ETHNICITY

Afghans living in the Central/Kabul region (36.1%) and the North East region (37.1%) are the most willing to leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity.¹² Afghans in the South West region are the least willing (17.8%), and also have the highest average monthly household income among all regions (Fig. 9.1).

DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY REGION




FIG. 9.1: Q-78a. *If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)*

These regional variations differ only slightly from those reported in 2015. In that year too, Afghans in the Central/Kabul region were the most willing to leave (47.4%), and those in the South West were the least willing (26.2%). Afghans residing in the West showed the widest year-over-year change, from 44.2% willing to migrate in 2015, to only 23.0% saying the same in 2016.

Looking across provinces (Fig. 9.2), there is wide variation in willingness to leave. Over half the respondents in Baghlan (58.6%) say they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This is in sharp contrast to Afghans in Nuristan (11.7%), Helmand (12.0%), and Zabol (14.9%), all of which border Pakistan. The high proportion of Baghlan respondents indicating a willingness to leave is perhaps unsurprising. The Baghlan-Balkh highway is part of the Ring Road that links Kabul to the north of Afghanistan. This makes the region a strategically significant province, and the Taliban are reported to have made significant inroads into the area over the past two years.¹³

DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY PROVINCE




FIG. 9.2: Q-78a. *If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)*

Once again, Afghans living in urban areas are more willing to leave (35.2%) than those living in rural areas (27.8%). This is consistent with 2015 survey results (45.3% and 38.2%, respectively; Fig. 9.3).

DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN: RURAL VS. URBAN




FIG. 9.3: Q-78a. *If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)*

Of the four main ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the Hazaras are the most willing to leave Afghanistan (38.6%, Fig. 9.4). This may be partly explained by the history of persecution and branding of Hazaras as outsiders within Afghanistan.¹⁴ Income might also play a role: Hazaras predominantly reside in the Central/Hazarajat region, which also has the lowest average monthly household income compared to other regions. Tajiks are the next-most willing ethnic group (32.0%), followed by Uzbeks (28.8%) and Pashtuns (24.3%). The pattern here is the same as in 2015, when 50.2% of Hazaras indicated a willingness to leave, followed by 43.0% of Tajiks, 38.9% of Uzbeks, and 34.9% of Pashtuns.

DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY ETHNICITY




FIG. 9.4: Q-78a. *If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)*

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MIGRATION

The 2015 *Survey* adduced a range of factors associated with an increased willingness to leave Afghanistan. These included gender, age, education, urban/rural living, and marital status. Results this year (Fig. 9.5) indicate that these factors are largely unchanged.

This year, Afghans who indicate a willingness to leave are again more likely to be men (32.6%) than women (26.7%). They also tend to be younger. Around a third of respondents (32.7%) between 18 and 30 years of age say they would leave if given the opportunity, 28.0% between the ages of 31 and 45, and 26.7% between 46 and 60. Willingness to leave Afghanistan is lowest in the 61-years-and-above age group, but still reaches 19.4%. Afghans who are single (37.8%) are more willing to leave than those who are married (27.8%).

Consistent with concerns about “brain drain,”¹⁵ a willingness to leave Afghanistan is strongly associated with higher levels of education. About a quarter of Afghans who have never been to school (24.7%) would leave if afforded the opportunity. This proportion rises to over one-third (36.0%) for those with a tertiary education. This association holds even after controlling for other demographic factors such as gender, age, and income, as well as geographic factors such as province and whether the respondent resides in an urban or rural area.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH EMIGRATION

AFGHANS WHO SAY THEY WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN ARE:	AFGHANS WHO SAY THEY WOULD NOT LEAVE AFGHANISTAN ARE:
MORE LIKELY TO BE EDUCATED	LESS LIKELY TO BE EDUCATED
MORE LIKELY TO BE YOUNGER	MORE LIKELY TO BE OLDER
MORE LIKELY TO BE MEN	MORE LIKELY TO BE WOMEN
MORE LIKELY TO HAVE HEARD OF DAESH/ISIS	LESS LIKELY TO HAVE HEARD OF DAESH/ISIS
LESS LIKELY TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT	MORE LIKELY TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
MORE LIKELY TO HAVE EXPERIENCED CORRUPTION	LESS LIKELY TO HAVE EXPERIENCED CORRUPTION
MORE LIKELY TO BE SINGLE	MORE LIKELY TO BE MARRIED
MORE LIKELY TO LIVE IN AN URBAN AREA	MORE LIKELY TO LIVE IN A RURAL AREA

FIG. 9.5: Factors associated with stated desire to migrate based on multivariate regression analysis of Q-78a, If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?

Family composition appears to have little bearing on the willingness to migrate. There are minimal differences among Afghans with or without children in their willingness to leave the country if given an opportunity (no children, 28.0%; one child, 31.4%; two children, 28.8%; three or more children, 27.0%).

Of Afghans who are able to generate an income, one-third (32.8%) would leave Afghanistan if they had the chance. White-collar professionals such as office workers or teachers (38.2%) are more willing to leave than unskilled or semi-skilled laborers or farmers (31.2%). Around a quarter of Afghans who are unable to generate an income (27.1%) would leave the country if afforded the opportunity.

9.2 REASONS FOR LEAVING

Key Questions

Q-78b. (Ask if answered “Yes” to Q-78a) Why would you leave Afghanistan? (Allow two answers.)

Q-78c. (Ask if answered “Yes” to Q-78a) Where would you want to live? (Allow two answers.)

Q-79. Do you have a family member or close relative that lives abroad?

Q-80b. (Ask if answered “Yes” to Q-79) Have these relatives helped you financially, such as sending money?

PUSH-PULL MODEL OF MIGRATION

Decisions about migration are multifaceted and driven by a range of factors.¹⁶ “Push” factors are domestic circumstances that motivate people to leave their country, such as economic, social, political, or security problems. “Pull” factors are external influences that attract would-be migrants to a particular destination, such as the destination’s reception and resettlement policies, or the presence there of family and friends.¹⁷

This push-pull model is consistent with research that suggests Afghans leaving their homeland fall into three categories. There are political refugees, who are at risk because of their political beliefs; there are those who leave the country for safety reasons; and there are economic refugees, who leave in search of better economic opportunities. The first two are related to push factors, the third to a pull factor.¹⁸

Some migration experts emphasize push factors in the migration behavior of Afghans.¹⁹ Domestic insecurity, as the Taliban and other militant groups compete for control in a number of districts, is one significant push factor. The perception that governance is weak and corruption is rife in Afghanistan (particularly since the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) is another important push factor. Other push factors include unemployment or underemployment, especially among young Afghans.

A key pull factor is thought to be exposure to higher global living standards.²⁰ The growing availability of television, the Internet, and mobile phones across the country has given Afghans unprecedented access to information, from the media and from overseas networks of friends and family, about the quality of life elsewhere and the chances of resettlement.²¹ This in turn may inform decision-making about whether to leave Afghanistan.

PUSH FACTORS

INSECURITY

Respondents who say they would leave Afghanistan were asked to give two reasons. Almost three-quarters (73.6%) cite insecurity as one of two reasons.²²

Responses to questions about groups such as Daesh/ISIL/ISIS²³ also reflect concerns about insecurity. For example, the knowledge that Daesh exists is associated with an increased willingness to leave Afghanistan. Specifically, Afghans who have heard of Daesh more frequently express willingness to leave Afghanistan (31.5%) than those who have not heard of Daesh (21.5%). Interestingly, the desire to migrate is equally prevalent among Afghans who think Daesh poses a threat to their district (31.3%) and those who do not (31.5%).

Fear for their own safety or that of their family is also associated with Afghans' willingness to leave Afghanistan. A somewhat higher proportion of Afghans who always fear for their own or their family's safety say they would leave (31.6%) than of Afghans who never fear for their own or their family's safety (26.9%). Likewise, a greater proportion of Afghans who report having suffered from violence or some other criminal act in the past year are willing to leave Afghanistan (36.3%) than those who have not (28.1%).

The belief that reconciliation between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups (AOGs) will lead to stability does not appear to diminish the intention to migrate. Of the Afghans who do not believe reconciliation efforts will lead to stability, 28.8% say they would leave the country, compared to 30.1% of those who believe reconciliation will lead to stability.

WEAK GOVERNMENT

This year, 28.8% of respondents cited concerns relating to weak government as a reason they would leave Afghanistan if they had an opportunity.²⁴ This finding is supported by other findings in the *Survey*. For example, as confidence that government institutions and officials will do their jobs decreases, the willingness to leave Afghanistan increases (Fig. 9.6).

DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS




FIG. 9.6: Q-78a. *If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)* **Q-35.** *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's OK, just say you have no opinion. (c) The Independent Election Commission; (f) Government ministers; (j) Parliament as a whole; (k) Provincial councils; (m) Your member of Parliament.*

In the same vein, the proportion of respondents indicating a willingness to leave Afghanistan is greater among those who think the National Unity Government (NUG) is doing a very bad job than among those who think it is doing a very good job (33.2% and 26.3%, respectively), and it is greater among those who think that the provincial government is doing a very bad job than among those who think it is doing a very good job (32.7% and 27.9%, respectively).

When asked why they would leave Afghanistan, very few respondents specifically cited corruption—less than 1.0% of the aggregated weak government figure. However, when all respondents were asked whether corruption was a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem in Afghanistan as a whole, 31.3% of those who consider it a major problem said they would leave the country, compared to 25.5% of those who consider it a minor problem and 18.2% of those who think it is no problem.

With regard to infrastructure, Afghans were asked whether a range of development projects had been implemented in their area over the past 12 months. These projects included, but were not limited to, repair or construction of roads and bridges, new schools or universities, new water projects, and new mosques. To examine whether increased development is associated with a decreased willingness to leave Afghanistan, responses to this question were aggregated. Afghans who had experienced the development of six or more projects were compared to those who had experienced fewer than six projects. The results suggest that

infrastructure development has little effect on the willingness to leave Afghanistan. In similar proportions (more than six projects, 29.7%; fewer than six projects, 27.8%), respondents say they would leave the country if they had the chance. This finding is consistent with the view of some migration experts who question the effectiveness of development approaches in conflict-prone regions.²⁵

Afghans were also asked whether their household financial situation is better than, worse than, or the same as the year before. Respondents who say their situation is worse are only marginally more willing to leave (30.8%) than those who say their situation is better (26.9%).

The willingness to leave Afghanistan was also found in similar proportions of Afghans who believe that religious leaders should be involved in politics, and those who believe they should not (29.5% and 30.1%, respectively); Afghans who are very satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, and those who are very dissatisfied (29.0% and 29.8%, respectively); and Afghans who feel very safe expressing opinions about the government, and those who feel very unsafe (28.6% and 29.4%, respectively).

UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment is cited by just over half (51.5%) of Afghans as a reason they would leave the country if they could. This may not be surprising, given that unemployment in Afghanistan is currently around 40.0%.²⁶ That said, those who believe their employment opportunities have deteriorated in last 12 months are only slightly more likely to express a willingness to leave than those who believe their employment opportunities have improved (31.2% and 27.6%, respectively).

NATIONAL MOOD

The *Survey* asked Afghans a range of questions that intuitively should be associated with a desire to migrate, but are not. While a record number of Afghans believe the country is moving in the wrong direction (66.0% of all respondents), this appears to have relatively little bearing on their willingness to leave. Of those who think the country is moving in the wrong direction, 31.1% indicate a willingness to leave, compared to 27.1% of those who believe the country is moving in the right direction. Similarly, the degree to which Afghans feel generally happy does not appear to influence their desire to leave their country. Respondents expressing overall happiness in their daily life express a willingness to leave Afghanistan in virtually the same proportion (27.8%) as those expressing overall unhappiness in their daily life (27.9%).

EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN

There is a general trend suggesting that those who are concerned with the rights of women, and with equality between men and women, are more willing to leave Afghanistan. A higher proportion of Afghans who strongly disagree with the practices of *baad* and *baddal*²⁷ say they would leave (31.7% and 31.0%, respectively) than of those who strongly agree with the practices (22.0% and 23.5%, respectively). Strong support for equal education for men and women is also associated with a marginally higher willingness to leave than opposition to equal education (33.7% and 28.3% respectively). Likewise Afghans who believe that women should be allowed to vote are marginally more willing to leave than those who do not think women should be allowed to vote (30.3% and 25.3% respectively).

PULL FACTORS

DESTINATION COUNTRIES

Historically, the borders between Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan and Iran have been porous. Afghans have traditionally moved across these borders for livelihood and security reasons.²⁸ More recently, there has been a marked increase in both voluntary and forced returns of Afghans from these countries. For example, on June 1, 2016, Pakistan began enforcing a strict visa regime that will affect Afghans' ability to remain in that country.²⁹ Iran, too, has reportedly tightened its policy on asylum seekers and is taking a stronger stance on Afghan irregular migrants.³⁰ Research suggests that when Afghans are sensitive to the reception and resettlement policies of destination countries, they will look for alternatives when these policies become more restrictive.³¹ In 2015, there was a significant increase in the number of Afghans looking to Europe for asylum, with 190,013 individuals applying for asylum in EU member states such as Germany, as well as Norway, and Switzerland.³²

Research also points to a relationship between preferred migration destinations and tribal associations. For example, Germany is the preferred destination for Afghans from Herat, especially Tajiks.³³ In the *Survey*, Afghans who say they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity were asked to provide two choices of destination countries. Respondents most frequently cite European countries, particularly Germany (42.7%), as a place they would want to live. This is followed by Iran (37.9%), Turkey (26.7%), and Pakistan (8.6%).

RELATIVES ABROAD

Having family abroad is also widely accepted as a pull factor in migration decisions.³⁴ A recent roundtable of migration experts suggests that Afghan families seeking to move abroad often send one family member first (usually a male) to build assets and networks in preparation for moving the whole family later.³⁵

This year, the *Survey* asked Afghans whether they have any family members or close relatives living abroad. The results reveal that 38.5% of Afghans have an immediate family member or close relative living abroad, and over a third of those relatives (37.3%) provide financial assistance to them. When asked to list up to two countries where these relatives live, respondents cite 48 different countries, including Iran (43.0%), Turkey (16.5%), Germany (23.9%), Pakistan (10.6%), the United States (7.8%), and Saudi Arabia (7.1%).³⁶ Combining up to two answers, most respondents (87.1%) report having a family member in a Western country, while roughly one-third (30.5%) report a family member in a non-Western country.

Having a family member abroad may be a factor associated with willingness to leave Afghanistan. Afghans with relatives abroad are over twice as likely as those without to say they would leave the country if given the opportunity (44.1% and 20.6%, respectively). Whether these relatives help financially, however, appears to be less important. The proportion of Afghans with relatives abroad who indicate a willingness to leave is very similar for those whose relatives abroad do, and do not, provide financial assistance (46.4% and 43.2%, respectively).

ACCESS TO MEDIA

The increased reach of electronic communications is also thought to play a significant role in the decisions Afghans make to leave their country,³⁷ and the *Survey* data this year suggests that access to information is strongly associated with a desire to leave Afghanistan. Afghans who live in an area with Internet access are more likely to indicate migration intentions than those who live in an area without access (36.1% and 25.0%, respectively). The same pattern of migration intentions is evident for Afghans with, and without, personal access to the Internet (44.1% and 33.0%, respectively). Likewise, a considerably higher proportion of Afghans who use the Internet to obtain news and information, compared to those who do not, indicate they would be likely to leave Afghanistan (42.9% and 27.9%, respectively).

There is a similar trend across a range of other media. For example, there is a large difference in migration intentions between those who do, and those who do not, rely on television for news and information (33.8% and 21.4%). A smaller difference is evident between those who do, and those who do not, rely on a mobile phone for news and information (33.6% and 26.8%). This compares to a marginal difference in migration intentions between those Afghans who do, and those who do not, rely on the radio for news and information (30.7% and 27.3%, respectively). Differences in migration intentions are smaller—less than 3.0%—between those who do, and do not, rely on mosques, shuras, or family and friends for news and information.

The significance of the media in migration decisions is also evident when looking at Afghans' confidence in the media (Fig. 9.7). Willingness to leave Afghanistan is noticeably higher among Afghans who have a lot of confidence in the media than it is among those who have no confidence in the media (32.7% and 22.2%, respectively). This relationship remains robust even after controlling for demographic factors such as education, age, income, gender, region, and whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area.

DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY CONFIDENCE IN THE MEDIA




FIG. 9.7: Q-78a. *If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)* **Q-35.** *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's OK, just say you have no opinion. (h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV.*

9.3 DECREASE IN WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE

Key Questions

Q-78a. *Tell me, if given opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*

Q-78b. *[Ask if answered "Yes" to Q-78a] Why would you leave Afghanistan? (Allow two answers.)*

Q-78c. *[Ask if answered "Yes" to Q-78a] Where would you want to live? (Allow two answers.)*

This year, there has been a substantial decrease in the proportion of Afghans indicating they would leave Afghanistan if afforded the opportunity. In 2015, 39.9% of respondents expressed a willingness to migrate. In 2016, this number has fallen to just 29.6%. This is the first time this trend has been observed, and it runs counter to the expectation that key push factors would promote increased emigration from Afghanistan.³⁸ For example, compared to 2015, this survey shows that Afghans' fears about personal safety have risen, their optimism about the direction of the country has fallen, and their satisfaction with the national government has dropped. However, fewer Afghans this year say they would leave the country if afforded the opportunity. One explanation is that pull factors, rather than push factors, may have greater influence on migration decision-making this year.

The observed decrease in Afghans' willingness to migrate is evident across all regions (Fig. 9.8), all ethnicities (Fig. 9.4), and in the majority of provinces. This consistency suggests that, at the very least, systemic factors are at play.

DESIRE TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BY REGION




FIG. 9.8: Q-78a. *If given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percent who say yes.)*

There are also some notable regional and provincial differences that point toward specific factors. For example, in West Afghanistan, the willingness of Afghans to leave in 2016 has dropped especially dramatically, from 44.2% in 2015 to 23.0% this year. The West region comprises Badghis, Herat, Farah, and Ghor provinces. Herat, which borders Iran, is a major border crossing for significant numbers of deportees and voluntary returnees to Afghanistan (157,223 between January and June 2016).³⁹ Herat itself in 2016 experienced a decline of more than half in willingness to leave, from 48.4% to 21.2%.

In addition to receiving the bulk of undocumented returnees to Afghanistan in 2016, Herat is also significant for other reasons. Germany is known to be a preferred destination for Afghans from Herat, especially Tajiks,⁴⁰ and Herat has been subject to a significant information campaign, tagged #RumoursAboutGermany.⁴¹ In response to the growing number of asylum applications, the German government, in November 2015, erected large billboards in Herat (among other places) to deter would-be asylum seekers.⁴² These signs, written in Dari and Pashto, were accompanied by a social media campaign and stories in print and on television.⁴³ This may account for some of the dramatic reductions in willingness to migrate seen in West Afghanistan this year.

Mazar-e-Sharif, in the province of Balkh, and Kabul were subject to the same German information campaign. Looking across provincial data, Kabul has experienced a drop in willingness to migrate, from 49.7% of respondents in 2015 to 36.5% this year. Balkh witnessed a similar drop, from 48.4% to 35.1%.

East Afghanistan and South West Afghanistan are also home to border crossings through which large numbers of voluntary returnees and deportees from Pakistan pass.⁴⁴ From 2015 to 2016, these regions also experienced a drop (albeit smaller) in the willingness to migrate, from 36.0% to 25.8% in East Afghanistan, and from 26.2% to 17.8% in South West Afghanistan.

By way of contrast to these sizeable decreases, the difference observed in North East Afghanistan is significantly less dramatic. In 2015, 40.0% of respondents said they would migrate if they could, compared to 37.1% this year. As previously noted, parts of the North East, specifically Baghlan, have been subject to intensive Taliban activity recently.⁴⁵ This suggests that insecurity, a known push factor, may feature more prominently in the migration intentions of Afghans in the North East.

Broader developments in the global migration context since 2015 may explain this year's dramatic reduction in willingness to leave Afghanistan. Primary among these changes is a significant shift in the reception policies of a number of European countries.⁴⁶ Afghans in 2016 are significantly less likely to successfully resettle in their destination country, an important consideration for potential refugees.⁴⁷ For example, 27.0% of Afghan asylum applications in Germany were rejected in 2015, compared to 46.0% so far in 2016.⁴⁸ The number of assisted returns of Afghans from Europe increased from 1,400 in 2015 to over 5,000 in the first half of 2016.⁴⁹ Further, in March 2016, Turkey made an agreement with the European Union to take back asylum seekers who travel from Turkey to Greece, and many Afghans have reportedly been forcibly returned as a result.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, efforts to repatriate undocumented Afghans from neighboring Iran and Pakistan have intensified.⁵¹

Against this landscape, a number of countries in Europe⁵² and elsewhere⁵³ have launched information campaigns to deter potential Afghan refugees from leaving home, noting the well-publicized perils of these journeys. There has also been a reported rise in attacks on migrants in many European host countries,⁵⁴ and a growing perception among Afghans seeking asylum that their needs are viewed as less pressing than those of other asylum seekers, principally Syrians.⁵⁵ At the same time, the Afghan government and other groups, running campaigns such as "Afghanistan Needs You,"⁵⁶ have sought to encourage citizens to stay at home and help rebuild the country.⁵⁷ This is all taking place in a context where access to electronic media such as television and the Internet is increasing dramatically across Afghanistan.⁵⁸

Perceptions of insecurity, poor governance, and unemployment are important push factors contributing to Afghans' willingness to leave, along with growing fear for personal safety, waning optimism, and less satisfaction with government than in 2015. Yet, Afghans appear more reluctant to leave their country this year than last. This finding may point to an increased role of pull factors in the past year, including more restrictive reception policies in preferred destination countries, and more robust measures to return Afghan immigrants from Pakistan, Iran, and some parts of Europe back to Afghanistan.

End Notes

- ¹ Nassim Majidi, Vivianne van der Vorst, and Christopher Foulkes, “Seeking Safety, Jobs, and More: Afghanistan’s Mixed Flows Test Migration Policies,” Migration Policy Institute website, February 25, 2016, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/seeking-safety-jobs-and-more-afghanistans-mixed-flows-test-migration-policies>.
- ² International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Afghanistan, Facts and Figures,” IOM website, <http://www.iom.int/countries/afghanistan>.
- ³ Lindsay Alexander, *Migration & Development: The Case of Afghanistan*, London Roundtable—16th December 2015 (British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group and The Royal United Services Institute, 2015), http://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/BAAG_ReportFeb2016_Final_0.pdf.
- ⁴ Majidi et al., “Seeking Safety.”
- ⁵ Alexander, *Migration & Development*.
- ⁶ IOM, “Afghanistan, Facts and Figures.”
- ⁷ UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015* (UNHCR, 2015), 16, <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Migration is often analyzed in terms of the “push-pull model,” which looks at the push factors (such as economic, social, or political problems) that drive people to leave their country, and pull factors that attract them to the country of destination. See International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Key Migration Terms,” IOM website, <https://iom.int/key-migration-terms>.
- ¹¹ The migration question was not included in the *Survey* between 2012 and 2014, due to space limitations in the questionnaire.
- ¹² The phrases willingness to leave, willingness to migrate, and desire to migrate are used here interchangeably.
- ¹³ Obaid Ali, *Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan* (Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 15, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/taleban-in-the-north-gaining-ground-along-the-ring-road-in-baghlan/>.
- ¹⁴ Phil Zabriskie, “The Outsiders,” *National Geographic Magazine*, February 2008, <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2008/02/afghanistan-hazara/phil-zabriskie-text/1>.
- ¹⁵ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Helping Reverse the ‘Brain Drain’ in Afghanistan,” UNAMA website, December 2, 2103, <https://unama.unmissions.org/helping-reverse-%E2%80%98brain-drain%E2%80%99-afghanistan-0>; Frud Bezhan, “Afghanistan Tries to Stem Tide of Migration ‘Brain Drain,’” *Radio Free Europe* website, September 22, 2015, <http://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-fighting-migration-brain-drain/27262971.html>.
- ¹⁶ Majidi et al., “Seeking Safety,” 4.
- ¹⁷ IOM, “Key Migration Terms.”
- ¹⁸ Angeliki Dimitriadi, *Migration from Afghanistan to third countries and Greece* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2013), 13, https://www.academia.edu/4356623/Migration_from_Afghanistan_to_Greece.
- ¹⁹ Alexander, *Migration & Development*.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Insecurity here includes seven response categories concerned with domestic security concerns. The figure represents an aggregate of these responses.
- ²³ While the group is commonly referred to as ISIS in English-speaking countries, Afghans typically refer to ISIS using the term “Daesh.”
- ²⁴ This figure represents the aggregation of multiple responses related to government, including but not limited to, bad economy, corruption, high prices, and lack of infrastructure (roads, clinics/hospitals, electricity, shelter).
- ²⁵ Alexander, *Migration & Development*.
- ²⁶ “Afghanistan, Economic Forecasts, 2016-2020 Outlook,” Trading Economics website, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/forecast>.
- ²⁷ Baad refers to the traditional practice of giving away a daughter to another party as a penalty or payment to settle a debt or

resolve a dispute, grievance, or conflict between families. Baddal refers to the exchange of daughters in marriage between families. This is often, but not always, a form of forced marriage, and may have economic implications (e.g., there is generally no bride price involved). For more, see Chapter 8.

²⁸ Majidi et al., “Seeking Safety,” 2.

²⁹ Waqas Ahmed, “Pakistan to enforce visa regime for Afghans, Afghan Council General in uproar,” *Daily Pakistan*, June 1, 2016, <https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/headline/pakistan-to-enforce-visa-regime-for-afghans-entring-pakistan-from-today-afghan-council-general-creates-drama/>.

³⁰ Majidi et al., “Seeking Safety,” 4.

³¹ Dimitriadi, *Migration from Afghanistan*, 13; Majidi et al., “Seeking Safety,” 3.

³² Majidi et al., “Seeking Safety,” 3.

³³ Dimitriadi, *Migration from Afghanistan*, 14.

³⁴ Lenny Linke, *Deciding to Leave Afghanistan (1): Motives for Migration* (Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 8, 2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/deciding-to-leave-afghanistan-1-motives-for-migration/>.

³⁵ Alexander, *Migration & Development*.

³⁶ Figures represent the percent of cases for q80a and q80b, combining both the first and second countries cited for each respondent.

³⁷ Alexander, *Migration & Development*.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Undocumented Afghan Returnees—Weekly Situation Report 16–22 October 2016,” IOM website, http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/IOM_Undocumented_Afghan_Returnees_Weekly_Situation_Report_22_October_2016.pdf

⁴⁰ Dimitriadi, *Migration from Afghanistan*, 14.

⁴¹ Ceri Oeppen, “Leaving Afghanistan! Are you Sure?’ European Efforts to Deter Potential Migrants Through Information Campaigns,” *Human Geography* 9, no. 2 (2016): 57–68, p. 61.

⁴² Shereena Qazi, “Germany to refugees: ‘Leaving Afghanistan? Think again,’” *Aljazeera*, November 24, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/germany-campaign-refugees-leaving-afghanistan-151124131156428.html>.

⁴³ Oeppen, “Leaving Afghanistan.”

⁴⁴ OM, “Undocumented Afghan Returnees.”

⁴⁵ Obaid Ali, *Taliban in the North*.

⁴⁶ “Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?” *BBC*, March 3, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286>; Mark Urban, “Europe’s migrant story enters new phase,” *BBC*, May 10, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36246816>; Jennifer Rankin, “EU refugee crisis: asylum seeker numbers double to 1.2m in 2015,” *The Guardian*, March 4, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/04/eu-refugee-crisis-number-of-asylum-seekers-doubled-to-12-million-in-2015>; Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), “‘We knew that they had no future in Kabul’: Why and How Afghan Families Decide to Leave,” AAN website, April 2015, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/20160427FES-Migration-IVs-paper-Engl.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, *Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers* (Commonwealth of Australia, August 2012), <http://apo.org.au/resource/report-expert-panel-asylum-seekers>.

⁴⁸ Kaveh Rostamkhani, “Afghans in Germany face rejection and deportation,” *IRIN*, October 25, 2016, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2016/10/25/afghans-germany-face-rejection-and-deportation>.

⁴⁹ Nassim Majidi and Laurence Hart, “Return and reintegration to Afghanistan: Policy implications,” *Migration Policy Practice* 6, no. 3 (2016), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/migration_policy_practice_journal_27.pdf.

⁵⁰ Ece Toksabay, “Amnesty says 30 Afghans forcibly returned from Turkey,” *Reuters*, March 23, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-afghans-idUSKCN0WP2JK>.

⁵¹ Belquis Ahmadi and Sadaf Lakhani, *The forced return of Afghan refugees and implications for stability*, PeaceBrief 199 (United States Institute of Peace, January 2016), <http://www.usip.org/publications/2016/01/13/the-forced-return-of-afghan-refugees-and-implications-stability>.

⁵² Oeppen, “Leaving Afghanistan.”

⁵³ Sune Engle Rasmussen and Ben Doherty, “‘Hard to watch’: Afghans react to \$6m Australian film aimed at asylum seekers,”

The Guardian, March 27, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/mar/28/hard-to-watch-afghans-react-to-6m-australian-film-aimed-at-asylum-seekers>.

⁵⁴ Melissa Eddy, “Violent Backlash Against Migrants in Germany as Asylum-Seekers Pour In,” *New York Times*, August 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/europe/germany-migrants-attacks-asylum-seekers-backlash.html?_r=0; Alexander, *Migration & Development*.

⁵⁵ Thalia Beaty and Kavitha Surana, “Broader than a Border: Afghan refugees receive a cold welcome in Europe,” *Quartz*, December 9, 2015, <http://qz.com/568717/afghan-refugees-receive-a-cold-welcome-in-europe/>.

⁵⁶ Afghanistan Needs You website, <http://afghanistannedsyou.af/>.

⁵⁷ Oeppen, “Leaving Afghanistan,” 67.

⁵⁸ “Afghanistan Profile—Media,” *BBC*, March 3, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12013942>.



APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

1. SUMMARY

The Asia Foundation's annual *Survey of the Afghan People* is Afghanistan's longest-running nationwide survey of the attitudes and opinions of Afghan adults. Since 2004, over 87,000 Afghan men and women have been surveyed, representing more than 400 districts in all 34 provinces. All data is public and free for immediate download here: <http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey>.

Face-to-face, paper-based interviews were conducted between August 31 and October 1, 2016, by 953 trained enumerators matched with respondents by gender (i.e., men interviewed men, and women interviewed women). All enumerators are residents of the provinces where they conducted interviews. Interviews ranged from 13 to 102 minutes in duration, with the average interview lasting 38 minutes. Field supervisors noted any political, social, or other newsworthy events during the survey fieldwork that may have affected the survey, and a report is available on the website.

As in previous years, fieldwork was conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), and third-party monitoring was conducted by Sayara Research. ACSOR's parent company, D3 Systems, Inc., provided statistical tools for the construction of survey weights and logic tests for quality control. The Asia Foundation provided other quality-control measures, including additional logic tests and independent monitoring of the central training, provincial trainings, and fieldwork.

The 2016 *Survey* is based on a sample of 12,658 men (52.7%) and women (47.3%) above 18 years of age residing in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The sample was stratified by province and by geography (urban/rural status) using the most recent population estimates (2015–2016) released by Afghanistan's Central Statistics Organization (CSO). The total unweighted sample consisted of 25.0% urban and 75.0% rural respondents.

The 2016 *Survey* differs from previous years in two important respects. First, the sample size includes a booster sample in selected districts within the provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Balkh, Baghlan, and Samangan. Responses from these oversamples are weighted down to their proportional population estimates by district, so as not to bias national or provincial statistics. Second, mobile tablets were utilized for data collection for the first time in a limited, Kabul-based, randomized control study with 528 men and women to determine the impact of this new method on public opinion. Results from the pilot suggest that this does not bias responses.

Sampling points in the *Survey* are determined using random selection techniques. However, in cases where a sampling point is not accessible to enumerators (due to insecurity, weather, village could not be found, etc.), an alternative method called an "intercept interview" is sometimes used for comparison.¹ Responses from these interviews are used to estimate the direction of potential bias on survey questions caused by sampling replacements. In this method, male enumerators "intercept" a sample of male respondents at public locations, such as bus stops or hospitals, as they are traveling to or from a highly insecure sampling point not otherwise accessible to enumerators. These responses are then compared to the responses of men in the main sample to estimate possible bias on specific questions. Sampling points that were designated for female respondents,

but which could not be accessed safely by female enumerators, were replaced with different female interviews within the same strata (same province and urban/rural designation). Intercept interviews do not include women due to cultural and security concerns. All statistics reported in this book represent the main sample of 11,623 randomly selected respondents (92% of the overall sample), unless otherwise identified as an intercept interview (8% of the overall sample).

Each year, the overall margin of error (MoE) for the survey is estimated on the basis of the binomial question, “Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” The estimated design effect is 3.45.² Using this estimate, the complex margin of error at the 95% confidence level is $\pm 1.6\%$ for the probability sample.³ This MoE takes into account both the complex survey design, which contains disproportionate stratification and two levels of clustering (the district and sampling point), as well as the weighting for provincial representativeness.

Disposition outcomes for all interviews were tracked by ACSOR staff using the standard codes of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), which have been adapted to the Afghan context. For this sample, the contact rate is 86.8%, the response rate is 79.8%, and the refusal rate is 5.0%.

2. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

Questions are determined annually on the basis of inputs from the Afghan government and other stakeholders. Each year, The Asia Foundation removes questions yielding low analytical value, while preserving trend-line questions for longitudinal comparison. Proposed new questions are vetted to ensure that they meet international standards—by ensuring, for example, that they can be easily understood by respondents, that they are not threatening or leading, and that response scales match question wording. In total, this year’s questionnaire went through 11 iterations before being approved for translation. All surveys were administered in either Dari or Pashto versions.

The 2016 survey questionnaire included 31 administrative questions (such as the date and time), used to track and manage each interview, 30 demographics questions (such as age and gender), and 110 substantive questions. Of the 110 substantive questions, 19 were new and four were selected from previous years of the *Survey*. Eighteen districts in the booster sample received an additional questionnaire after the main survey, which included 35 substantive questions. The questionnaire addresses infrastructure and development, rule of law, governance, security, corruption, elections, reconciliation, women’s issues, migration, and social issues.

3. SAMPLE DESIGN

The sample was drawn using a multi-stage, systematic sampling approach consistent with previous years for meaningful longitudinal comparisons.

Target population:	Afghan adults in 34 provinces.
Target sample:	9,600 Afghan adults in 34 provinces (main sample) + 3,000 respondents in oversample districts.
Achieved sample:	9,650 Afghan adults in 34 provinces ⁴ (main sample) + 3,008 respondents in oversample districts.

Determining the sample followed six steps:

Step 1: For the main sample, a base sample was first stratified disproportionately by province, desired margin of error, and power estimates. A minimum of 200 interviews were carried out in each province, with the exception of Paktika, where fieldwork had to be redone due to quality control flags in the initial fieldwork. Within each province, the sample was then stratified by urban and rural population figures from the 2015–2016 CSO estimates. Each of the 65 strata is allocated at least one primary sampling unit (PSU) to ensure that the entire target population has a probability of selection. After the urban and rural strata of each province receive a cluster, the remainder of the province's sample is allocated proportionally. For the booster samples in the northern provinces, the base sample was stratified disproportionately by district, with each district as its own stratum.

Step 2: Districts were selected via probability proportional to size (PPS) systematic sampling. Districts serve as the PSU. Each PSU contains two sampling points, one of male respondents and one of female respondents. This is done to allow for gender-matched interviewing, which is a cultural requirement of working in Afghanistan. Each PSU is chosen via PPS sampling within its stratum. In order to obtain some information on the perceptions of those living in insecure areas, areas inaccessible to the enumerators conducting random walk, intercept interviews were performed with people coming out of those areas to towns, bazaars, bus depots, or hospitals in more secure areas, usually in a neighboring district. For the 2016 survey, approximately 8% of the interviews (n=1,035) were intercept interviews. Intercept interviews were done in 75 districts across 25 provinces. These intercept interviews are identified by the variables “Method” and “Method2” in the data set.

Step 3: The settlements within districts were selected by simple random sampling. These serve as the secondary sampling unit (SSU). Within urban strata, neighborhoods (called *nabias* in cities and towns) were used, while in rural strata, villages were used. Because population data for settlement sizes does not exist, a simple random selection among all known settlements was used to select locations. In this survey, six interviews were conducted per sampling point, which equates to approximately one full day of interview work for one enumerator, including travel time.

The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces can cause a sampling point to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence. At the time of the fieldwork 16.9% of males were inaccessible to male interviewers, while 28.7% of females inaccessible to female interviewers. A complete listing of replaced sampling points for the 2016 sample, along with reasons for each replacement, can be downloaded from the Survey website.⁵ A total of two replicate draws were provided to the field team prior to the launch of fieldwork, each a random assignment. Settlement/nahia-level replacements are done by supervisors in the field, where neighboring accessible settlements are chosen as replacements whenever possible.

In compliance with Afghan cultural norms, interviews conducted by ACSOR enumerators were gender-specific, with female enumerators interviewing women and male enumerators interviewing men. Some districts with significant insurgent activity, military operations, or lack of transportation had male-only samples. In cases where a sampling point designated for female interviews was only accessible to male enumerators, it was replaced with a female sampling point from within the same strata (same province and same urban/rural status).

Step 4: Field managers used maps generated from several sources to select starting points within each SSU. In rural areas, the system required enumerators to start in one of five randomly selected locations (northern, southern, eastern, or western edges of the rural settlement, or in the center). In urban areas, because it is more difficult to differentiate neighborhood borders, a random location (north, south, east, west, or center) was provided to the enumerator, who started from an identifiable landmark in the vicinity (e.g., a school or mosque).

Step 5: To improve the randomization process, each sampling point was also randomly assigned a different first-contacted house: either the first, second, or third house the interviewer arrived at following the start of the random walk. After approaching the first-contacted house, the interviewer then used a set interval to select all other households for inclusion in the sample— selecting every third house on the right in rural areas, for example, and every fifth house on the right in urban areas.

Step 6: After selecting a household, enumerators were instructed to use a Kish grid for randomizing selection of the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed by name and age in descending order, and the respondent was selected according the rules of the Kish grid. The Kish grid provides a random selection criterion based on which visit the household represents in the enumerator’s random walk and the number of inhabitants living in the household. Column numbers in the Kish grid that accompanied the questionnaire were pre-coded in order to help prevent fraud or convenience selection based on available people. Enumerators were not allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the respondent selected by the Kish grid. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, enumerators moved on to the next household according to the random route.

4. CONTACT PROCEDURES

Under no circumstances were enumerators allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after three visits, the enumerator then moved on to the next household according to the random walk. These visits were made at different times of the same day, or on different days of the field period, in order to provide a more flexible schedule for engaging the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force had difficulty in many rural areas meeting the three-visit requirement prior to substitution.

In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some callbacks, most interviews were completed on the first attempt:

- First contact, 97.0%
- Second contact, 2.5%
- Third contact, 0.5%

Due to the high rate of unemployment, and the choice of an appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan.

5. WEIGHTING

Weighting is a method of making the survey sample representative of a population. It usually assumes a random selection of respondents, and that the true population is known. The weight used for the 2016 survey (labeled “w” in the data) was constructed as a proportional weight. Eight weights were created by two strata, one stratum of provincial population and one by urban/rural proportions using CSO data. The base weight, also referred to as the probability-of-selection weight or design weight, is simply the inverse of the probability of selection for each respondent. However, two assumptions were made in the sampling design that resulted in treating the sample as approximately EPSEM (equal probability of selection method):

1. All settlements are of equal size. Since population estimates at the settlement level are unavailable and/or unreliable, the sample design selected settlements using a simple random sample (SRS). Under the assumption that the settlements are of equal size, the SRS condition of equal probabilities of selection holds true.
2. The random route procedure is equivalent to a simple random sample of households and respondents. Random route and Kish grid procedures were used for respondent selection. The assumption is that these procedures are equivalent to performing a simple random selection of households and respondents at the settlement level.

A fully EPSEM method results in a self-weighting design, or rescaled base weights of 1. However, base weights are still needed to correct for any disproportionate stratification that may be the result of oversampling, rounding for the cluster design, or removal of interviews due to quality control. The base weights are thus computed as follows:

$$B_i = (n_i / N_i)^{-1}$$

$$w_i = B_i^{-1}$$

B_i = PROBABILITY OF SELECTION FOR A RESPONDENT

W_i = BASE WEIGHT FOR RESPONDENTS

N_i = SAMPLE SIZE IN STRATA I

N_i = total population in strata i

An adjustment due to response rates was performed.

- Using the base-weighted data, response rates were estimated using AAPOR's Response Rate 3 (RR3) calculation, which is as follows:⁶

$I \div [(I+P) + (R+NC+O) + e(UH+UO)]$, where

- I = Completes
 - P = Partials
 - R = Refused
 - NC = Non-contact
 - O = Other
 - e = Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible. Calculated in this case as eligible ÷ (eligible + unknown eligibility).
 - UH = Unknown household
 - UO = Unknown other
- These response rates are then applied as weighting class adjustments to respondents within each Province.
 - The non-response adjustment for each region was calculated:

$$w_{\text{non-response}} = RR3^{-1}$$

A post-stratification adjustment was then performed on the resulting adjusted base weight to match each target population's geographic distribution in Afghanistan. The only targets used for the ranking were province, by urban/rural status, and gender.

6. WEIGHTED SAMPLE, BY PROVINCE

Figure 10.1 provides the population percentages for each province as supplied by the CSO, the unweighted sample, and the weighted sample.

	PERCENTAGE IN POPULATION	PERCENTAGE IN UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE (INCLUDES INTERCEPT INTERVIEWS)	PERCENTAGE IN WEIGHTED SAMPLE (WGT5) ⁷
KABUL	16.1%	8.3%	16.1%
KAPISA	1.6%	1.7%	1.6%
PARWAN	2.5%	1.7%	2.5%
WARDAK	2.2%	2.7%	2.2%
LOGAR	1.4%	1.6%	1.4%
GHAZNI	4.5%	2.4%	4.5%
PAKTIA	2.0%	1.8%	2%
PAKTIKA	1.6%	0.5%	1.6%
KHOST	2.1%	1.8%	2.1%
NANGARHAR	5.6%	3.3%	5.6%
LAGHMAN	1.6%	1.8%	1.6%

KUNAR	1.7%	1.6%	1.7%
NURISTAN	0.5%	1.7%	0.5%
BADAKHSHAN	3.5%	4.3%	3.5%
TAKHAR	3.6%	6.8%	3.6%
BAGHLAN	3.4%	6.9%	3.4%
KUNDUZ	3.7%	6.9%	3.7%
BALKH	4.9%	8.1%	4.9%
SAMANGAN	1.4%	4.3%	1.4%
JAWZJAN	2.0%	1.7%	2%
SAR-E-POL	2.1%	1.5%	2.1%
FARYAB	3.7%	2.0%	3.7%
BADGHIS	1.8%	1.5%	1.8%
HERAT	7.0%	4.2%	7%
FARAH	1.9%	1.6%	1.9%
NIMROZ	0.6%	1.6%	0.6%
HELMAND	3.4%	3.2%	3.4%
KANDAHAR	4.5%	3.4%	4.5%
ZABUL	1.1%	1.8%	1.1%
URUZGAN	1.3%	1.7%	1.4%
GHOR	2.5%	1.7%	2.5%
BAMYAN	1.7%	2.6%	1.7%
PANJSHIR	0.6%	1.7%	0.6%
DAIKUNDI	1.6%	1.8%	1.6%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

FIG. 10.1. *Provincial distribution of Afghan population used to create survey weights for the 2016 Survey.*

7. SAMPLING REPLACEMENTS

Afghanistan remains a challenging research environment. Each year, randomly identified sampling points have to be replaced because of lack of access, usually due to insecurity, but also sometimes due to remoteness. As of August 2016, 71% of the Afghan population is estimated to live in districts accessible to male and female enumerators from ACSOR, while 11% live in districts accessible only to male interviewers, and 18% live in districts where ACSOR lacks access. This means that, in total, 29% of women and 18% of men are inaccessible to random selection.

This year, of 2,262 sampling points selected, a total of 800 villages from the main draw had to be replaced. This represents a total replacement rate of 35.4% for original sampling points. Reasons for all replacements are summarized in Figure 10.2, and a full list of replacements can be found on The Asia Foundation's Survey website. Female sampling points had a slightly higher rate of replacement (42.0%, or 441 out of 1,049) than did male sampling points (31.7%, or 359 out of 1,133). Figure 10.2 illustrates the reasons for replacements since they were first recorded in 2008. These have been largely consistent over the years, with security being the primary reason for replacements since 2009.

REASONS FOR VILLAGE REPLACEMENTS BY YEAR

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
REASON	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
SECURITY ISSUES/TALIBAN	33	50	65	60	56	54	65	69	70
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	19	22	19	18	28	23	25	23	22
VILLAGE ABANDONED/COULD NOT BE FOUND	44	26	16	19	11	17	10	7	5
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	0	2	0	4	3	5	1	0	1
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	4	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	1
NOT SPECIFIED/OTHER	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

FIG. 10.2. *Reasons for sampling replacements since first recorded in 2008.*

8. QUALITY CONTROL

Approximately 35% of the fieldwork interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control. As in 2014 and 2015, Sayara Research provided third-party monitoring.

Fieldwork quality control consisted of:

- Direct observation during the interview (521 interviews, 4%);
- A return visit by the supervisor to the residence where an interview took place (2,835 interviews, 22%);
- Back-check from the central office (40 interviews, 0.3%); or
- Quality control by a third-party monitor (1,081 interviews, 9%).

In order to improve accuracy and verify fieldwork, ACSOR interviewers also collected GPS data, using phones, at 1,878 of 2,262 sampling points (83%). As an extra level of verification, GPS coordinates were then compared with the GPS coordinates of villages provided by the CSO. For this study, the median distance between the CSO coordinates and the ACSOR coordinates from the selected villages was 1.25 km.

2016 SURVEY COVERAGE




FIG. 10.3. Survey coverage using GPS to illustrate sampling points.

CODING, DATA ENTRY, AND DATA CLEANING

After the completed questionnaires were returned to the ACSOR central office in Kabul, the answers to open-ended questions were sorted and coded by a team of coders familiar with international standards for creating code typologies for open-ended data. The questionnaires were then sent for data entry by a team of more than 20 keypunchers.

Following data entry, ACSOR and The Asia Foundation applied logic tests to clean the data, using Stata and Hunter software programs. These programs search for patterns and duplicates that may indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an enumerator.

Sample logic tests included:

Equality test: compares interviews for similarities, grouped by enumerator, within sampling point, province, or any other variable. Typically, interviews with an enumerator average of 90% or higher are flagged for further investigation.

“Don’t know” (i.e., non-response) test: determines the percentage of “don’t know” responses for each enumerator’s cases. Typically, interviews with 40% or higher “don’t know” responses are flagged for further investigation.

Duplicates test: compares cases across all enumerators and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other, and surveys with 96% similarity or greater are removed. The *percentmatch* program command in the Stata software is used for this test.

For these tests, six cases were deleted for having an interviewer average of over 90% similar responses (i.e., failing the equality test), 504 cases were deleted for being over 96% similar in substantive responses to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test), and no cases were deleted for consisting of over 40% “don’t know” responses (i.e., failing the “don’t know” test).

In total, 31 logic tests were used and 7.1% of all interviews were removed, including 514 by ACSOR and 460 by The Asia Foundation.

During the data entry process, 20% of all paper questionnaires (2,610 out of 13,089) were randomly selected by ACSOR’s data entry managers for double entry to check for keypunching errors. These questionnaires were given to a different team for reentry, and data results from this independent entry were then compared to the primary data set. Discrepancies and errors were identified by data coders. For all errors, questionnaires were then reviewed, and the correct data included in the final data set. The error rate for data entry for the 2016 *Survey* was 0.14%, which is acceptable under international quality control standards and slightly lower than the 0.18% error rate in 2015.

9. MARGIN OF ERROR

Focusing on the portion of the sample that is probability based (i.e., excluding intercept interviews), the added variance from a multi-stage stratified cluster design can be estimated via a design-effect estimate for the survey’s variables and, in turn, used to estimate the complex margin of sampling error. Design-effect estimates provided in this section account for both the complex sample design and the weights. The sample was stratified by urban/rural status and province with two stages of clustering: district and settlement. The design effect, for reporting purposes, is estimated for a key question of interest: “Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” The following table provides design-effect estimates for each response category of this key variable using the statistical software called R (survey package). In an effort to provide the reader with a survey-wide design effect, a “weighted mean” design effect was calculated as the average across each response category of the variable when weighted by frequency of response (Fig. 10.4).

DESIGN-EFFECT ESTIMATION USING Q1

	PROPORTION	COMPLEX SE	DESIGN EFFECT	SRS BOOTSTRAPPED SE
RIGHT DIRECTION	28.67%	0.7327%	3.3228	0.4047%
WRONG DIRECTION	66.26%	0.7937%	3.5669	0.4267%
REFUSED	0.51%	0.0860%	1.8601	0.0680%
DON'T KNOW	4.56%	0.2995%	2.6076	0.1865%
WEIGHTED MEAN			3.4445	

FIG. 10.4. Components used to estimate overall margin of error, including design effects and bootstrapped standard errors (SE) that assume a simple random sample (SRS).

Assuming a simple random sample with $n=12,658$ and $p=.5$ at the 95% confidence interval level, the margin of error for the survey is 0.9%, slightly less than last year's 1.0%. However, when accounting for the complex design through the design-effect estimate of 2.53, the complex margin of error (MoE) is 1.60%, virtually identical to last year (1.59%).

In addition to this conservative⁸ estimate of MoE, statistic-specific standard errors are provided using bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is a resampling method that does not rely on assumptions about the distribution of the variable of interest. These estimates are calculated with the weighted data, and can be multiplied by the square root of the design effect in order to achieve a standard error that takes the design into consideration. These estimates take into consideration the actual responses during calculation (as opposed to the conservative setting at $p=.5$).

End Notes

¹ The booster districts utilized a different replacement protocol: due to the need to conduct district-level analysis in these districts, sampling points that were not accessible to women were replaced by male sampling points within the same district. As a result, this year's overall sample contained slightly more men than women, but the results were then weighted to a 50:50 gender distribution.

² The design-effect estimate is a weighted average across individual response option design effects for this key question of interest.

³ The probability sample excludes intercept interviews from variance estimation.


⁴ The target n-size for this survey was 12,600. The initial data set delivered by ACSOR had an n-size of 9,615. A total of 344 interviews were removed as a result of quality control by ACSOR and client logic checks, which reduced the total n-size in the final data set to 9,271.

⁵ <http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey>

⁶ https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/MainSiteFiles/FindingE.pdf

⁷ "Wgt5" variable in the data set. Distribution of the weighted sample by province is approximately the same for all four weights.

⁸ The margin of error for a binary response is maximized when the proportions are set equal to each other ($p=.5$)



APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

M4. REGION

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
CENTRAL/KABUL	25%
EAST	9%
SOUTH EAST	10%
SOUTH WEST	11%
WEST	13%
NORTH EAST	15%
CENTRAL/HAZARAJAT	3%
NORTH WEST	14%

M6A. GEOGRAPHIC CODE

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
VILLAGES	75%
TOWNS	5%
CITIES	6%
METRO (KABUL)	14%

M7. PROVINCE

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
KABUL	16%
KAPISA	2%
PARWAN	2%
WARDAK	2%
LOGAR	1%
GHAZNI	5%
PAKTIA	2%
PAKTIKA	2%
KHOST	2%
NANGARHAR	6%
LAGHMAN	2%
KUNAR	2%
NURISTAN	1%
BADAKHSHAN	3%
TAKHAR	4%
BAGHLAN	3%
KUNDUZ	4%

BALKH	5%
SAMANGAN	1%
JAWZJAN	2%
SAR-E-PUL	2%
FARYAB	4%
BADGHIS	2%
HERAT	7%
FARAH	2%
NIMROZ	1%
HELMAND	3%
KANDAHAR	4%
ZABUL	1%
URUZGAN	1%
GHOR	3%
BAMYAN	2%
PANJSHIR	1%
DAIKUNDI	2%

D1. GENDER

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
MALE	50%
FEMALE	50%

D2. HOW OLD ARE YOU?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,730	2,893	11,623
	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
18 TO 24 YEARS OLD	24%	29%	25%
25 TO 34 YEARS OLD	30%	28%	30%
35 TO 44 YEARS OLD	24%	20%	23%
45 TO 54 YEARS OLD	14%	12%	13%
55 AND OLDER	9%	10%	9%
AVERAGE AGE	34.9	34.1	34.5

D14A. WHICH ETHNIC GROUP DO YOU BELONG TO?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
PASHTUN	38%
TAJIK	36%
UZBEK	8%
HAZARA	12%
TURKMEN	2%

BALUCH	< 0.5%
NURISTANI	1%
AIMAK	1%
ARAB	1%
PASHAYE	< 0.5%
SADAT	1%
QEZELBASH	< 0.5%
GUJAR	< 0.5%
WAKHI	< 0.5%
BAYAT	< 0.5%
TEMORI	< 0.5%
AFGHAN	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%



APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

MAIN SURVEY QUESTIONS:

Q1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
RIGHT DIRECTION	29%
WRONG DIRECTION	66%
REFUSED	1%
DON'T KNOW	4%

Q2. (If Q-1 answer is "right direction") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q2a. First mention _____

Q2b. Second mention _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: RIGHT DIRECTION	3,404	3,404
RECONSTRUCTION/REBUILDING	22%	33%
GOOD SECURITY	16%	27%
HAVING ACTIVE ANA AND ANP	6%	10%
SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS HAVE OPENED	5%	10%
ECONOMIC REVIVAL	4%	10%
PEACE/END OF THE WAR	5%	9%
GOOD GOVERNMENT	4%	7%
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION SYSTEM	4%	7%
ROAD RECONSTRUCTION	3%	6%
REDUCTION IN LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	2%	6%
DEMOCRACY/ELECTIONS	2%	4%
REMOVING TALIBAN	2%	4%
HAVING LEGAL CONSTITUTION	2%	4%
BETTER ELECTRICITY SUPPLY THAN BEFORE	2%	3%
WOMEN CAN NOW WORK	1%	3%
FREEDOM/FREE SPEECH	1%	3%
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE	1%	3%
NATIONAL UNITY	1%	3%
REDUCTION IN POPPY CULTIVATION	1%	2%
DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE	1%	2%
REFUGEES RETURN	1%	2%

MORE JOB OPPORTUNITIES	1%	2%
IMPROVED JUSTICE	1%	2%
DECREASE IN CRIME	1%	2%
CLEAN DRINKING WATER	< 0.5%	2%
HAVING PARLIAMENT	< 0.5%	2%
REMOVING TERRORISM	1%	1%
HAVING A LEGITIMATE PRESIDENT	1%	1%
WOMEN HAVE MORE FREEDOM	1%	1%
MORE ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS	1%	1%
DISARMAMENT	1%	1%
GOOD COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	1%	1%
PREVENTION/ELIMINATION OF SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%	1%
PREVENTION/ELIMINATION OF CRIME	< 0.5%	1%
FOREIGN FORCES LEAVING AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	1%
MORE FACTORIES	< 0.5%	1%
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS	< 0.5%	1%
CLINICS HAVE BEEN BUILT	< 0.5%	1%
DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IN GENERAL	< 0.5%	1%
BETTER RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	1%
NEW PRESIDENT	< 0.5%	1%
PEOPLE ARE SATISFIED WITH GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	1%
RESPECTING WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%	1%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	1%
FREE MOVEMENT/TRAVEL POSSIBLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PEOPLE COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RESPECTING ISLAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BETTER TREATMENT OF ADDICTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SIGNING STRATEGIC AGREEMENTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LOW PRICES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PREVENTING INTERFERENCE BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NOTHING IS GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORE AND BETTER MEDIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACTIVE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE IN EXPORTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WOMEN PARTICIPATE IN POLITICS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
YOUTH ARE INVOLVED IN POLITICS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GIROA AND HIZBE ISLAMI	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ESTABLISHING HIGH PEACE SHURA/JIRGA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MINING OF NATURAL RESOURCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DECREASE IN NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LESS ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO (INSURGENTS IN) PAKISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO NUG	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASED SALARIES FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

DECREASE IN ARBITRARY ATTACKS BY THE U.S.	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ACCESS TO PRODUCTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BETTER TRANSPORTATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DETECTING AND DEFUSING MINES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HAVING ACTIVE AIRPORTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NEW TECHNOLOGY IS AVAILABLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORE WATER FOR IRRIGATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITY GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE/PRESENCE OF GOVERNMENT COURTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%	13%

Q3. (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Q3a. First mention _____

Q3b. Second mention _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: WRONG DIRECTION	7,658	7,658
INSECURITY	33%	49%
THERE IS UNEMPLOYMENT	11%	27%
CORRUPTION	8%	15%
BAD GOVERNMENT	5%	10%
BAD ECONOMY	4%	10%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	4%	8%
POOR LEADERSHIP	4%	7%
NO RECONSTRUCTION HAS HAPPENED	3%	5%
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	3%	5%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	3%	5%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	2%	4%
INJUSTICE IN THE COUNTRY	2%	3%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%	3%
INCREASE IN CRIME	1%	3%
HIGH PRICES	1%	3%
POOR EDUCATION SYSTEM	1%	3%
PEOPLE DISILLUSIONED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	1%	2%
LACK OF UNITY	1%	2%
INCREASE IN DRUG TRADE	1%	2%
WATER & POWER SUPPLY PROBLEMS	1%	2%
LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW	1%	2%

LACK OF AID/NO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	1%	1%
TOO MANY FOREIGNERS ARE GETTING INVOLVED	1%	1%
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CAUSE PROBLEMS	1%	1%
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN COUNTRY'S MILITARY AFFAIRS	1%	1%
TWO-FACED POLITICS	1%	1%
THERE IS NO PROGRESS	1%	1%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	1%	1%
PRESENCE/INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGNERS	1%	1%
POLITICAL RESISTANCE	1%	1%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	< 0.5%	1%
PAKISTAN'S ROCKET ATTACKS ON AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN ISAF/COALITION FORCES AND ANP	< 0.5%	1%
PRESENCE OF ISIS	< 0.5%	1%
FOREIGN AID CAUSES PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
HEALTHCARE PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
MIGRATION	< 0.5%	1%
WESTERN INFLUENCE IS TOO GREAT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISARMAMENT HASN'T TAKEN PLACE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNFAIR ELECTIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ELECTION FRAUD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ROADS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ISLAM IS IN DANGER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SHELTER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TERRORISM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ATTENTION TO AGRICULTURE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WEAK PARLIAMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SIGNING STRATEGIC AGREEMENTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THE GOVERNMENT IS SUPPORTING TALIBAN AND AL-QAEDA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PLACING BOMBS ON THE ROADS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WEAK ANA AND ANP	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DEPARTURE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NOTHING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RAPE/SEXUAL HARASSMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISRESPECTING ISLAMIC VALUES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THEFT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INVESTMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE IN POPPY CULTIVATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KILLING ANA/ANP	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

LACK OF RESPECT FOR ISLAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO CANDIDATES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WORK IS NOT GIVEN TO APPROPRIATE PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH LUXURY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ARBITRARY U.S. ATTACKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
POISONING SCHOOL CHILDREN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATION OF ARBAKIES (ARMED GROUPS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
I DON'T TRUST THE PEACE PROCESS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FOOD FOR PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH FREEDOM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AMERICANS BLOCKING ROADS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MISUSE OF POLITICAL POWER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
COUNTRY IS MOVING TOWARDS CHAOS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF TRAINED DOCTORS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNCERTAINTY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IEC INTERFERING IN ELECTION AND SUPPORTING ONE CANDIDATE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DRUG ADDICTS ARE PROLIFERATING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MAFIA IS IN POWER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RELEASING PRISONERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LAND DISPUTES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THERE ARE SPIES IN THE GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%	10%

Q4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)*

Q4a. *First mention* _____
Q4b. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623	11,623
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION	13%	21%
NOTHING	17%	17%
GOOD SECURITY	10%	16%
DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE/IRRIGATION/LIVESTOCK	9%	13%
DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY	7%	11%

BUILDING ROADS AND BRIDGES	6%	10%
UNITY AMONG PEOPLE	4%	7%
BUILDING CLINICS	2%	6%
AVAILABILITY OF JOBS	3%	5%
BUILDING DAMS	3%	5%
AVAILABILITY OF DRINKING WATER	3%	5%
BUILDING MOSQUES	2%	3%
ESTABLISHMENT OF PEOPLE'S COUNCIL	1%	2%
PEOPLE'S SUPPORT FOR ANP	1%	2%
ENFORCEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER	1%	2%
BETTER ECONOMY	1%	2%
BETTER PUBLIC SERVICES	1%	1%
FIGHTING CORRUPTION	1%	1%
FIGHTING NARCOTICS	1%	1%
FIGHTING CRIME	1%	1%
TRADE AND BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT	1%	1%
AVAILABILITY OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING	1%	1%
FIGHTING AGAINST AOG	1%	1%
IMPROVEMENTS IN WOMEN'S/HUMAN RIGHTS	1%	1%
ESTABLISHMENT/PRESENCE OF DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	< 0.5%	1%
HAVING STRONG ANSF	< 0.5%	1%
CREATION OF GOVERNMENT COURTS	< 0.5%	1%
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SEWER CONSTRUCTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FREEDOM OF SPEECH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RELIGION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRAINING OF ANSF	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RETURN OF REFUGEES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CULTURE AND TRADITION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRAINING OF AIR FORCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATING NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EVERYTHING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CONTROL OF HIGH PRICES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISARMING OF PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GIVING THE RIGHT JOB TO THE RIGHT PERSON	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CLEANER ENVIRONMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ELECTIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERNATIONAL AID	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

ESTABLISHING FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PEACE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MEDIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISTRICT GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRAINED DOCTORS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FIGHTING THE TALIBAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
YOUTH JOINING ANP	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXISTENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NO DAESH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BUILDING ANTI-FLOOD WALLS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
STRONG GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	1%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	8%	30%

Q5. In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area?

Q5a. First mention _____

Q5b. Second mention _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623	11,623
UNEMPLOYMENT	18%	32%
INSECURITY/ATTACKS/VIOLENCE	15%	23%
ELECTRICITY	11%	20%
ROADS	8%	15%
DRINKING WATER	8%	15%
EDUCATION/SCHOOLS/LITERACY	5%	11%
HEALTHCARE/CLINICS/HOSPITALS	4%	9%
HIGH PRICES	3%	7%
POOR ECONOMY	3%	6%
POVERTY	3%	6%
CORRUPTION	3%	5%
CRIME	2%	4%
RECONSTRUCTION/REBUILDING	2%	3%
TALIBAN	2%	3%
WATER FOR IRRIGATION	1%	2%
POLLUTION	1%	2%
NO PROBLEMS	1%	1%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	1%	1%
DRUG SMUGGLING	1%	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%	1%
LACK OF AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT	1%	1%
DRUG ADDICTION	1%	1%

INJUSTICE	1%	1%
THEFT	1%	1%
GOVERNMENT/WEAK GOVERNMENT/CENTRAL AUTHORITY	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF (DECENT) SHELTER	< 0.5%	1%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	< 0.5%	1%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	< 0.5%	1%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF FOOD	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF TRAINED DOCTORS	< 0.5%	1%
DIKES AND DRAINS TO COMBAT FLOODING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF UNITY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ANA AND ANP	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ROADSIDE BOMBS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NATURAL DISASTERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE BY PAKISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ENTERTAINMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MUNICIPALITIES NOT DOING THEIR JOB WELL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MOSQUES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH FREEDOM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LAWS NOT ENFORCED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FOREIGN FORCES SEARCHING HOUSES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF TERRORISM AND AL-QAEDA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ARMED PEOPLE/WARLORDS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FUEL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FORCED MARRIAGES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF ISIS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SEWAGE SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNEMPLOYMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PROBLEMS OF RETURNEES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF BAKERIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PEOPLE NOT FEELING RESPONSIBLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ARBAKIES (ARMED GROUPS SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

LACK OF BANKING SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MORAL CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FUEL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISRESPECT FOR ISLAMIC VALUES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GOVERNOR MISAPPROPRIATING LANDS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BAD/CORRUPT GOVERNOR	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AOG TAKES MONEY FROM PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COLD HOUSES (FOR FRUITS)	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ARSON ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SHURAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MEN TEASING WOMEN ON STREETS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MADRASAS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF HELP FOR WIDOWS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
POLLUTION IN THE ENVIRONMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE IN POPPY CULTIVATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DROUGHT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AERIAL BOMBING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MARKETS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BAAD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN BOYS AND GIRLS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PUBLIC WELFARE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INDUSTRIAL PARKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RELEASING PRISONERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HIGH DOWRIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RESTRICTIONS ON MOTORBIKES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
VILLAGE LEADERS ARE WEAK	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FARMLAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ANDSF MISTREATING PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PERSONAL ENMITY BETWEEN PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF TRADE ROUTE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HIGHER AUTHORITIES USE FORCE TO DO WHAT THEY WANT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%	10%

Q6. In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next biggest problem?

Q6a. First mention _____

Q6b. Second mention _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623	11,623
UNEMPLOYMENT	51%	71%
ILLITERACY	12%	26%
POOR ECONOMY	6%	16%
DRUG ADDICTION	7%	14%
INSECURITY	4%	12%
NO HIGHER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH	4%	8%
LACK OF SCHOOLS	2%	4%
PEOPLE LEAVING THE COUNTRY	1%	3%
COSTLY MARRIAGES	1%	2%
CORRUPTION	1%	2%
LACK OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE	1%	2%
INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMES	1%	2%
LACK OF RIGHTS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE	1%	2%
TAKING REFUGE IN IRAN	1%	2%
HIGH COST OF LIVING	1%	2%
MORAL CORRUPTION	1%	1%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	1%	1%
TRIBAL PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	1%
CHANGING THEIR IDEOLOGY FOR WAR	< 0.5%	1%
JOINING AOG DUE TO UNEMPLOYMENT	< 0.5%	1%
INJUSTICE	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF ATHLETIC FIELDS	< 0.5%	1%
FORCED MARRIAGES	< 0.5%	1%
CAMPAIGN AMONG YOUTH FOR TALIBAN ENROLLMENT	< 0.5%	1%
THEY DON'T HAVE A CLEAR FUTURE	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF FACTORIES	< 0.5%	1%
KILLING OUR YOUTH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF HEALTHCARE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NO PROBLEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
YOUTH ARE INVOLVED IN SUICIDE ATTACKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISTURBANCE FROM POLICE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INFORMATION/INTEREST IN ISLAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MISUSE OF YOUTH IN POLITICS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SHELTER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

LACK OF ELECTRICITY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
WEAK PARLIAMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INTERNET ACCESS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TOO MUCH USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND MENTAL DISORDERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KIDNAPPING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PERSONAL ENMITY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF MADRASAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF DRINKING WATER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF RECONSTRUCTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF INTERNATIONAL SCHOLARSHIPS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
JOINING THE LOCAL COMMANDERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%	16%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

Q7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem?*

Q7a. *First mention* _____

Q7b. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623	11,623
EDUCATION/ILLITERACY	21%	36%
LACK OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN	11%	23%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	13%	22%
LACK OF RIGHTS	8%	15%
FORCED MARRIAGES/DOWRY	8%	13%
POVERTY	4%	8%
NO HOSPITALS/CLINICS	4%	7%
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSES	4%	7%
SECURITY	3%	5%
NOTHING	3%	3%
CAN'T LEAVE HOMES	2%	3%
PREGNANCY-RELATED HEALTHCARE	2%	3%
GENERAL HEALTHCARE	1%	2%
BAAD	1%	2%
WOMEN DENIED HIGHER EDUCATION	1%	2%

WOMEN CONTROLLED BY MEN	1%	2%
LACK OF TRAINED DOCTORS	1%	2%
LACK OF SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS	1%	2%
GOVERNMENT NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO WOMEN	1%	1%
LACK OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER	1%	1%
LACK OF MARKETS FOR CRAFTS	1%	1%
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION UNAVAILABLE	< 0.5%	1%
INJUSTICE	< 0.5%	1%
DISTURBANCE TO WOMEN	< 0.5%	1%
SUICIDE	< 0.5%	1%
MURDER OF LITERATE WOMEN	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF SHELTER	< 0.5%	1%
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY	< 0.5%	1%
WOMEN FORCED TO WORK	< 0.5%	1%
WOMEN DENIED SHARE OF INHERITANCES	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF RESPECT TOWARDS WOMEN	< 0.5%	1%
CORRUPTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RAPE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF REPRESENTATION SHURA/JIRGA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF BAKERY FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF CONSTRUCTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DRUG ADDICTION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HIGH PRICES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CULTURAL PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PUBLIC BATHS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PARKS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KIDNAPPING OF WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DIVORCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ATTENTION TO WIDOWS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FOOD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PROBLEMS IN GENERAL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISTURBANCE CREATED BY ISIS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MATERNAL MORTALITY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ROADSIDE MINES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BIAS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF COURTS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ROADSIDE MINES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SELLING WOMEN/GIRLS FOR MONEY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SHARIA LAWS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN BOYS AND GIRLS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

NOT HAVING HIJAB	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NO ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE LOANS TO WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF KINDERGARTENS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CRIMES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ORGANIZATIONS WORKING FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF PLACE FOR RELIGIOUS PRACTICES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FARMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UNCERTAIN FUTURE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
RUNNING AWAY FROM HOME	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BADDAL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF FACTORIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	4%	20%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

SERVICES AND HEALTH

Q8. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	BETTER	THE SAME	WORSE	REFUSED	DONT KNOW
A) FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD	19%	44%	37%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	8%	32%	60%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) AVAILABILITY OF PRODUCTS IN THE MARKET	10%	48%	41%	< 0.5%	1%
D) QUALITY OF FOOD IN YOUR DIET	16%	48%	35%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
E) PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF YOUR HOUSE/DWELLING	15%	53%	31%	< 0.5%	1%
F) HEALTH/WELL-BEING OF YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS	19%	50%	30%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
G) ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	14%	41%	43%	1%	1%
H) ACCESS TO SCHOOLS	23%	51%	26%	< 0.5%	1%

Q9. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	YES	NO	REFUSED	DONT KNOW
A) RECONSTRUCTION/BUILDING OF ROADS OR BRIDGES	34%	65%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) NEW GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OPENING	19%	80%	< 0.5%	1%
C) NEW PRIVATE SCHOOL OPENING	15%	84%	< 0.5%	1%
D) NEW PRIVATE UNIVERSITY	10%	89%	< 0.5%	1%
E) DRINKING WATER PROJECT (E.G., NEW WELLS, HAND PUMPS, TANK SYSTEM, RESERVOIR)	26%	73%	< 0.5%	1%

F) IRRIGATION PROJECT	17%	82%	< 0.5%	1%
G) GOVERNMENT-SUPPLIED ELECTRICITY	17%	82%	< 0.5%	1%
H) HEALTHCARE (PRIMARY HEALTH CENTER, REGULAR VISITS OF DOCTORS, ETC.)	21%	78%	1%	1%
I) RECONCILIATION WITH ANTIGOVERNMENT ELEMENTS	9%	89%	< 0.5%	2%
J) PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE	20%	79%	< 0.5%	1%
K) NEW FACTORIES OPENED	5%	94%	< 0.5%	1%
L) BUILDING NEW MOSQUES	31%	68%	< 0.5%	1%

Q10. *If it were up to you and if you had the necessary resources, what two things would you do to improve the quality of life in your area?*

Q10a. *First mention* _____
Q10b. *Second mention* _____

	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623	11,623
DEVELOP EDUCATION/SCHOOLS	14%	26%
CONSTRUCT ROADS	12%	21%
BUILD MASJID	8%	14%
HELP HEALTH CENTERS AND CLINICS	7%	14%
CREATE FACTORIES	6%	11%
BRING ELECTRICITY	6%	11%
CREATE MORE JOBS FOR YOUTH	6%	11%
BRING SECURITY	6%	9%
SOLVE PEOPLE'S PROBLEMS	4%	7%
PROVIDE DRINKING WATER	4%	7%
PROVIDE TAILORING/VOCATIONAL TRAINING	3%	6%
DEVELOP AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK	3%	5%
RECONSTRUCTION IN GENERAL	3%	5%
CREATE MORE ECONOMIC PROJECTS	2%	4%
IMPROVE TRADING AND BUSINESS	2%	3%
PROVIDE MORE WATER FOR IRRIGATION	1%	3%
CREATE COMPANIES	1%	2%
BUILD FRUIT-PROCESSING FACTORY	1%	1%
ARREST ALL MAFIA AND SMUGGLERS	1%	1%
CREATE SPORTS STADIUM	1%	1%
STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN	< 0.5%	1%
MAKE PEACE WITH TALIBAN	< 0.5%	1%
BUILD AN ICE FACTORY	< 0.5%	1%
IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%	1%
BUILD ANTI-FLOOD WALLS	< 0.5%	1%
ELIMINATE CORRUPTION	1%	< 0.5%

NOTHING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BUILD KINDERGARTENS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATE WOMEN'S COUNCIL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IMPLEMENT LAW AND JUSTICE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CLEAN THE ENVIRONMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IMPROVE QUALITY OF MY PERSONAL LIFE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CONTROL TAXES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IMPROVE THE TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATE SECURITY CHECK POINTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATE UNITY AMONG PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
STOP FORCED MARRIAGES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DESTROY ISIS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
STOP AFGHANS FROM LEAVING AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
HELP THE GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DESTROY AOG	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ELIMINATE CRIMINALS AND ROBBERS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PROVIDE WEAPONS TO ANSF	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INCREASE NUMBER OF AOG	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DECREASE THE COST OF GOODS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ELIMINATE POPPIES AND DRUGS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REMOVE ROADSIDE IEDS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BUILD PUBLIC BATHS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BUILD SEWAGE SYSTEM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATE COLD STORAGES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GIVE WOMEN EQUAL RIGHTS IN INHERITANCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SOLVE CULTURAL PROBLEMS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TAKE THE POWER FROM THE USA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REDUCE MARRIAGE COSTS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REMOVE THE CURRENT MALIK	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EXTRACT MINERALS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BUILD RAILROAD TRACKS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRAIN MIDWIVES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
GET FOREIGNERS OUT OF THE COUNTRY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATE CHARITY ORGANIZATIONS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CREATE MORE PROJECTS FOR WOMEN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DISARM PEOPLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	5%	20%

SECURITY

Q11. *There are many security forces in the country. Which of these groups would you say is most responsible for providing security in your village/gozar?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NATIONAL ARMY	23%
LOCAL POLICE	21%
NATIONAL POLICE	53%
ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS	1%
FOREIGN ARMIES	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q12. *Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	GETTING BETTER	GETTING WORSE	NO DIFFERENCE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) ANA	54%	20%	26%	< 0.5%	1%
B) ANP	35%	31%	31%	< 0.5%	3%
C) ALP	40%	26%	33%	< 0.5%	1%

Q13. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) THE ANA IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.	55%	36%	6%	3%	< 0.5%	1%
B) THE ANA HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN.	50%	37%	10%	4%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) THE ANA PROTECTS CIVILIANS.	49%	36%	10%	5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

Q14. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) THE ANP IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.	37%	46%	12%	5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) THE ANP HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN.	39%	42%	14%	5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) THE ANP IS EFFICIENT AT ARRESTING THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES.	33%	42%	17%	8%	< 0.5%	1%

Q15. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	50%	36%	9%	5%	< 0.5%	1%
B) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	44%	37%	13%	5%	< 0.5%	1%
C) AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE	37%	33%	16%	9%	< 0.5%	4%

Q16a. Would you agree or disagree with a family member's decision to join the Afghan National Police?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
AGREE	74%
DISAGREE	24%
REFUSED	1%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q16b. (if Q-16a answer is "disagree" or "don't know") Why would you disagree with their decision?

Q16ba. First mention: _____

Q16bb. Second mention: _____

BASE: RESPONDENTS WHO DISAGREE (2,826)	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
THE DEATH TOLL IS HIGH	21%	30%
INSECURITY	12%	19%
LACK OF GOOD LEADER/GOVERNMENT	10%	18%
FEAR OF TALIBAN/AL QAEDA	10%	17%
LOW SALARY	7%	16%
THEY ARE CORRUPT	6%	11%
THE FAMILY DOESN'T ALLOW	4%	7%
LACK OF EQUIPMENT FOR WOMEN	2%	5%
NOT INTERESTED	3%	4%
LACK OF RULE OF LAW	2%	4%
FEAR OF ENMITY	2%	4%
CONDITIONS ARE NOT GOOD	2%	3%
IT'S A HARD JOB	2%	3%
LACK OF RESPECT TOWARDS PEOPLE	2%	3%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%	3%
LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG ANSF	1%	2%
ALREADY HAVE A JOB	1%	2%
THEY ARE ADDICTS	1%	1%
UNCERTAIN FUTURE	< 0.5%	1%
EXISTENCE OF ISIS	< 0.5%	1%

IT'S NOT CUSTOMARY	< 0.5%	1%
THEY DON'T EXIST IN MY AREA	< 0.5%	1%
EXISTENCE OF FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%	1%
THEY ARE THIEVES	< 0.5%	1%
NO REASON	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF TRAINING	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MALIK DOES NOT ALLOW	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THEY SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR EDUCATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T NEED THE PAY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THEY ARE BRUTAL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
I DON'T WANT TROUBLE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THEY DON'T PRAY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SCHOLARS DO NOT ALLOW IT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ROADSIDE IEDS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	7%	31%

Q17. *Have you heard of the group called ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	81%
NO	18%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q18. *(if Q-17 answer is "yes") In your view, does ISIS/Daesh currently pose a threat to the security of your district?*

BASE: HEARD ABOUT ISIS/DAESH	9,445
YES	39%
NO	41%
NOT ASKED	19%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q19. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
ALWAYS	15%
OFTEN	24%
SOMETIMES	31%

RARELY	18%
NEVER	12%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q20. *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	19%
NO	80%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q21. *(If Q-20 answer is "yes") What kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*

Q-21a. *First mention:* _____

Q-21b. *Second mention:* _____

BASE: EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE (2,250)	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	29%	36%
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	9%	20%
RACKETEERING/EXTORTION	10%	17%
PICK-POCKETING	9%	17%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	7%	15%
BURGLARY/LOOTING	8%	13%
MURDER	6%	13%
KIDNAPPING	6%	12%
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT/PROPERTY TAKEN FROM YOUR VEHICLE OR PARTS OF THE VEHICLE STOLEN	5%	8%
MILITANTS/INSURGENT ACTIONS	3%	6%
POLICE ACTIONS	3%	5%
SMUGGLING	1%	4%
ACTIONS BY FOREIGN FORCES (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	1%	2%
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	1%	2%
ARMY ACTIONS	1%	1%
FIGHTING BETWEEN TALIBAN AND GOVERNMENT FORCES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ETHNIC CONFLICT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%	25%

Q22. (If Q-20 answer is “yes”) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not?

BASE: EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE	2,250
YES	64%
NO	35%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q23. (If Q-22 answer is “yes”) Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?

Q-23a. First mention: _____

Q-23b. Second mention: _____

BASE: EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE (2,250)	FIRST MENTION	SECOND MENTION
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	37%	50%
SHURA/ELDERS	19%	37%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	18%	20%
TRIBAL LEADER/MALIK	7%	18%
DISTRICT GOVERNOR/WOLESWAL	6%	17%
MULLAH SAHEB	4%	12%
PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY	3%	8%
COURTS	1%	5%
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR	2%	4%
LOCAL MILITIA (ARBAKI)	1%	3%
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	1%	3%
JUST MY FAMILY	1%	3%
LOCAL COMMANDER OR WARLORD	1%	2%
AFGHANISTAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION	< 0.5%	1%
PRESS OR OTHER MEDIA	< 0.5%	1%
TALIBAN	< 0.5%	1%
LOCAL PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TRAFFIC OFFICER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%	15%

Q24. *If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that Government law-enforcement agencies and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE	9%
A FAIR AMOUNT	38%
NOT VERY MUCH	32%
NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	20%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

CORRUPTION

Q25. *Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations. Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	IN ALL CASES	IN MOST CASES	IN SOME CASES	IN NO CASES	HAD NO CONTACT	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) OFFICIALS IN THE MUNICIPALITY/DISTRICT OFFICE	6%	11%	13%	21%	49%	< 0.5%	1%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	4%	9%	14%	21%	51%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) CUSTOMS OFFICE	4%	9%	11%	19%	57%	< 0.5%	1%
D) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	3%	9%	15%	30%	42%	< 0.5%	1%
E) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	3%	7%	10%	31%	49%	< 0.5%	1%
F) JUDICIARY/COURTS	6%	11%	14%	20%	49%	< 0.5%	1%
G) DA AFGHANISTAN BRESHNA SHERKAT (STATE ELECTRIC COMPANY)	3%	9%	13%	24%	50%	< 0.5%	1%
H) HOSPITALS/CLINICS	3%	12%	20%	40%	25%	< 0.5%	1%
I) WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	6%	10%	15%	23%	45%	< 0.5%	1%
J) ADMISSION TO SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY	3%	7%	13%	34%	42%	< 0.5%	1%

Q26. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas.

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	MAJOR PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	NOT A PROBLEM	REFUSED	DONT KNOW
A) IN YOUR DAILY LIFE	61%	28%	10%	< 0.5%	1%
B) IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD	55%	35%	10%	< 0.5%	1%
C) AMONG LOCAL AUTHORITIES	58%	33%	8%	< 0.5%	1%
D) IN YOUR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	67%	26%	6%	< 0.5%	1%
E) IN AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE	75%	19%	5%	< 0.5%	1%

Q27. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS	41%
RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS	57%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q28. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? By democracy, we mean choosing the president and Parliament by voting, rather than by appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
VERY SATISFIED	14%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	42%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	27%
VERY DISSATISFIED	17%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q29. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	NO FEAR	SOME FEAR	A LOT OF FEAR	REFUSED	DONT KNOW
A) VOTING IN A NATIONAL/PROVINCIAL ELECTION	46%	38%	16%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	27%	38%	33%	< 0.5%	1%
C) RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	22%	42%	33%	< 0.5%	3%
D) ENCOUNTERING ANP	55%	30%	15%	< 0.5%	1%
E) ENCOUNTERING ANA	57%	28%	14%	< 0.5%	1%

F) TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	18%	42%	40%	< 0.5%	1%
G) ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN MILITARY ONLY)	20%	42%	37%	< 0.5%	1%
H) ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN	6%	18%	75%	< 0.5%	1%
I) ENCOUNTERING ISIS/DAESH	4%	13%	82%	< 0.5%	1%

Q30. *In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government, while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. Thinking back to a year ago, how safe did you feel expressing your opinions about the government in public?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
VERY SAFE	13%
SOMEWHAT SAFE	42%
SOMEWHAT UNSAFE	32%
VERY UNSAFE	12%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q31. *How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions—a lot, some, very little, or none at all?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
A LOT	8%
SOME	36%
VERY LITTLE	28%
NONE AT ALL	28%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q32. *In the last two years, has the member of Parliament (MP) for your province ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affected you?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	24%
NO	74%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q33. *In your opinion, which of the following does your Member of Parliament care about most?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NATIONAL ISSUES	10%
PROVINCIAL ISSUES	19%
DISTRICT OR MUNICIPALITY ISSUES	12%
ETHNIC ISSUES	22%
PERSONAL INTERESTS	35%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q34. *Members of Parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or very bad job?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	VERY GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT BAD JOB	VERY BAD JOB	REFUSED	DONT KNOW
A) LISTENING TO CONSTITUENTS AND REPRESENTING THEIR NEEDS	15%	40%	25%	19%	< 0.5%	1%
B) MAKING LAWS FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY	13%	31%	28%	26%	< 0.5%	2%

Q35. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	A LOT OF CONFIDENCE	SOME CONFIDENCE	NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE	NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	REFUSED	DONT KNOW
A) THE PRESIDENT (ASHRAF GHANI)	18%	31%	23%	28%	< 0.5%	1%
B) THE CEO (DR. ABDULLAH ABDULLAH)	9%	27%	30%	34%	< 0.5%	1%
C) INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION	7%	26%	32%	33%	< 0.5%	1%
D) COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	14%	39%	28%	17%	< 0.5%	2%
E) COMMUNITY SHURAS/JIRGAS	23%	40%	22%	14%	< 0.5%	1%
F) GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	7%	29%	35%	28%	< 0.5%	2%
G) INTERNATIONAL NGOS	11%	33%	31%	24%	< 0.5%	2%
H) MEDIA SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TV	27%	38%	22%	13%	< 0.5%	1%
I) NATIONAL NGOS	11%	37%	32%	19%	< 0.5%	2%
J) PARLIAMENT AS A WHOLE	7%	30%	32%	29%	< 0.5%	2%
K) PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	12%	35%	30%	22%	< 0.5%	2%
L) RELIGIOUS LEADERS	31%	36%	19%	14%	< 0.5%	1%
M) YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT	7%	28%	34%	30%	< 0.5%	1%

Q36. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or very bad job?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	VERY GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT BAD JOB	VERY BAD JOB	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT	12%	37%	24%	26%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	14%	39%	28%	19%	< 0.5%	1%
C) MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES (ASK URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY)	9%	34%	25%	29%	< 0.5%	4%
D) DISTRICT GOVERNMENT (ASK RURAL RESIDENTS ONLY)	11%	40%	27%	10%	< 0.5%	12%

RECONCILIATION

Q37. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	63%
NO	34%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

Q38. In your opinion, what is the main reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
TO GAIN POWER	23%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY PAKISTAN	12%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS/INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	11%
TOO MUCH CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT	7%
THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	3%
UNEMPLOYMENT/POVERTY	3%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED/MOTIVATED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	3%
TO CREATE INSECURITY	2%
TO DESTROY OUR COUNTRY	2%
TO ESTABLISH SECURITY	2%
UNEMPLOYMENT/POVERTY	2%
FOR MONEY	2%
TO SUPPORT ISLAM	2%
THEY ARE AGAINST DEMOCRACY	1%
LACK OF ATTENTION TO THEIR DESIRES	1%
THERE IS NO REASON	1%

INJUSTICE	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
TO SUPPORT DRUG TRAFFIC	1%
MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE	1%
THEY ARE NOT AFGHAN	1%
THEY ARE CORRUPT	1%
THEY ARE BRUTAL/CRUEL	1%
TO FORCE FOREIGN FORCES TO WITHDRAW	1%
ILLITERACY	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST ISLAM	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST POLICE FORCES	< 0.5%
FIGHTING IS THEIR WAY OF LIFE	< 0.5%
TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY	< 0.5%
ROBBERY	< 0.5%
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN	< 0.5%
FREEDOM	< 0.5%
TO DESTROY SCHOOLS	< 0.5%
TO CREATE FEAR/TERROR	< 0.5%
HAVE AVAILABLE WEAPONS	< 0.5%
TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AFGHANS	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST DEVELOPMENT	< 0.5%
GOVERNMENT/ANSF IS TOO WEAK TO FIGHT THEM	< 0.5%
THEY ARE TRAITORS	< 0.5%
THEIR LEADERS FORCE THEM TO FIGHT	< 0.5%
THEY ARE STUPID/BARBARIAN	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION	< 0.5%
TO EXTRACT MINERALS OF AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%
SUFFER LOSSES BY INTERNATIONAL FORCES	< 0.5%
KARZAI IS SUPPORTING THEM	< 0.5%
THEY HAVE BEEN DECEIVED	< 0.5%
INTERFERENCE OF HIZB ISLAMI	< 0.5%
THEY ARE SLAVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES	< 0.5%
THEY ARE NOT AWARE OF ISLAMIC LAWS	< 0.5%
THEY CONSIDER CURRENT GOVERNMENT NON-ISLAMIC	< 0.5%
THEY ARE EXTREMIST	< 0.5%
FOR REVENGE	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN WORKING	< 0.5%
PROTECT PEOPLE FROM CRUEL GOVERNMENT	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST ELECTIONS	< 0.5%
REFUSED	1%
DON'T KNOW	8%

Q39a. Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for armed opposition groups?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NO SYMPATHY AT ALL	77%
A LITTLE SYMPATHY	11%
A LOT OF SYMPATHY	6%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	1%

Q39b. (If Q-39a answer is "a lot") You said that you have a lot of sympathy. Why do you say that?

First response: _____

BASE: HAVE A LOT OF SYMPATHY	639
THEY ARE AFGHANS	36%
THEY ARE MUSLIM	21%
DON'T WANT PEACE AND SECURITY	6%
PREVENT KILLING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE	4%
THEY WANT TO FIGHT A HOLY WAR (JIHAD)	4%
THEY ARE OPPRESSORS	3%
IMPLEMENT SHARIA LAW	3%
THEY ARE NOT AFGHANS	2%
PEOPLE WANT PEACE	2%
THEY FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN FORCES	2%
EARN MONEY THROUGH ISLAMIC WAYS	1%
THEY ARE INFIDELS	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY ARE ROBBERS	1%
THE GOVERNMENT MISTREATS THE PEOPLE	1%
I JUST HAVE A LOT OF SYMPATHY	1%
REMOVING MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
TO DAMAGE THE ECONOMY	1%
THEY WORK FOR FOREIGNERS	1%
ELIMINATING WAR	1%
FOR THEIR PERSONAL REASONS	1%
THEY ARE GOOD PEOPLE	1%
DON'T HAVE ANY SYMPATHY	< 0.5%
THEY WORK FOR PAKISTAN	< 0.5%
THEY ARE ILLITERATE	< 0.5%
BECAUSE OF THE SUICIDE ATTACKS	< 0.5%
THEY ARE THE ENEMY OF AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%

THEY RESOLVE OUR DISPUTES	< 0.5%
THEY ARE OUR ENEMIES	< 0.5%
THEY ARE CRIMINALS	< 0.5%
THEY ARE BAD PEOPLE	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%
BECAUSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT	< 0.5%
THEY GET THEIR RIGHTS	< 0.5%
THEY ARE TRAITORS	< 0.5%
THEY ARE CORRUPT	< 0.5%
I VALUE MY COUNTRYMEN	< 0.5%
THEY DEFEND THE COUNTRY	< 0.5%
THEY BRING INJUSTICE	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	4%

Q39c. (If Q-39a answer is "a little") You said that you have a little sympathy. Why do you say that?

First response: _____

BASE: HAVE A LITTLE SYMPATHY	1,302
THEY ARE AFGHANS	39%
THEY ARE MUSLIM	18%
DON'T WANT PEACE AND SECURITY	6%
KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE	5%
THEY ARE OPPRESSORS	3%
THEY ARE NOT AFGHANS	2%
THEY WORK FOR PAKISTAN	2%
IMPLEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW	2%
THEY GET THEIR RIGHTS	2%
EARN MONEY THROUGH ISLAMIC WAYS	1%
THEY ARE INFIDELS	1%
THEY WANT TO CREATE DISUNITY	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY ARE MADE TO DO SO	1%
THEY ARE ROBBERS	1%
DONT HAVE ANY SYMPATHY	1%
THE GOVERNMENT MISTREATS THE PEOPLE	1%
PEOPLE WANT PEACE	1%
THEY WANT TO FIGHT A HOLY WAR (JIHAD)	1%
I JUST HAVE A LOT OF SYMPATHY	1%
THEY ARE ILLITERATE	1%
THEY ARE REMOVING MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
THEY ARE THE ENEMY OF AFGHANISTAN	1%

THEY FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN FORCES	1%
THEY ARE CRIMINALS	1%
THEY ARE ELIMINATING WAR	1%
THEY ARE CORRUPT	1%
THEY ARE DESTROYING ROADS AN BRIDGES	< 0.5%
BECAUSE OF THE SUICIDE ATTACKS	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST EDUCATION SYSTEM	< 0.5%
THEY SUPPORT POPPY CULTIVATION	< 0.5%
THEY DAMAGE THE ECONOMY	< 0.5%
THEY RESOLVE OUR DISPUTES	< 0.5%
THEY ARE OUR ENEMIES	< 0.5%
THEY WORK FOR FOREIGNERS	< 0.5%
THEY ARE BAD PEOPLE	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S RIGHTS	< 0.5%
BECAUSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT	< 0.5%
BECAUSE THEY DONT HAVE ANY SHELTER	< 0.5%
THEY DON'T WANT DEMOCRACY	< 0.5%
BECAUSE THEY HAVE PARTICULAR TARGET/PURPOSE	< 0.5%
FOR THEIR PERSONAL REASONS	< 0.5%
THEY WORK FOR IRAN	< 0.5%
THEY ARE TRAITORS	< 0.5%
I VALUE MY COUNTRYMEN	< 0.5%
THEY DEFEND THE COUNTRY	< 0.5%
THEY ARE GOOD PEOPLE	< 0.5%
THEY BRING INJUSTICE	< 0.5%
ELDERS SUPPORT THEM	< 0.5%
FOR COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT	< 0.5%
REFUSED	1%
DON'T KNOW	5%

Q39d. (If Q-39a answer is “no sympathy”) You said that you don't have any sympathy. Why do you say that?

First response: _____

BASE: NO SYMPATHY	8,967
KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE	27%
THEY ARE OPPRESSORS	17%
THEY DON'T WANT PEACE AND SECURITY	9%
THEY WORK FOR PAKISTAN	9%
THEY COMMIT SUICIDE ATTACKS	5%
THEY ARE THE ENEMY OF AFGHANISTAN	5%
DON'T KNOW	3%

THEY ARE INFIDELS	2%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	2%
THEY ARE NOT AFGHANS	2%
THEY ARE AGAINST RECONSTRUCTION	2%
THEY WANT TO EARN MONEY THROUGH ISLAMIC WAYS	1%
THEY ARE AFGHANS	1%
THEY ARE ROBBERS	1%
THEY ARE DESTROYING ROADS AND BRIDGES	1%
DON'T HAVE ANY SYMPATHY	1%
THEY ARE ILLITERATE	1%
REMOVING MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST EDUCATION SYSTEM	1%
THEY ARE OUR ENEMIES	1%
THEY ARE CRIMINALS	1%
THEY WORK FOR FOREIGNERS	1%
THEY ARE BAD PEOPLE	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S RIGHTS	1%
THEY ARE TRAITORS	1%
THEY ARE CORRUPT	1%
THEY ARE MUSLIM	< 0.5%
THEY WANT TO CREATE DISUNITY	< 0.5%
THEY ARE MADE TO DO SO	< 0.5%
THE GOVERNMENT MISTREATS THE PEOPLE	< 0.5%
PEOPLE WANT PEACE	< 0.5%
THEY WANT TO FIGHT A HOLY WAR (JIHAD)	< 0.5%
I JUST DON'T HAVE ANY SYMPATHY	< 0.5%
THEY WANT TO SUPPORT POPPY CULTIVATION	< 0.5%
THEY WANT TO DAMAGE THE ECONOMY	< 0.5%
THEY FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN FORCES	< 0.5%
THEY RESOLVE OUR DISPUTES	< 0.5%
THEY PLACE MINES	< 0.5%
BECAUSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT	< 0.5%
IMPLEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW	< 0.5%
THEY DON'T WANT DEMOCRACY	< 0.5%
BECAUSE THEY DON'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR TARGET/PURPOSE	< 0.5%
THEY GET THEIR RIGHTS	< 0.5%
THEY DON'T STOP THE WAR	< 0.5%
OR MY OWN PERSONAL REASONS	< 0.5%
THEY WORK FOR IRAN	< 0.5%
I VALUE MY COUNTRYMEN	< 0.5%
THEY ARE GOOD PEOPLE	< 0.5%
THEY BRING INJUSTICE	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S EDUCATION	< 0.5%

ELDERS SUPPORT THEM	< 0.5%
THEY ARE AGAINST COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT	< 0.5%
THEY ARE SLAVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

JUSTICE

Q40. *Within the last year, have you or anyone you know been represented by a defense lawyer in a criminal case?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	21%
NO	78%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q41. *(If Q-40 answer is "yes") Did you or the person you know pay for those services?*

BASE: REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER	2,444
YES	54%
NO	45%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q42. *To the best of your knowledge, what does a defense lawyer (vakil-e-modafa) do? You can choose up to three options from the list. If you don't know, just say "I don't know." Does a defense lawyer...*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	YES	NO	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A. MANAGE MARRIAGE PROPOSALS?	47%	48%	< 0.5%	4%
B. HELP PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED?	74%	23%	< 0.5%	3%
C. WORK IN THE PARLIAMENT?	35%	59%	< 0.5%	6%

Q43. *Do you think a person arrested for a crime should have the right to a lawyer, even if they are guilty?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	79%
NO	17%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%

Q44. (If Q-43 answer is “No”) Why do you say that a guilty person should not have the right to a lawyer?

BASE: SHOULD NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO A LAWYER	1,992
HE SHOULD BE PUNISHED	47%
THE CRIME IS OBVIOUS	15%
HE SHOULD DEFEND HIMSELF	5%
HE DOESN'T HAVE THE RIGHT	3%
A CRIMINAL DOESN'T NEED A DEFENDER	3%
THE LAWYER WILL DEFEND THE CRIMINAL	3%
IT IS DANGEROUS	2%
IT IS AGAINST JUSTICE	2%
IT REDUCES CORRUPTION/CRIME	2%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	17%

Q45. If you were ever arrested, which of these types of lawyers would you trust to fight for your rights?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	YES	NO	REFUSED	DONT KNOW
A) A DEFENSE LAWYER EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT	64%	35%	< 0.5%	1%
B) A DEFENSE LAWYER EMPLOYED BY AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION	40%	58%	< 0.5%	2%
C) A DEFENSE LAWYER EMPLOYED BY A CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION	49%	49%	< 0.5%	2%
D) AN INDEPENDENT LAWYER NOT EMPLOYED BY EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OR AN ORGANIZATION	58%	40%	< 0.5%	2%

Q46. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the available dispute resolution services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
VERY SATISFIED	14%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	45%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	27%
VERY DISSATISFIED	13%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q47. *In the past two years, have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	22%
NO	77%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q48. *(If Q-47 answer is "yes") What kind of a case or dispute was it?*

BASE: HAD A DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	2,602
DISPUTE OVER LAND	43%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	18%
OTHER PROPERTY DISPUTE, NOT LAND	14%
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE	10%
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT	7%
DIVORCE	4%
ROBBERY	1%
MURDER	1%
DRUG SMUGGLING	< 0.5%
DISPUTE OVER WATER	< 0.5%
RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS	< 0.5%
GOVERNMENT SERVICES	< 0.5%
DISPUTE OVER INHERITANCE	< 0.5%
PHYSICAL ABUSE/BEATING	< 0.5%
FIGHT BETWEEN DIFFERENT GROUPS	< 0.5%
WORK DISPUTE	< 0.5%
KIDNAPPING	< 0.5%
REFUSED	1%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q49. *(If Q-47 answer is "yes") Were you fully satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings?*

BASE: HAD A DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	2,602
FULLY SATISFIED	20%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	49%
NOT SATISFIED	21%
NOT FINISHED YET/STILL IN PROCEEDINGS	9%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q50. (If Q-47 answer is "yes") Where have you taken this case or dispute?

BASE: HAD A DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	2,602
HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	23%
STATE COURT	36%
VILLAGE/NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED SHURA/JIRGA	43%
POLICE	< 0.5%
FRIENDS	< 0.5%
DISTRICT OFFICE	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%

Q51. (If Q-50 answer is "Huquq Department") And now let's turn to the local Huquq Department. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO HUQUQ DEPARTMENT (629)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) LOCAL HUQUQS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED.	26%	44%	16%	13%	-	2%
B) LOCAL HUQUQ FOLLOWS THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE.	19%	37%	29%	13%	-	2%
C) LOCAL HUQUQS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE.	16%	39%	28%	16%	-	2%
D) LOCAL HUQUQ RESOLVES CASES QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY.	14%	31%	32%	20%	< 0.5%	2%

Q52. (If Q-50 answer is "state courts") Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO STATE COURTS (978)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW
A) STATE COURTS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED.	21%	41%	20%	12%	6%
B) STATE COURTS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE.	17%	40%	25%	12%	6%
C) STATE COURTS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE.	17%	32%	30%	15%	6%
D) STATE COURTS RESOLVE CASES IN A PROMPT AND TIMELY MANNER.	11%	32%	31%	19%	6%
E) STATE COURTS TREAT MEN AND WOMEN EQUALLY.	18%	33%	29%	13%	7%

Q53. (If Q-50 answer is “shura/jirgas”) And now let’s turn to village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO SHURA/JIRGAS (1,160)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) LOCAL SHURAS/JIRGAS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	32%	51%	9%	2%	-	5%
B) LOCAL SHURAS/JIRGAS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	33%	38%	20%	3%	-	5%
C) LOCAL SHURAS/JIRGAS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	30%	41%	19%	4%	-	6%
D) LOCAL SHURAS/JIRGAS RESOLVE CASES TIMELY AND PROMPTLY	28%	38%	24%	4%	-	6%
E) THERE SHOULD BE LOCAL WOMEN'S SHURAS AND JIRGAS	27%	36%	22%	9%	< 0.5%	6%

WOMEN'S ISSUES

Q54. In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	24%
NO	73%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%

Q55a. (If Q-54 answer is “yes”) What organization, institution, or authority is that?

BASE: KNOWS AN ORGANIZATION, INSTITUTION, OR AUTHORITY	2,772
DIRECTORATE OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS	51%
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL	9%
DISTRICT OFFICE	7%
QAWM ELDERS	5%
WOMEN'S SHURA	5%
THE COURT	3%
LOCAL COUNCIL	3%
POLICE	2%
VILLAGE SHURA/ELDERS SHURA	2%
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN GENERAL	1%
ATTORNEY GENERAL	1%
PROVINCIAL OFFICE	1%
CHIEF OF POLICE	1%

MINISTRY OF RURAL REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT	1%
DIRECTORATE OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS	1%
SAFE HOUSE	1%
THERE ARE NO MADRASAS IN OUR AREA	1%
NEDA-E-ZAN ORGANIZATION	1%
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM	< 0.5%
MUNICIPALITY	< 0.5%
LOCAL JIRGAS	< 0.5%
LOCAL AUTHORITIES	< 0.5%
ANA	< 0.5%
UNESCO	< 0.5%
JAMYAT ESLAH	< 0.5%
PEACE COUNCIL	< 0.5%
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%
HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTES	< 0.5%
PUBLIC HEALTH DIRECTORATE/CLINIC	< 0.5%
WASA ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%
WOMEN'S CAPACITY BUILDING LITERACY ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%
AGHA KHAN FOUNDATION	< 0.5%
CARE	< 0.5%
TRUST ORGANIZATIONS	< 0.5%
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION	< 0.5%
RELIGIOUS ULEMA	< 0.5%
SOCIAL COUNCIL	< 0.5%
ORGANIZATION IN GENERAL	< 0.5%
HAQ-O-ADALAT	< 0.5%
DACAAR	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

Q55b. (If Q-54 answer is "yes") Have you ever contacted this or another organization, institution, or authority that helps solve women's problems in your area?

BASE: KNOWS AN ORGANIZATION, INSTITUTION, OR AUTHORITY	2,772
YES	41%
NO	58%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q56. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) THE PRACTICE OF BAAD IS ACCEPTABLE.	5%	13%	16%	65%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) THE PRACTICE OF BADDAL IS ACCEPTABLE.	10%	22%	23%	45%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) A DAUGHTER IS ENTITLED TO PART OF HER DECEASED FATHER'S INHERITANCE (MIRAS).	63%	25%	8%	4%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

Q57. Some people say that women should have the same opportunities for education as men. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
STRONGLY AGREE	39%
SOMEWHAT AGREE	42%
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	14%
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q58. And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) ISLAMIC MADRASA EDUCATION	70%	24%	4%	2%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) PRIMARY SCHOOL	60%	26%	10%	4%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
C) HIGH SCHOOL	56%	28%	11%	5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
D) UNIVERSITY IN YOUR PROVINCE	43%	29%	17%	11%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
E) STUDYING IN ANOTHER PROVINCE	21%	26%	27%	26%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
F) STUDYING ABROAD ON SCHOLARSHIP	17%	20%	24%	39%	< 0.5%	1%

Q59. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
WOMEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME.	74%
WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME.	25%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q60. (If Q-59 answer is “women should not be allowed to work outside the home.”) Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?

First mention: _____

BASE: WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK	2,860
IT'S AGAINST ISLAMIC LAW	24%
UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS OUTSIDE THE HOME	17%
BAD SECURITY OUTSIDE THE HOME	12%
THEY ARE NOT NEEDED OUTSIDE THE HOME	11%
THE FAMILY DOESN'T ALLOW IT	11%
TO PREVENT MORAL CORRUPTION	6%
WOMEN SHOULD NOT WORK ALONGSIDE MEN	4%
THEY NEED TO HELP WITH KIDS	2%
THEY DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT	1%
CRIMINALS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THEM	1%
THEY LACK EXPERIENCE	1%
THE GOVERNMENT NEVER SUPPORTS THEM	1%
THEY ARE ILLITERATE	1%
IT'S CONSIDERED SHAMEFUL	1%
FEAR OF TALIBAN/ISIS	< 0.5%
THEY DON'T RESPECT HJAB	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	7%

Q61. And thinking about where women can work, for each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work there?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) GOVERNMENT OFFICES	36%	33%	15%	16%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
B) NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)	19%	26%	27%	27%	< 0.5%	1%
C) HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	59%	25%	9%	6%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
D) FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS	65%	21%	8%	5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
E) CO-ED SCHOOLS	36%	30%	19%	14%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
F) ARMY/POLICE	13%	23%	30%	33%	< 0.5%	1%
G) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) WITH FEMALE EMPLOYEES ONLY	21%	25%	25%	29%	< 0.5%	1%
H) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) WHERE MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES WORK IN THE SAME ROOM	11%	22%	27%	39%	< 0.5%	1%

Q62. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	30%	40%	16%	13%	< 0.5%	1%
B) GOVERNOR OF A PROVINCE	26%	30%	26%	18%	< 0.5%	1%
C) CEO OF A LARGE COMPANY	24%	30%	25%	21%	< 0.5%	1%
D) MINISTER OR CABINET MEMBER	24%	31%	24%	20%	< 0.5%	1%
E) CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN	22%	26%	25%	26%	< 0.5%	1%

Q63. *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the National Parliament?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
A MAN	34%
A WOMAN	32%
NO DIFFERENCE	33%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q64. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
WOMAN 1	34%
WOMAN 2	27%
WOMAN 3	15%
WOMAN 4	16%
WOMAN 5	6%
WOMAN 6	1%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q65. *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
MOSTLY FOR MEN	45%
MOSTLY FOR WOMEN	13%
EQUAL FOR BOTH MEN AND WOMEN	42%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q66. Do you think women should be allowed to vote in elections?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	88%
NO	11%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q67. If women vote, do you think they should decide for themselves whom to vote for, or should men decide for women whom they should vote for?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES	57%
MEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR WOMEN	21%
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES BUT IN CONSULTATION WITH MEN	21%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q68 AND Q69. What do you think is the best age for a man/woman to get married?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623	11,623
	BEST AGE FOR MEN	BEST AGE FOR WOMEN
14 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	2%
15 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	3%
16 YEARS OLD	2%	9%
17 YEARS OLD	1%	5%
18 YEARS OLD	11%	32%
19 YEARS OLD	4%	8%
20 YEARS OLD	22%	24%
21 YEARS OLD	4%	3%
22 YEARS OLD	11%	5%
23 YEARS OLD	5%	2%
24 YEARS OLD	6%	2%
25 YEARS OLD	20%	4%
26 YEARS OLD	4%	< 0.5%
27 YEARS OLD	2%	< 0.5%
28 YEARS OLD	2%	< 0.5%
29 YEARS OLD	1%	< 0.5%
30 YEARS OLD	5%	< 0.5%
31 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
32 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
33 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
34 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-

35 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
36 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
37 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
38 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
39 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
40 YEARS OLD	< 0.5%	-
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE MEDIA

Q70. *Do you listen to radio programs?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	65%
NO	34%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q71. *(If Q-70 answer is “yes”) You said you listen to the radio. On days when you listen to the radio, how many hours do you listen to it on average?*

BASE: LISTENS TO RADIO	7,639
LESS THAN 30 MINUTES	19%
31 MINUTES TO 1 HOUR	35%
1 HOUR TO 2 HOURS	32%
MORE THAN 2 HOURS A DAY	13%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q72. *Do you watch television programs?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	65%
NO	35%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q73. (If Q-72 answer is “yes”) On days when you watch television, how many hours do you watch on average?

BASE: WATCHES TV	7,494
LESS THAN 30 MINUTES	7%
31 MINUTES TO 1 HOUR	25%
1 HOUR TO 2 HOURS	38%
MORE THAN 2 HOURS A DAY	30%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q74. (If Q-72 answer is “yes”) Which TV station do you watch most often?

BASE: WATCHES TV	7,494
TOLO TV	36%
ARIANA TV	10%
SHAMSHAD TV	9%
LEMAR TV	8%
KHORSHID TV	7%
TV AFGHANISTAN KABUL (RTA)	5%
1 TV	4%
TOLO NEWS TV	3%
AINA TV JAWZJAN	2%
TAMADON TV	2%
AREZO TV	2%
NOOR TV	1%
NOORIN TV	1%
HEWAD TV	1%
BADAKHSHAN TV	< 0.5%
TV HERAT	< 0.5%
GHORYAN TV-HERAT	< 0.5%
TV KANDAHAR	< 0.5%
TV BALKH MAZAR-E-SHARIF	< 0.5%
PAKISTAN TV	< 0.5%
STAR TV	< 0.5%
IRAN TV	< 0.5%
TV TAJIKISTAN	< 0.5%
AFGHAN TV	< 0.5%
NANGARHAR TV	< 0.5%
INDIAN TV CHANNELS	< 0.5%
ASHNA TV	< 0.5%
PAKTIA TV	< 0.5%
SAQI TV (HERAT)	< 0.5%

MAIWAND TV	< 0.5%
BBC TV	< 0.5%
GEM TV	< 0.5%
IRAN SPORTS TV	< 0.5%
HAMOON TV	< 0.5%
TARAQI TV	< 0.5%
HERAI TV	< 0.5%
ISLAH TV	< 0.5%
ARIA TV	< 0.5%
ZENDAGI TV	< 0.5%
MAIHAN TV	< 0.5%
NEGAH TV	< 0.5%
NAB TV	< 0.5%
ISTIQLAL TV	< 0.5%
ANY EDUCATIONAL TV	< 0.5%
ASIA TV	< 0.5%
MAN O TO TV	< 0.5%
RAH FARDA TV	< 0.5%
ASAR TV	< 0.5%
ZHWANDON TV	< 0.5%
FANOSTV	< 0.5%
PMC TV	< 0.5%
KABUL NEWS TV	< 0.5%
DAWAT TV	< 0.5%
FARYAB TV	< 0.5%
MITRA TV	< 0.5%
GEM BOLLYWOOD TV	< 0.5%
BATOR TV	< 0.5%
B4U TV	< 0.5%
SHAHR TV	< 0.5%
ARIA NEWS TV	< 0.5%
7 TV	< 0.5%
3 SPORTS TV	< 0.5%
PESHGAM TV	< 0.5%
JAHAN TV	< 0.5%
KHAWAR TV	< 0.5%
KHOST TV	< 0.5%
GHARGHAKHT TV	< 0.5%
WATAN TV	< 0.5%
GHAZNIWAL TV	< 0.5%
SHARQ TV	< 0.5%
SABAWON TV	< 0.5%
PARWAN TV	< 0.5%

SABA TV	< 0.5%
TANWEER TV	< 0.5%
RANA TV	< 0.5%
SETARA SAHAR TV	< 0.5%
MAHAR TV	< 0.5%
MELA TV	< 0.5%
MILLI MAH NAW TV	< 0.5%
TAKHAR NATIONAL TV	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q75. Do people in your area have access to the Internet, either through a cable connection, wireless connection, or cellular data (e.g., 2G or 3G)?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	40%
NO	57%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%

Q76. (If Q-75 answer is "yes") Do you personally have access to the Internet?

BASE: PEOPLE IN AREA WITH ACCESS TO INTERNET	4,643
YES	28%
NO	71%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q77. Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	YES	NO	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW
A) RADIO	70%	29%	-	< 0.5%
B) TV SET	66%	34%	-	< 0.5%
C) MOBILE PHONE	42%	58%	-	< 0.5%
D) THE INTERNET	12%	88%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
E) MOSQUE	48%	52%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
F) COMMUNITY SHURAS	39%	61%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
G) FRIENDS AND FAMILY	80%	19%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

MIGRATION

Q78a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	30%
NO	69%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

Q78b. (If Q-78a answer is “yes”) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

Q-78b_1. First mention: _____

Q-78b_2. Second mention: _____

BASE: WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN (3,445)	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
INSECURITY	49%	70%
UNEMPLOYMENT	28%	51%
BAD ECONOMY	9%	19%
TALIBAN ARE KILLING PEOPLE	2%	5%
WEAK GOVERNMENT	1%	3%
CORRUPTION	1%	3%
FOR EDUCATION	1%	3%
UNCERTAIN FUTURE	1%	3%
INJUSTICE	1%	2%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%	2%
FOR MY CHILDREN'S BETTER FUTURE	1%	2%
LACK OF FREEDOM FOR WOMEN	1%	1%
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES' INTERFERENCE	< 0.5%	1%
EXISTENCE OF CRIMINALS	< 0.5%	1%
HIGH PRICES	< 0.5%	1%
FEAR OF ISIS	< 0.5%	1%
LACK OF CLINICS/HOSPITALS	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ETHNIC STRIFE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
VACATION	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF ELECTRICITY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ILLITERACY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FOR HAJ	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FAMILY PREFERENCE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TERRORISTS IN AFGHANISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LACK OF SHELTER	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

NO REASON	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%	20%

Q-78c. (If Q-78a answer is "yes") Where would you want to live?

Q-78c_1. First mention: _____

Q-78c_2. Second mention: _____

BASE: WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN (3,445)	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
IRAN	28%	38%
TURKEY	14%	27%
GERMANY	14%	25%
PAKISTAN	4%	9%
USA	5%	8%
ANY EUROPEAN COUNTRY	5%	7%
SAUDI ARABIA	4%	7%
CANADA	3%	6%
AUSTRALIA	2%	5%
INDIA	2%	4%
FRANCE	2%	4%
UAE	2%	4%
UK	2%	4%
SWEDEN	1%	4%
AUSTRIA	1%	2%
RUSSIA	1%	2%
TAJIKISTAN	1%	2%
UZBEKISTAN	1%	1%
ANY ISLAMIC COUNTRY	1%	1%
GREECE	1%	1%
NETHERLANDS	1%	1%
JAPAN	< 0.5%	1%
EGYPT	< 0.5%	1%
ITALY	< 0.5%	1%
NORWAY	< 0.5%	1%
BELGIUM	< 0.5%	1%
KUWAIT	< 0.5%	1%
IRAQ	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DENMARK	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KAZAKHSTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SWITZERLAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KYRGYZSTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FINLAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%

TURKMENISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BRAZIL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
CHINA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UKRAINE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AZERBAIJAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ANY SECURE COUNTRY	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
JORDAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
QATAR	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
THAILAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SINGAPORE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	3%	29%

Q79. Do you have a family member or close relative who lives abroad?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	39%
NO	61%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

Q80a. (If Q-79 answer is "yes") In what countries do they live?

Q-80a_1. First mention: _____

Q-80a_2. Second mention: _____

BASE: RELATIVE LIVES ABROAD (4,475)	1ST MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
IRAN	34%	43%
GERMANY	15%	24%
TURKEY	9%	16%
PAKISTAN	5%	11%
USA	5%	8%
SAUDI ARABIA	5%	7%
UK	4%	7%
AUSTRALIA	4%	5%
UAE	3%	5%
CANADA	3%	5%
SWEDEN	2%	4%
FRANCE	2%	3%
AUSTRIA	1%	2%
NETHERLANDS	1%	2%
INDIA	1%	2%
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	1%	2%

NORWAY	1%	2%
TAJIKISTAN	1%	1%
DENMARK	1%	1%
RUSSIA	1%	1%
BELGIUM	1%	1%
ITALY	1%	1%
KUWAIT	1%	1%
UZBEKISTAN	< 0.5%	1%
CHINA	< 0.5%	1%
GREECE	< 0.5%	1%
SWITZERLAND	< 0.5%	1%
IRELAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
JAPAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
TURKMENISTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SYRIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
LEBANON	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
BANGLADESH	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
AZERBAIJAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
MALAYSIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
UKRAINE	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
NEW ZEALAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
FINLAND	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
ARABIC COUNTRIES	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
KYRGYZSTAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
EGYPT	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
QATAR	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
INDONESIA	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
SUDAN	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
PORTUGAL	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
IRAQ	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%	40%

Q80b. (If Q-79 answer is “yes”) Have these relatives helped you financially, such as by sending money?

BASE: RELATIVE LIVES ABROAD	4,475
YES	37%
NO	61%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q81. Which of the following three options do you identify with most at the moment?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	1ST MENTION	2ND MENTION	1ST & 2ND MENTION
BEING AFGHAN	62%	16%	78%
BEING _____ [STATE ETHNICITY FROM D-11]	16%	37%	53%
BEING MUSLIM	22%	40%	62%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	1%
DONT KNOW	< 0.5%	7%	7%

Q82. In general, would you say that your countrymen have more similarities to each other, or more differences from each other?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
MORE SIMILARITIES	52%
MORE DIFFERENCES	46%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	2%

DEMOGRAPHIC

D3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	45%
NO	55%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D4. (If D-3 answer is "yes") What type of activity is that?

BASE: HAVE AN ACTIVITY	5,229
FARMER (OWN LAND/TENANT FARMER)	29%
INFORMAL SALES/BUSINESS	12%
SKILLED WORKER/ARTISAN	12%
FARM LABORER (OTHER'S LAND)	9%
LABORER, DOMESTIC, OR UNSKILLED WORKER	9%
SMALL-BUSINESS OWNER	7%
SCHOOL TEACHER	7%
SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL	6%
GOVERNMENT OFFICE—CLERICAL WORKER	4%
PRIVATE OFFICE—CLERICAL WORKER	2%
MILITARY/POLICE	2%
GOVERNMENT OFFICE—EXECUTIVE/MANAGER	1%

PRIVATE OFFICE—EXECUTIVE/MANAGER	< 0.5%
UNIVERSITY TEACHER	< 0.5%
MULLAH	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

D5. *How many of the following does your household have?*

ITEM	BASE	MEAN	STD. DEV	MIN	MAX
A) BICYCLE	5,361	1.18	0.46	1	6
B) MOTORCYCLE	4,788	1.15	0.39	1	4
C) CAR	2,308	1.09	0.34	1	4
D) TV	7,084	1.22	0.57	1	13
E) REFRIGERATOR	2,512	1.10	0.38	1	6
F) WASHING MACHINE	2,903	1.12	0.42	1	7
G) SEWING MACHINE	8,122	1.24	0.56	1	7
H) JERIBS OF LAND	6,985	5.75	7.02	1	100
I) LIVESTOCK (NOT POULTRY)	7,171	7.02	8.45	1	80

D6. *Do you have a tazkera (national identity card)?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	72%
NO	28%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

D7 AND D8. *For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?*

	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	8,730	2,893	11,623
LESS THAN 2,000 AFS	7%	4%	6%
2,001–3,000 AFS	8%	5%	7%
3,001–5,000 AFS	21%	14%	19%
5001–10,000 AFS	36%	31%	35%
10,001–15,000 AFS	16%	19%	16%
15,001–20,000 AFS	7%	12%	8%
20,001–25,000 AFS	2%	4%	3%
25,001–40,000 AFS	1%	6%	3%
MORE THAN 40,000 AFS	1%	2%	1%
REFUSED	< 0.5%	< 0.5%	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%	2%	1%

D9. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	19%
NO	81%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

EDUCATION

D10a. *How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
0 YEARS	54%
1 TO 5 YEARS	40%
6 TO 10 YEARS	5%
MORE THAN 10 YEARS	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D10b. *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,263
NEVER WENT TO SCHOOL	52%
PRIMARY SCHOOL INCOMPLETE	11%
PRIMARY SCHOOL COMPLETE	4%
SECONDARY SCHOOL INCOMPLETE	5%
SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETE	2%
HIGH SCHOOL INCOMPLETE	5%
HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETE	13%
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION INCOMPLETE/14TH GRADE	4%
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION COMPLETE	2%
MASTER'S DEGREE	< 0.5%
INFORMAL SCHOOLING AT HOME	2%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D11. *Which languages do you speak?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,263
DARI	81%
PASHTO	50%
UZBEKI	11%

ENGLISH	4%
TURKMENI	2%
URDU	2%
ARABIC	1%
BALOCHI	1%
NURISTANI	1%
PASHAYE	< 0.5%
HINDI	< 0.5%
RUSSIAN	< 0.5%
GERMAN	< 0.5%
FRENCH	< 0.5%
SHIGHNEE	< 0.5%
OTHER (SPECIFY)	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D12. Are you married or single?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
SINGLE	19%
MARRIED	79%
WIDOWER/WIDOW	2%

D13. (If D-12 answer is "married" or "widow") How many children do you have?

BASE: MARRIED OR WIDOW	9,405
0 TO 5 CHILDREN	79%
6 TO 10 CHILDREN	19%
11 TO 15 CHILDREN	1%
REFUSED	1%

HEALTH

D18. Do you have difficulty seeing, even if wearing glasses?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NO - NO DIFFICULTY	86%
YES - SOME DIFFICULTY	12%
YES - A LOT OF DIFFICULTY	2%
CANNOT DO AT ALL	< 0.5%

D19. *Do you have difficulty hearing, even if using a hearing aid?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NO - NO DIFFICULTY	89%
YES - SOME DIFFICULTY	9%
YES - A LOT OF DIFFICULTY	2%
CANNOT DO AT ALL	< 0.5%

D20. *Do you have difficulty walking or climbing steps?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NO - NO DIFFICULTY	81%
YES - SOME DIFFICULTY	14%
YES - A LOT OF DIFFICULTY	5%
CANNOT DO AT ALL	1%

D21. *Do you have difficulty remembering or concentrating?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NO - NO DIFFICULTY	83%
YES - SOME DIFFICULTY	14%
YES - A LOT OF DIFFICULTY	3%
CANNOT DO AT ALL	1%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D22. *Do you have difficulty with self-care such as cleaning yourself?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NO - NO DIFFICULTY	90%
YES - SOME DIFFICULTY	8%
YES - A LOT OF DIFFICULTY	2%
CANNOT DO AT ALL	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D23. *Using your usual language, that is to say the language you use most often, do you have difficulty communicating, for example understanding or being understood?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
NO - NO DIFFICULTY	86%
YES - SOME DIFFICULTY	12%
YES - A LOT OF DIFFICULTY	2%
CANNOT DO AT ALL	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D24. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
VERY HAPPY	38%
SOMEWHAT HAPPY	39%
NOT VERY HAPPY	18%
NOT AT ALL HAPPY	5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

D25a. *Do you personally use a mobile phone or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	56%
NO	44%
REFUSED	< 0.5%

D25b. *How many people live here in this household?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
1 TO 5 PEOPLE	10%
6 TO 10 PEOPLE	52%
11 TO 15 PEOPLE	29%
16 TO 20 PEOPLE	7%
21 TO 30 PEOPLE	1%
31 TO 40 PEOPLE	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

D25c. *How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
0 PERSONS	11%
1 PERSON	22%
2 PEOPLE	30%
3 PEOPLE	19%
4 PEOPLE	8%
5 PEOPLE	5%
6 OR MORE PEOPLE	4%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	< 0.5%

D25d. (If D-25c answer is “one” or “more”) How many members of your household own mobile phones that can access the Internet, such as the ability to access email, websites, or Facebook?

BASE: HAVE MOBILE PHONE	10,318
0 PERSONS	62%
1 PERSON	18%
2 PEOPLE	9%
3 PEOPLE	2%
4 PEOPLE	1%
5 PEOPLE	< 0.5%
6 PEOPLE	< 0.5%
7 PEOPLE	< 0.5%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	7%

D26. Would you be interested to participate in mobile phone surveys that give you free phone credits for responding?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	46%
NO	53%
REFUSED	< 0.5%
DON'T KNOW	1%

D28. (Interviewer code): Record number of people present for the interview (excluding the interviewer). Please record the number of people present from each of the three generational categories listed below. If nobody was present from a particular category, enter “0.”

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (11,623)	NONE PRESENT	AT LEAST ONE PRESENT
JUNIOR (CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE)	28%	72%
ADULTS (PEERS, FRIENDS)	29%	71%
ELDERS	38%	62%

D29. (Interviewer code): Which of the following statements best describes the respondent's level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THE QUESTIONS.	70%
THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD MOST OF THE QUESTIONS.	25%
THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, BUT WITH SOME HELP.	4%
THE RESPONDENT HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING MOST OF THE QUESTIONS.	< 0.5%

D30. (Interviewer code): Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE (AT EASE) WITH ALL THE QUESTIONS.	72%
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH MOST OF THE QUESTIONS.	24%
THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH ONLY SOME OF THE QUESTIONS.	3%
THE RESPONDENT WAS GENERALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SURVEY QUESTIONS.	1%


TO BE COMPLETED BY THE SUPERVISOR:

D31. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
YES	38%
NO	62%

D32. Method of quality control/back-check

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	11,623
DIRECT SUPERVISION DURING INTERVIEW	4%
BACK-CHECK IN PERSON BY SUPERVISOR	26%
BACK-CHECK FROM THE CENTRAL OFFICE	< 0.5%
QUALITY CONTROLLED BY NON-ACSOR MONITORING TEAM	8%
NOT APPLICABLE	62%



The Asia Foundation

House No. 861, Street No. 1,
Sub-Street of Shirpour Project
Kabul, Afghanistan

www.asiafoundation.org