

1951

1951
End of the Rana dynasty and restoration of the monarchy.

1960
First elected government falls in a coup d'état by partisans of the king.

1996
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launches armed insurgency over long-held grievances. More than 12,000 die and 200,000 are displaced in 10-year civil war that follows.

2005
King Gyanendra declares himself absolute ruler and cuts off Nepal from the outside world. The king relents after a year of growing demonstrations.

2006
Comprehensive Peace Accord with Maoists ends the civil war.

2008
Churches attacked and priest murdered in eastern Nepal in growing Hindu-Christian violence. Church bombing in Kathmandu kills three and injures 14 in 2009.

2008
The monarchy is abolished.

2008
The first Constituent Assembly is elected, but cannot agree on a new constitution, leading to years of escalating protests and strikes.

2015
Two major earthquakes cause widespread devastation.

2015
New constitution is rapidly adopted following quakes. Forty-five die in violent protests by ethnic and minority groups opposing the document.

2015
Violent blockade of the India-Nepal border by Madhesi parties as conflict escalates in the Terai.

1959
New constitution establishes parliamentary democracy.

1990
Popular movement forces the king to restore democracy and reform the constitution.

2001
Ten royal family members are massacred in their palace, allegedly by Prince Dipendra.

2007
Mass protests and violence by Madhesi parties—the Madhesh Andolan—erupt in the Terai over long-term discrimination and exclusion.

2007
Muslim mosques and shops looted in Dang as Hindu-Muslim violence resurges.

2013
Violent clashes between the ruling coalition and the opposition lead to a caretaker government. Second Constituent Assembly elected in November.

2017
Tensions and sporadic violence during local elections, particularly in the Terai.

2017

Nepal

At a glance



National civil war
Shifted from high to absent



Communal/ideological conflict
Medium low



National political conflict
Ebbs and flows between medium and high



Local political and electoral conflict
Low



Transnational terrorism
No violence, but terrorist presence



Local resource conflict
High



Separatism and autonomy
Shifted from medium to low



Urban crime and violence
Low

** Rankings are based on the last 15 years and are relative to other Asian countries.*

Overview

Nepal is characterized by weak governance that has led to ongoing political instability. A civil war killed almost 13,000 and displaced 200,000 between 1996 and 2006. A peace accord has led to much progress since then. The country abolished the monarchy in 2008, carried out two Constituent Assembly elections, in 2008 and 2013, integrated former combatants from the Maoist's military wing into the Nepal Army, and promulgated a new constitution in 2015. However, with parties and elites often focused on protecting their own interests, political contention is often heated, further cementing divisions, with violence sometimes the result. The continued marginalization of certain ethnic, caste, and regional populations perpetuates grievances that can be mobilized for political violence. Following the promulgation of the new constitution in 2015, violence reemerged in the Terai region between Madhesi groups and parties in Nepali government when a Madhesi-led blockade of the Indo-Nepal border exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and economic stagnation caused by the devastating earthquakes in April and May. With disagreements over the amendments to the 2015 constitution unresolved, political tensions remained high in the lead-up to three tiers of elections in 2017. The country also struggles with growing urban crime and violence in the Kathmandu Valley and pervasive gender-based violence.



National civil war

Nepal endured a civil war from 1996 to 2006 that killed around 13,000 people. The war was launched by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in February 1996 with the aim of overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a communist government.

Nepal has historically been governed by a series of dynasties. A civil movement in 1951 ended the autocratic rule of the Rana dynasty and restored the monarchy, which then ruled with advice from political parties. A constitution was promulgated in 1959 to establish parliamentary democracy. However, the first elected government, under the leadership of B. P. Koirala, was dismissed after a royal coup in 1960, which led to three decades of absolute monarchy. In the early 1990s, political parties joined hands to launch a successful popular movement for democracy, pressuring the king to restore a multiparty parliament and reform the constitution in 1990–91. Given entrenched grievances, including severe rural poverty, caste and ethnic discrimination, endemic corruption, and the concentration of wealth and power, the dramatic political changes of the early 1990s raised popular expectations of social progress and greater equality. Following the intransigence of other parties towards reform, the CPN (Maoist) submitted a long list of demands to the government on February 4, 1996, addressing a wide range of social, economic, and political issues, and warned that an armed struggle would follow if the demands were not met. One week later, they launched an organized, armed insurgency against the state. During the ensuing years, the Maoist rebels gained significant control over rural areas, while the government retained control of the main cities and towns. Later years saw increasing and effective insurgent attacks on police and military personnel.

There were several changes in government over those years. In June 2001, ten members of the royal family were shot to death during a family party at the royal palace, allegedly by Crown Prince Dipendra, who shot himself. The dead included Queen Aishwarya, and King Birendra, who was succeeded by his brother, Gyanendra. In 2005, King Gyanendra declared himself absolute ruler, suppressing the media, restricting civil liberties, and temporarily cutting off communications with the outside world. Dissatisfaction with the monarchy grew rapidly, and following mass demonstrations throughout the country, the king reinstated parliament in April 2006. After a series of negotiations, a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed between the

13,000
killed in civil war
1996–2006

CPN (Maoist) and the new democratic government in November 2006, marking the end of the armed conflict.¹ Under the Accord, the CPN (Maoist) was allowed to take part in government in exchange for agreeing to lock up its weapons and confine fighters to UN-monitored camps until they could be integrated with the Nepal Army.

According to the final report on the Nepal conflict published by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), the government estimates that a total of 12,686 individuals, including government security forces, Maoist rebel fighters, and civilians, were killed between February 1996 and November 2006.² The Uppsala Conflict Data Program estimates that annual fatalities peaked in 2002 with 4,433 deaths (figure 1).³ Civilians, killed by both government security forces and the Maoist rebels, accounted for around 20 percent of all fatalities over the ten years.⁴ Up to 200,000 people were displaced by the conflict.⁵ Human rights violations and abuses by government security forces and the Maoists were widespread. Both sides, but especially government forces, committed unlawful killings, torture, and forced disappearance, as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence.⁶



National political conflict

The political landscape remains volatile in postconflict Nepal. While insurgency-related violence was ended by the signing of the CPA, political protests and clashes occur frequently and at times escalate to low-level violence, often disrupting the economy and people's mobility. Political conflicts in recent years have centered on the constitution, implementation of certain aspects of the CPA, and rivalry between political parties and factions over control of national power.

A root cause of the civil war and the current political tensions is the marginalization of certain ethnic, caste, and regional populations. Even though all actors involved in peace negotiations have agreed that a more inclusive state with a federal model is required, they profoundly disagree over the design of that model. The Maoists and other groups representing marginalized populations, including the Madhesi parties from the Terai, have demanded ethnic-based federalism, while traditional political parties such as the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)—the CPN (UML)—along with right-wing parties have opposed




Figure 1. Number of fatalities during the people's war in Nepal (1996–2006)

Source: Prepared based on data provided by UCDP⁷

1,600+

killed in postconflict Terai 2007–2012

identity-based federalism as undermining national unity, meritocracy, and individual rights.⁸ Given the extreme diversity of Nepal's current districts, including those where groups are proposing identity-based borders, there are significant disagreements. All sides are promoting federal models that serve their own interests, and limited scope for compromise has been found to date.

Between 2007 and 2015, multiple changes of government and large-scale protests took place in the country. The subsequent failure of the first Constituent Assembly (CA), which was elected in 2008, to meet the extended deadline to draft a constitution led to widespread protests and strikes in 48 districts. The main stumbling blocks were disagreements over a federal model and issues around proportional representation and forms of governance. The standoff continued, and clashes between supporters of the ruling and opposition parties broke out in January 2013 during a protest demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai from the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), formerly the CPN (Maoist). Following the protests, an interim caretaker government was appointed in March 2013, and the second Constituent Assembly elections were held that November. The elections were disrupted by Maoist factions and allied parties, which staged transportation strikes, intimidated candidates and voters, and pillaged vote preparation centers. Two devastating earthquakes in April and May 2015 prompted the major political parties such as the NC, the CPN (UML), the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist-Centre)—formerly the Unified Community Party of Nepal (Maoist)—and the CPN (Maoist) to rapidly agree to a draft constitution in June. Despite nationwide protests by ethnic and minority parties opposing the draft and demanding greater representation in the government, the constitution was adopted in September 2015. Human Rights Watch reported that approximately 45 people were killed in the violent protests over the new constitution during August and September, almost all of which took place in the Terai region, including one incident in Tikapur that killed seven policemen and one child.⁹

Following the promulgation of the constitution, the conflict between the Madhesi parties and the Nepali Government in the Terai region escalated. The Madhesi parties launched a border blockade of goods from India in September 2015. Violent clashes quickly intensified. The International Crisis Group reported that the blockade resulted in 12 deaths between November 2015 and January 2016.¹⁰ Nepal accused India of interfering in Nepali politics to support the Madhesi demands. The blockade caused severe shortages of fuel and medical supplies, exacerbating the dire humanitarian crisis and economic stagnation caused by the earthquakes. According to the Nepal Economic Forum, estimates suggested that the blockade resulted in daily economic losses of NPR 2 billion (USD 19.4 million).¹¹ Eventually, fatigue from prolonged protests, the rising prices of goods, and economic losses led to an end to the protests and the blockade in February 2016. Parliament introduced a constitutional amendment bill in November 2016 that partially addressed the dissenting Madhesi parties' demands, but unresolved grievances and exclusion issues left the southern half of Nepal a potential hotbed of renewed violence during the constitutionally mandated local, provincial, and national elections in 2017. Twelve were killed in nearly 400 violent elections-related incidents between February and June 2017.¹² Despite the violence, the three rounds of local elections held in May, June, and September were considered free and fair by most observers.



Transnational terrorism

There are no reports of organized transnational terrorist organizations in Nepal. However, the U.S. State Department has noted that Nepal's open border with India and weak border controls raise concerns that such groups could use Nepal as a transit or staging point.¹³ Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan are experiencing significant terrorist violence, and terrorist groups could use Nepal as a safe haven. South Asia experts and security analysts believe that the Indo-Nepal border, particularly in the Terai region, is favorable for criminal activities such as the trafficking of people, human organs, small arms, contraband goods, drugs, and counterfeit currency, and could offer a hideout for armed criminal and terrorist groups.¹⁴ Visas and passports are not required for Nepalis and Indians to travel between the two countries through Nepal's southern border.¹⁵ As Indian and Nepali merchants often travel by road in large groups, it is easy for people to cross over in disguise.¹⁶ In addition, the security situation in the Terai region has become extremely volatile since the civil war (see below). There has been concern that criminal networks such as the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba are exploiting these weaknesses, generating significant operating capital.¹⁷

Subnational level




Separatism and autonomy

Following the signing of the CPA, the Terai witnessed increased violence and the proliferation of armed groups calling for greater autonomy and political rights for the Madhesis and other ethnic minorities. The Terai is the most densely populated area outside of Kathmandu, accounting for roughly half of the Nepali population.¹⁸ It contains a mixture of ethnic, caste, and religious groups including Madhesis, Tharus, migrants from other parts of Nepal, and many others.¹⁹

The Madhesis represent a significant segment of the country's population and have suffered political, economic, and social discrimination and exclusion. The failure to address long-held grievances has caused the Madhesis to turn to violence to bring attention to their plight. Between January and February 2007, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) launched a large-scale protest, known as Madhesi Andolan, which led to violent clashes with Maoist cadres in the region. The MJF joined forces with other Madhesi political groups to create a coalition, the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), which seeks to transform the Terai into a single, autonomous province. The UDMF thus polarized the Terai population into a Madhesi vs. Pahadi (Kathmandu Valley) dichotomy, which stigmatizes elite ethnicities and binds otherwise disparate but similarly afflicted ethnic groups together.²⁰ This reignited longstanding tensions between Madhesi and Pahadi communities that date back to the 1960s, when the Pahadis, who migrated from the hills to the plains for work, started to dominate local politics and the economy. The Madhesi movement also raised concerns among smaller ethnic groups that did not want to be subsumed by the Madhesi and lose their own cultural and linguistic identities. These small ethnic minority groups pressured the government by organizing strikes and protests and demanded their own autonomy and political rights, further inflaming ethnic divisions and violence in the region.²¹

During 2007, armed groups multiplied in the Terai, particularly in the east. Their number was estimated at 26 in 2011.²² Several armed groups that emerged from the Maoist insurgency repositioned themselves as political outfits, while others have pursued criminal operations since the signing of the CPA.²³ The politically affiliated armed groups were initially perceived to share a coherent political ideology, but they have splintered into smaller criminal syndicates.

The Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a Nepali human rights NGO, reported that over 1,600 people were killed in the Terai between 2007 and 2012, 90 percent of them by nonstate



armed groups.²⁴ Central and eastern Terai were most affected, accounting for 80 percent of the fatalities. Violence in the Terai remained high for the first two years after the civil war's end, resulting in 363 deaths in 2007 and 383 in 2008,²⁵ but fatalities decreased to 206 in 2012.²⁶ In a 2011 survey, almost half of respondents (47 percent) said they had observed a decrease in the activity of armed groups from 2010 to 2011, while 27 percent said the situation had not changed.²⁷ Experts believe that security has improved due to a decrease in the number of armed groups, which in turn can be credited both to increased police activity and to peace negotiations between different political groups and the government.²⁸

Despite the reduction in the number of active armed groups, the promulgation of the new constitution has provoked sporadic violent protests by various ethnic groups and political parties in the Terai region since the summer of 2015 (see the section on national political conflict). Protest groups have sometimes clashed with police and security forces, resulting in casualties on both sides. Human rights groups have found that the police used excessive force against protestors.²⁹



Large-scale communal and ideological conflicts

Interreligious conflict has occasionally flared up between Hindus and other religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians.³⁰ Nepali Muslims are among the most marginalized, poor, and underresourced people in the country, and historically have lived in small villages in the Terai region. Hindu-Muslim conflict, which initially occurred in Nepalgunj, Banke District, prior to the civil war in the 1990s, resurged in 2007 in Tulsipur, Dang District.³¹ Several Muslim mosques and shops were looted, and houses were vandalized. This was a ripple effect of the Madhesi-Pahadi communal violence that erupted a few days earlier

in Kapilvastu, following the murder of Mohit Khan, a local Madhesi leader, in which 14 people were killed (four Madhesis and 10 Pahadis), dozens were injured, and around 300 houses were set on fire.³² The OHCHR investigation reported that rumors about violence against Pahadis in Kapilvastu spread through Dang District, fueling attacks against Muslims.³³ Postconflict violence between Hindus and Christians manifested itself in several attacks on churches and the murder of a Christian priest in eastern Nepal in 2008. A bomb explosion at the Catholic church in Kathmandu in May 2009 killed three at Saturday morning mass and severely injured 14 others.³⁴ The National Defense Army, a Hindi fundamentalist organization, took responsibility for the attack and demanded that Nepal's Christians leave the country. In addition, following the vote in the CA against declaring Nepal a Hindu state in September 2015, Hindu nationalists detonated explosive devices at three churches in Jhapa District, causing minor damage.

Local level



Local political conflict and electoral violence

Nepal held local elections for the first time in 20 years on May 14, June 28, and September 18, 2017. This marks a significant step toward full implementation of the new constitution adopted in September 2015. The local elections pave the way for provincial and national elections to follow. As mandated by the constitution, all three levels of elections are to be conducted by January 2018. If elections at all levels are successful, this will mark a return to the democratic process after two decades of upheaval.

Tensions escalated in the lead-up to the local elections, particularly in the Terai region, where disputes over amendments to the 2015 constitution are unresolved. When the local elections were announced in February 2017, the Madhesis vowed to boycott and disrupt any elections in their region until their grievances were addressed.³⁵ The Madhesis continued to stage protests and strikes, sometimes resulting in violent clashes. For instance, violence flared in Saptari District on March 6, 2017, when the police opened fire on protesters who disrupted a political rally organized by the CPN (UML), killing five.³⁶ However, tensions later subsided. The last round of voting, held in September in Province 2, in the heart of eastern Terai, was comparatively peaceful.



Local conflict over resources and community rights

Competition over natural resources such as land and water is deeply embedded in Nepali history and society. At the community level, however, resource conflict is seldom violent, usually ending in amicable resolution through mediation or persisting in a state of nonviolent animosity. Poor governance and the country's highly stratified and hierarchical social structure skew access to natural resources, particularly for lower-caste and minority ethnic groups, creating tensions between individuals, families, and communities. Land ownership and use issues have been entrenched in society for decades. Since the 1960s, land reform has been an important arena for competition among political parties. Land was also a central issue in the civil war, with Maoists targeting large landowners as a symbol of Nepal's patronage-based state. With very little actual policy reform in the postconflict period, land issues remain contentious and promise to ignite violent disagreements in the future if left unattended.

Nepal has a high volume of land disputes, which constitute the largest category of court cases. The Community Self-Reliance Centre (CSRC) reported that between 2013 and 2015 there were over 124,000 land-related court cases, just 26.4 percent of which went to trial.³⁷ If a case goes to trial, the formal legal process is costly and time-consuming, compelling poor and marginalized people to give in to the demands of rich landlords. The poor and marginalized tend to pursue land dispute claims in other, more accessible forums, such as district land revenue offices.³⁸ The

most common land-related disputes involve disagreements over property lines, disagreements between tenants and landlords, disagreements among families over the inheritance of land, control of *guthi* land³⁹ and its revenue, encroachment on public land, and land registration and cancellation.⁴⁰ Most land disputes are resolved at the community level through local mediation by respected members of the village or Village Development Committee, and never make it to the police or the courts.⁴¹

Even though Nepal has abundant water, unequal access creates tensions, especially where there are competing uses (e.g., irrigation, drinking water, hydropower, and industrial use).⁴² Competition to use the same water source for multiple purposes is common. A WaterAid study found that water sources were heavily used, or fully used, with no possibility of extension, in 74 percent of sites studied, while just 26 percent had surplus water and could plan for further distribution to wider communities.⁴³ The major cause of water conflict appeared to be the increasing scarcity of water sources. However, there were also conflicts where supplies were adequate, because community members had become protective of their water source for future use. Disputes over water also arise due to longstanding grievances about higher castes exploiting lower castes, clashes of egos, and other political disputes. In addition, Nepal's hydropower boom has provoked violent conflicts between local communities and the government and hydropower developers. For example, violence flared around the Khimti Dhaldkebar plant in April and July 2016.⁴⁴ The Armed Police Force was accused of using excessive force against community protesters, including women and the elderly.⁴⁵ Conflicts over land and water will continue to occur as long as legal frameworks and regulations are absent or unenforced.



Urban crime and violence

Nepal's continued political instability and weak rule of law after the civil war have led to the rise of violent clashes among politically affiliated armed groups and criminal activities by gangs and organized crime groups in urban areas. Even though only 17 percent of Nepal's population lives in urban areas, levels of urban crime and violence are increasing. Beyond the Terai, the Kathmandu Valley—the country's largest urban agglomeration, which includes Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur—appears to be the most insecure area in the country. In a study by Small Arms Survey, nearly 60 percent of respondents in the Valley said that the security situation had remained the same or grown worse from 2010 to 2011, compared to less than 30 percent in other urban and rural areas.⁴⁶ Research by Saferworld in 2011 found that residents' perceptions of insecurity were partly due to significant criminal activities of political youth wings and criminal gangs, flourishing organized crime such as human trafficking, illicit trade in red sandalwood, kidnapping, extortion, and money laundering, and a rise in randomly targeted crimes like theft, mugging, and burglary.⁴⁷ The metropolitan police reported Kathmandu had the most crimes in 2015–16 (4,917), followed by Sunsari (1,441), Chitwan (1,241), and Jhapa (1,196).⁴⁸ However, the national homicide rate in 2011 was low at 2.9 per 100,000 people.⁴⁹

Youth involvement in violent activities is a growing concern. Youths age 15–29 represent 30 percent of the total population and 33 percent of the urban population.⁵⁰ As the country's population has grown younger, policymakers and regional experts have emphasized the importance of addressing issues among urban youth such as unemployment and crime.⁵¹ Some young men are drafted by the youth wings of political parties to engage in protests, strikes, and shutdowns. They are also recruited by underground armed groups and criminal gangs to carry out violent activities that include extortion and kidnapping.⁵² For some youths, joining an armed group can instill a sense of power and purpose, especially for those who are unemployed and who have migrated from rural areas. A recent study of security in the Terai reveals that violence and crime are not always the work of organized groups; they are sometimes perpetrated by unknown groups or by a handful of youths pursuing the three *m*'s—money, machines (cell phones, motorbikes), and *masti* (fun).⁵³



Domestic and gender-based violence

Violence against women and girls is endemic in Nepal. Women and girls face domestic violence, physical and psychological torture, rape, trafficking, dowry-related violence, and child marriage. This is driven by social, cultural, and religious norms, compounded by years of conflict. The country's citizenship law is gender-biased: a woman's identity is derived from her father, and discriminatory legal provisions position women as the property of men.⁵⁴ Women are economically dependent, because men inherit and control most property. A combination of the immense social stigma attached to victims of sexual assault and the fear of retaliation has prevented many women from reporting crimes that occurred during the civil war, while the perpetrators walk free.⁵⁵

Reports of crimes against women and children increased between 2003–04 and 2013–14 (figure 2). Domestic violence cases in particular have increased significantly in recent years. The Nepal Police recorded 6,835 domestic violence cases in 2013–14.⁵⁶ According to the 2011 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), one-third of women who had ever married had experienced emotional, physical, or sexual violence from their spouse at least once in their marriage.⁵⁷ Even though police records indicate that reporting of domestic violence cases is increasing, a culture of silence still discourages women from seeking help. The 2011 NDHS found that three in four women who experienced violence did not seek help.⁵⁸ For those who did, the most common source of help was the woman's family (52 percent) or friends or neighbors (53 percent) while few sought help from the police (4 percent), medical professionals (3 percent), or social service organizations (3 percent).⁵⁹

Sexual violence against Nepali women and girls is prevalent. The Nepal Police reported that the number of reported rapes almost sextupled, from 154 to 912, in the 10 years from 2003–04 to 2013–14.⁶⁰ Rape is underreported due to social stigma. Nepal's criminal justice system also acts as a barrier to victims by limiting the reporting time to 35 days from the date of the rape.⁶¹




Figure 2. Gender-based crimes in Nepal

Source: The Nepal Police⁶²

Notes

- 1 For more information on the Comprehensive Peace Accord, see “Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist),” United Nations website, <http://un.org.np/node/10498>.
- 2 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), *The Nepal Conflict Report* (Geneva: UNOHCHR, 2012), 72, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/NepalConflictReport.aspx>.
- 3 Erik Melander, Therése Pettersson, and Lotta Themnér, “Organized violence, 1989–2015,” *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5 (2016), 727–742; and Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “Violence Against Civilians in War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007), 233–246. The author calculated the total number of fatalities for each year between 1996 and 2006 using the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset 5.0 and the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v. 1.4–2016, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/>.
- 4 Eck and Hultman, “Violence Against Civilians in War.”
- 5 Sonal Singh et al., “Conflict induced internal displacement in Nepal,” *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 23, no. 2 (2007): 103–110.
- 6 See UNOHCHR, *Nepal Conflict Report*.
- 7 Author’s calculations as per note 3.
- 8 Clare Castillejo, *Nepal’s elections: new prospects for peacebuilding?* (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2013), <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Asia/Publications/Nepal-s-elections-new-prospects-for-peacebuilding>.
- 9 Human Rights Watch, “*Like We Are Not Nepali*”: *Protest and Police Crackdown in the Terai Region of Nepal* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2015), 1, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/nepal1015_forupload.pdf.
- 10 International Crisis Group (ICG), *Nepal’s Divisive New Constitution: An Existential Crisis*, Asia Report No. 276 (Brussels: ICG, 2016), <https://d2071andvipowj.cloudfront.net/276-nepal-s-divisive-new-constitution-an-existential-crisis.pdf>.
- 11 Akshov Shakya and Tejeshwi Nath Bhattarai, *Post Disaster Assessment: Blockade 2015/16* (Patan: Nepal Economic Forum, 2016), 42, <http://asd.org.np/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Post-Disaster-Assessment-Blockade-2015-16-1.pdf>.
- 12 Nepal Monitor/The Asia Foundation Peace Monitoring Project, *Trends of Violence and Contestation in Nepal, April-June 2017*, <https://www.nepalmonitor.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2nd-quarterly-report-reduced-size.pdf>.
- 13 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2016), 251–252, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/>.
- 14 Interdisciplinary Analysts, Nepal Madhesh Foundation, Small Arms Survey, and Saferworld, *Armed Violence in the Terai* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2011), <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-Saferworld-2011-armed-violence-in-the-Terai.pdf>.
- 15 Any government-issued ID will do.
- 16 Mateen Hafeez, “Porous border makes Nepal a choice hideout,” *Times of India*, October 30, 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Porous-border-makes-Nepal-a-choice-hideout/article-show/24894553.cms>.
- 17 Jason Miklian, *Illicit Trading in Nepal: Fueling South Asian Terrorism*, South Asia Briefing Paper #3 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2009), 4, <http://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7273>.
- 18 Central Bureau of Statistics, *National Population and Housing Census 2011* (Kathmandu: Government of Nepal, 2012), 3, <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demo-graphic/sources/census/wphc/Nepal/Nepal-Census-2011-Vol1.pdf>.
- 19 Nepal has 125 caste/ethnic groups (2011 census), and many of these groups live in the Terai region.
- 20 Jason Miklian, *Nepal’s Terai: Constructing an Ethnic Conflict*, South Asia Briefing Paper #1 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2008), <https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=409&type=publicationfile>.
- 21 Interdisciplinary Analysts et al., *Armed Violence in the Terai*, 9.
- 22 “Nepal Assessment 2012,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) website, accessed March 12, 2017, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/assessment2012.htm>.
- 23 Subindra Bogati, Jovana Carapic, and Robert Muggah, *The Missing Middle: Examining the Armed Group Phenomenon in Nepal* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2013), <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/NAVA-IB1-Missing-Middle.pdf>.
- 24 Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), *Nepal Human Rights Yearbook 2013* (Kathmandu: INSEC, 2013), 4, <http://www.insec.org.np/index.php?type=publication&ptype=R&lang=E&tid=1>.
- 25 Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), *Nepal Human Rights Yearbook 2009* (Kathmandu: INSEC, 2009), 4, <http://www.insec.org.np/index.php?type=publication&ptype=R&lang=E&tid=1>.
- 26 INSEC, *Nepal Human Rights Yearbook 2013*, 10.
- 27 Mihaela Racovita, Ryan Murray, and Sudhindra Sharma, *In Search of Lasting Security: An Assessment of Armed Violence in Nepal* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2013), 51, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR20-In-Search-of-Lasting-Security-NAVA.pdf>.
- 28 Human Rights Watch, *Like We Are Not Nepal: Protest and Police Crackdown in the Terai Region of Nepal*.
- 29 “Letter to Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli Re: Prosecutions Linked to Terai Violence,” Human Rights Watch website, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/05/letter-prime-minister-khadga-prasad-sharma-oli>.
- 30 According to the 2011 population and housing census, the Nepali population is 81 percent Hindu, 9 percent Buddhist, 4.4 percent Muslim, 3.1 percent Kirat, 1.4 percent Christian, 0.5 percent Prakriti, and 0.6 percent other.
- 31 Racovita et al., *In Search of Lasting Security*, 23.
- 32 UNOHCHR, *Investigation Report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal into the violent incidents in Kapilvastu, Rupan-dehi and Dang districts of 16–21 September 2007*

- (Geneva: UNOHCHR, 2007), 7, http://nepal.ohchr.org/en/resources/Documents/English/reports/HCR/2008_06_18_KAPILVASTU_Report_E.pdf.
- 33 Mark Owen and Anna King, *Religious Peacebuilding and Development in Nepal: Report and Recommendations* (Winchester: University of Winchester, 2013), 8, <http://www.winchester.ac.uk/academicdepartments/theology-religion-and-philosophy/Research/Documents/Religion%20and%20Peacebuilding%20in%20Nepal%20Report.pdf>.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Gopal Sharma, "Nepal to Hold First Local Elections in 20 Years: Minister," *U.S. News and World Report*, February 20, 2017, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-02-20/nepal-to-hold-first-local-elections-in-20-years-minister>.
- 36 Democracy Resource Center, COCAP, and Nepal Monitor, *Analysis Update 2—Impact of the Saptari Incident on the Electoral Environment*, (Democracy Resource Center, March 28, 2017), <http://democracyresource.org/analysis-update-2-impact-of-the-saptari-incident-on-the-electoral-environmentmarch-2017/>.
- 37 Community Self-Reliance Centre (CSRC), *CSO Land Reform Monitoring Report* (Kathmandu: CSRC, 2016), 34–35, <http://www.csrcnepal.org/uploads/publication/JXUdvW54RgcT6c5RluqD3NbSum981wEw.pdf>.
- 38 Community Self-Reliance Centre (CSRC), *Land Reform Monitoring Indicators, Nepal* (Kathmandu: CSRC, 2012), 20–21, http://www.angoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/04/land-reform-monitoring-indicators-nepal/CSO_Land_Reform_Monitoring_indicators.pdf.
- 39 Land donated for religious purposes, hence tax free.
- 40 International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Microdynamics of Land Conflict and Land Conflict Resolution in Nepal* (Kathmandu: IOM Nepal, 2016), 9, <https://publications.iom.int/books/microdynamics-land-conflict-and-land-conflict-resolution-nepal>.
- 41 Danielle Stein and Bert Suykens, *Land Disputes and Settlement Mechanisms in Nepal's Terai* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/research/JSRP/JSRP%20Papers/JSRP-Paper-12a.aspx>.
- 42 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Nepal: USAID Country Profile—Property Rights and Resource Governance* (USAID, September 2010), 11, <https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/nepal-2/>.
- 43 WaterAid in Nepal, *Water source conflict in Nepal: A right to water perspective* (London: WaterAid, 2012), 13, <http://www.wateraid.org/~media/Publications/right-to-water-source-conflict-nepal.pdf>.
- 44 Louise Voller, "Hydro boom sparks violent conflict in Nepal," *Danwatch*, October 27, 2016, <https://www.danwatch.dk/en/nyhed/hydro-boom-sparks-violent-conflicts-in-nepal/>.
- 45 Indigenous Peoples Human Rights Defenders Network (IPHRD), "Nepal: Letter to WB President and Board on Nepal's Khimti-Dhalkebar Transmission Line Project," IPHRD website, July 7, 2016, http://iphndefenders.net/nepal-letter-wb-president-board-nepals-khimti-dhalkebar-transmission-line-project/#_ftn4.
- 46 Racovita et al., *In Search of Lasting Security*, 47–8.
- 47 Saferworld, *Perceptions of public security and crime in the Kathmandu Valley* (Kathmandu: Saferworld, 2012), <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/655-perceptions-of-public-security-and-crime-in-the-kathmandu-valley>.
- 48 "Kathmandu crime rate highest across nation," *Himalayan Times*, October 19, 2016, <https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/kathmandu-crime-rate-highest-across-nation/>. More information on official crime statistics is available in Nepali, accessed March 13, 2017, <https://metro.nepalpolice.gov.np/index.php/metro-news/crime-table/301-tribasriya-aparadh-taalika>.
- 49 "Homicide counts and rates (2000–2015)," UNODC Statistics website, accessed March 13, 2017, <https://data.unodc.org/#state:2>.
- 50 Central Bureau of Statistics, *National Population and Housing Census 2011*, 65.
- 51 Jaideep Gupte and Subindra Bogati, Key Challenges of Security Provision in Rapidly Urbanising Contexts: Evidence from Kathmandu Valley and Terai Regions of Nepal (UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2014), <http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/key-challenges-of-security-provision-in-rapidly-urbanising-contexts-evidence-from-kathmandu-valley-and-terai-regions-of-nepal>.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Interdisciplinary Analysts et al., *Armed Violence in the Terai*.
- 54 Center for Research on Environment Health and Population Activities, *A Study on Gender-Based Violence Conducted in Selected Rural Districts of Nepal* (Kathmandu: Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, 2012), <http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1164>.
- 55 Human Rights Watch, *Silenced and Forgotten: Survivors of Nepal's Conflict-Era Sexual Violence* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/09/23/silenced-and-forgotten-o>.
- 56 "18 Years Crime Data Related to Women and Children," Nepal Police website, accessed March 14, 2017, <https://cid.nepalpolice.gov.np/index.php/cid-wings/women-children-service-directorate>.
- 57 Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), New ERA, and ICF International Inc., *Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2011* (Kathmandu: MOHP, New ERA, and ICF International Inc., 2012), 242, <http://www.dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-FR257-DHS-Final-Reports.cfm>.
- 58 Ibid., 250.
- 59 Ibid., 251.
- 60 "18 Years Crime Data Related to Women and Children," Nepal Police website.
- 61 Human Rights Watch, *Silenced and Forgotten*.
- 62 "18 Years Crime Data Related to Women and Children," Nepal Police website.