

COVID-19 AND CONFLICT IN MYANMAR
BRIEFING PAPER SERIES

No. 3

COVID-19 AND ESCALATING CONFLICT: THREE PRIORITIES FOR RAKHINE STATE

January 2021



The Asia Foundation

SMART PEACE 

COVID-19 AND ESCALATING CONFLICT: THREE PRIORITIES FOR RAKHINE STATE

This short briefing paper is the third in a series of practical notes on how the coronavirus pandemic is unfolding against the backdrop of Myanmar's ongoing conflicts. The series is prepared by The Asia Foundation as part of [Smart Peace](#), a global initiative which combines the expertise of consortium members to address the challenges of building peace. Smart Peace seeks to combine peacebuilding techniques, conflict analysis, rigorous evaluation and behavioral insights. The resulting lessons will help communities, international organizations and governments to implement peace strategies with greater confidence. Smart Peace is funded by the UK Government.

At a glance...

Rakhine State is a high-risk region for Covid-19 given existing health and humanitarian challenges, and ongoing conflict. Thus far, the first and second waves of the pandemic have been less severe than feared although low rates of testing indicate that official data likely presents an incomplete picture. There is no guarantee that this relative quiet will persist. The humanitarian impact of both conflict and Covid-19 restrictions are grave.

- Rakhine State has specific and complicated challenges: pre-existing and ongoing humanitarian and health crises; a complex conflict landscape with violence that continues to escalate even during the pandemic; and restrictions on freedom of movement, humanitarian support, and internet access, all imposed by the Myanmar Government to counter cited conflict threats.
- The conflict between the Tatmadaw (government military forces) and the Arakan Army (AA) – an insurgent ethnic armed organization (EAO) – is evolving, and the stakes are high. Both sides appear ready for escalation, which would worsen the humanitarian challenges already facing many people in the state. The Government is defensive in the face of international scrutiny on the continued plight of Rohingya communities; national responses are seen at best as symbolic, at worst as aggravating existing tensions and threatening the human rights of local populations.
- Historically, international humanitarian and health workers on the ground have operated through partnerships with local groups because of long-standing restrictions preventing them from direct implementation. Community organizations and *parahita* (community welfare) groups have been important support mechanisms for communities affected by the conflict and for the pandemic response. International interventions around Covid-19 require flexibility and nuanced understanding of the challenges and opportunities of working with local support networks. Humanitarian actors should prioritize understanding conditions in areas of strong AA influence, in order to determine how best to support responses there.
- Myanmar's Government has left Rakhine State out of national peace efforts and the AA's disinterest in joining formal negotiations further decreases the chance of establishing mechanisms and institutions to end hostilities, resolve disputes, and address deep-seated grievances. Promoters of peace must also keep their eye on the bigger picture. The situation in Rakhine State is linked to other conflicts and crises, and the absence of a political way forward is a major concern. The informal ceasefire negotiated in late 2020 offers some hope.

A new crisis folded into older ones

A rapid second outbreak of Covid-19 began in Rakhine State in August 2020, largely centered in Sittwe. A few cases have also been reported in some of the state's displacement camps for people fleeing the ongoing conflict.¹ Outbreaks thus far have affected more people in conflict-hit northern and central Rakhine State, sparing many communities in the relatively stable south, and especially vulnerable groups of ethnic Rakhine and Rohingya living in the state's 169 camps for internally displaced people (IDPs). Actual numbers of Covid-19 cases are likely to be significantly higher than reported as testing rates are low, particularly in camps, and random testing suggests there could be extensive community transmission.² While initial fears that large numbers of Rohingya would return from refugee camps in Bangladesh and spread infection have proved unfounded, they have nonetheless been portrayed in local media and on social media as vectors of disease.³ Information regarding the level of infection in rural communities, particularly those under AA control is scarce. In those areas, the virus is reportedly seen by some populations as a tool for further government coercion and control, and at the very least a lesser threat than ongoing conflict and violence⁴.

Government measures have alternated between stay-at-home orders and lesser prohibitions, applicable both to ordinary residents and to IDPs in camps. It has also required mandatory testing for humanitarian and other aid workers before they are allowed to deliver services, a process that can cause delays in the delivery of relief.⁵ Initially, all those who tested positive for Covid-19 were hospitalized, but as cases rose, asymptomatic people have been asked to quarantine at home.

As elsewhere, disruptions to farming, trade, and daily wage work have negatively impacted livelihoods. But the pandemic in Rakhine State is occurring against the backdrop of severe pre-existing crises. Violence and the long-running humanitarian emergency affecting Rohingya communities, compounded by escalating conflict between the Tatmadaw and AA mean that there are now almost 360,000 people living in displacement camps across the state. These include around 129,000 Rohingya displaced internally by violence in 2012, and approximately 230,000 Rakhine and other ethnic communities displaced by the ongoing conflict.⁶ Camps are rudimentary, sanitation is poor, and physical distancing impossible. Many people have fled to urban areas or monasteries, rather than camps, and are taken care of by host communities and local support networks.

Citing conflict, the Government has restricted the access of humanitarian and other aid workers to areas of AA activity in northern and central Rakhine State. The Covid-19 crisis enabled authorities to tighten their control under the guise of public health response. Many UN agencies and international NGOs have worked under these challenging conditions for years and are experienced in remote monitoring and working with local networks. With the outbreak of Covid-19, the landscape of responders has continued to

¹ ['Myanmar: Covid-19 Humanitarian Situation Report No. 11, 23 October 2020'](#), UN OCHA.

² 'Covid-19 Deaths Pass 300', Frontier Myanmar Daily Briefing, 1 October 2020.

³ See, for example, Andrew Nachemson, ['Racism is fueling Myanmar's deadly second wave of COVID-19'](#) in *The Diplomat*, 11 September 2020.

⁴ ['Rakhine State: The weekly report November 16-20'](#), Arakan Humanitarian Coordination Team.

⁵ See, for example, 'Myanmar: Covid-19 Humanitarian Situation Report No. 11, 23 October 2020', UN OCHA.

⁶ ['Myanmar: Humanitarian Update No. 1, 26 November 2020'](#), UN OCHA.

evolve dynamically: new networks emerge, and new forms of mobilization and coordination take place on the ground.⁷

Rakhine State-based networks and organizations have shouldered much of the burden of providing relief, service delivery, and public information. Some, like the Rakhine Ethnic Congress, are formal, work in across the state, partner with international organizations, and have experience working in structured and planned ways. Others, local *parahita* networks, have strong local ties and community identities, are funded by the community, and have traditionally responded to unexpected needs or crises in communities and families. *Parahitas* are playing an increasingly important role, as are religious leaders. International actors have struggled to capture an accurate picture of this evolution, and coordination from outside of Rakhine State has been sporadic and reactive. Simultaneously, the landscape of conflict and its humanitarian impact is also changing rapidly. Support actors need to respond with agility and prioritize conflict sensitivity.

In June 2019, the Government restricted mobile internet access in most conflict-affected parts of Rakhine State; the restrictions remain in seven townships and affect an estimated 1.4 million people.⁸ The internet shutdown has contributed significantly to vulnerability, isolation, and anger among communities in Rakhine State. Communication is critical for pandemic prevention, and while the Government's restrictions are also aimed at disrupting AA communications, the armed group appears to find ways around them leaving local populations and community organizations to suffer the most, as the shutdown deprives them of critical information, and the ability to conduct livelihood-related activities and mobilize effectively in response to crises.⁹

Fighting through a pandemic

The conflict that erupted between the AA and the Tatmadaw in December 2018 has steadily escalated. On 23 March 2020, coinciding with the UN Secretary General's call for a global ceasefire in response to the Covid-19 crisis, the Government of Myanmar designated the Arakan Army as a terrorist organization, a move that distinguishes the AA from other ethnic armed organizations operating in Myanmar, and carries significant legal implications.¹⁰ The Tatmadaw announced a unilateral ceasefire on 9 May 2020 which did not apply to Rakhine and southern Chin States. The AA, as part of the Brotherhood Alliance, announced a unilateral ceasefire in November 2020, later extended until the end of the year, a gesture which in practice means very little.¹¹ During the first phase of Myanmar's Covid-19 crisis, fighting continued as normal, followed by a brief late-monsoon lull with reduced AA activity. During this period, the AA consolidated its hold in central and northern Rakhine State, maintained support bases in neighboring parts of Chin State, and attempted to expand into the south.

Neither the AA nor the Tatmadaw is likely to win a decisive military victory in this asymmetric conflict, but both are upping the stakes for civilians. The nature of the fighting in Rakhine State has

⁷ In March 2020, a group of Rakhine community-based and civil society organizations formed the Arakan Humanitarian Coordination Team in response to the need to improve relief and development efforts in the State.

⁸ Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, '[People in Parts of Myanmar Are Living Under the World's Longest Internet Shutdown. It's Putting Lives in Danger](#)', 16 November 2020, *Time*.

⁹ 'MDRF calls for the end of the 2G digital blackout', 1 September 2020; 'Lift the Restrictions on Internet Access', 28 June 2019. Available at <http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/>.

¹⁰ '[An Avoidable War: Politics and Armed Conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State](#)', Asia Report N° 307, 9 June 2020, International Crisis Group.

¹¹ "Statement", No. 41/2020, 12 November 2020, Arakan Army, arakanarmy.net.

translated into significant harm to local populations. The AA hides amongst local communities, uses guerrilla tactics such as kidnapping, and targets Tatmadaw personnel and facilities, government officials, politicians, and the police.¹² The Tatmadaw responds with airstrikes and by deploying more troops, heavy artillery, and air and naval resources.¹³ There appears to be little attempt to minimize harm to civilians. Waves of displacement reflect feelings of insecurity and terror. There are reports of the Tatmadaw burning villages and even using local residents as scouts or advance parties.¹⁴ Researchers and journalists sometimes quote displaced Rakhine people as saying that they are more afraid of the army and the fighting than they are of Covid-19.¹⁵

Governance, challenged for years by crises and divisive politics in Rakhine State, is ever weaker. Township administrators, unable to carry out their duties in AA-controlled areas, have retreated to Sittwe, while village level administrators have resigned or chosen to cooperate with the group at the grassroots. The AA's designation as a terrorist organization prevents its leaders from contacting the Government and imperils other entities from considering collaboration, including on efforts to contain Covid-19. The military and the AA have used the pandemic to discredit each other, but both endanger existing support systems.¹⁶ The AA's pandemic-control efforts have been mainly online, using its strong social media presence to include mentions of Covid-19, likely an attempt to enhance its status with local populations in the absence of effective government leadership. Yet the AA is also charged with targeting World Food Program trucks carrying supplies to Paletwa in southern Chin, which has been under siege for several months.¹⁷ The killing in April 2020 of a driver for the World Health Organization ferrying Covid-19 test swabs to Yangon, for which both the AA and Tatmadaw deny responsibility, highlighted the serious risks the conflict poses to frontline workers, who, even if not directly targeted, risk being caught in the crossfire.¹⁸ Most recently, a Tatmadaw attack on a boat carrying supplies for the International Committee of the Red Cross left one person dead. The Tatmadaw denies details reported in the media, but not that the attack occurred.¹⁹

Why are the stakes of the conflict so high?

Rakhine State's exclusion from the Government's conflict resolution and peace efforts limit the appeal of political pathways to engagement between the two conflict parties. External actors, including foreign governments and businesses, have strategic, security, economic, and normative interests in the region. It is difficult to predict how increases in harm to civilians and broader insecurity will affect these interests, or how external responses to them might shape humanitarian and conflict dynamics in Rakhine State and the Government's approach. Covid-19 presents a significant added risk to these conditions.

¹² David Scott Mathieson, [The Arakan Army in Myanmar: Deadly Conflict Rises in Rakhine State](#), United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No.486, November 2020.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ [Myanmar: Indiscriminate airstrikes kill civilians as Rakhine conflict worsens](#), Amnesty International, 8 July 2020.

¹⁵ Khaing Yoe Hla, [Rakhine State IDPs Exceed 36,000 Since August: Myanmar NGO](#) in The Irrawaddy, 5 October 2020.

¹⁶ The AA claimed that "the government of Myanmar was poorly prepared to prevent the Coronavirus transmission even though they have got enough opportunity and sufficient condition." 'Announcement on Covid-10 [sic] exigency', 26 April 2020, arakanarmy.net. Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, 'Myanmar leaves no one behind in its fight against COVID-19 in Rakhine State' 10 April 2020.

¹⁷ Ei Ei Toe Lwin, [UN aid reaches strife-torn Myanmar town](#) in Myanmar Times, 3 May 2020, Myanmar Times.

¹⁸ Hein Thar and Ye Mon, [After WHO driver's death, fear and foreboding haunt Rakhine's COVID-19 response](#) in Frontier Myanmar, 27 April 2020.

¹⁹ [Red Cross says injuries reported after boat carrying aid attacked in Myanmar](#) in Reuters, 28 October 2020.

The election could deepen polarization or lead to reconciliation

It was clear that the national elections of 8 November 2020 could not be held safely or freely in parts of Rakhine State, due to the escalating conflict and specifically because of Arakan Army intimidation of candidates.²⁰ Yet the decision of the national oversight body, the Union Election Commission, to cancel voting entirely in areas encompassing 73 percent of Rakhine State's 1.64 million voters (not including most Rohingya who were already unable to vote) was widely interpreted as a deliberate move to bolster the dominant national party, Aung Sang Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD).²¹ Attempts by the Union Election Commission to censor party campaign speeches in the weeks before the election were flagged by candidates and parties across Myanmar.²² Nevertheless, Rakhine parties won five of the eight Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) seats, and four of the five Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house) seats, being contested.²³

Many in Rakhine State remain skeptical of the electoral process' capacity to ensure meaningful representation and fruitful discussion of Rakhine grievances.²⁴ Whether or not by-elections take place in the near future, both pandemic relief and conflict mitigation fronts will be impacted by the extent to which the Arakan National Party and Arakan Front Party, key Rakhine political parties, are permitted to participate meaningfully in the state government, and by the willingness of the AA and the Tatmadaw to pursue a meaningful bilateral ceasefire. Soon after the election, the Japanese Special Envoy for Myanmar, Yohei Sasakawa, visited Rakhine State and engaged in quiet diplomacy with both the AA and the Tatmadaw.²⁵ Both sides then issued statements calling for elections to be held in the areas where they had been cancelled. These significant steps led to an informal ceasefire, generating space for meaningful dialogue.²⁶

Excluded from the formal process, the AA remains pivotal to chances for peace

Peace and conflict resolution efforts received little attention in the run-up to the elections and it will likely take time before the new government prioritizes them, as it seeks first to balance the interests and priorities of many actors, including the Tatmadaw. This delay poses significant challenges to efforts to slow the spread of Covid-19, provide humanitarian assistance in Rakhine State, and plan for the state's recovery from the impact of the pandemic.

²⁰ Nyein Nyein, '[NLD calls for release of its three candidates abducted by Arakan Army](#)' in Irrawaddy, 22 October 2020.

²¹ See for example Priscilla Clapp and Jason Tower, '[Election Cancellations in Rakhine State Could Signal Trouble for Myanmar](#)', USIP, 5 November 2020. '[Another Landslide Victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's Party in Myanmar – But at What Cost?](#)', International Crisis Group, 12 November 2020.

²² Rakhine State had already blocked prominent and legally registered ethnic news outlets on mobile networks in April 2020, citing the need to curtail Covid-19 related misinformation. '[Time to take away the election commission's red pen](#)' in Frontier Myanmar, 7 October 2020.

²³ '[Myanmar's 2020 General Election Results in Numbers](#)' in Irrawaddy, 11 November 2020.

²⁴ In 2015, although the Arakan National Party won a comfortable majority in the State parliament and could logically have expected to form the State-level Government, the president directed the NLD to form a minority government instead. The ANP had also insisted that a member of their party should be appointed as Chief Minister, a decision made directly by the President, and were angered that this core demand was ignored. Earlier this year, the popular Rakhine politician, Dr Aye Maung, lost his appeal to overturn a conviction for high treason and is serving a 20-year prison sentence.

²⁵ See the details of these efforts provided in an interview with Japan's ambassador to Myanmar, Ichiro Maruyama, in Nan Lwin, '[No Change in Our Commitment to Support Myanmar's Economic Development: Japanese Ambassador](#)' in Irrawaddy, 21 November 2020.

²⁶ ICG, '[From Elections to Ceasefire in Myanmar's Rakhine State](#)', Briefing 164, 23 December 2020,

The first NLD administration, from 2015 to 2020, separated the multiple crises in Rakhine State from the national discussion around conflict, peace, and ethnic politics, and sought to isolate the AA from other EAOs using the terrorist designation.²⁷ Yet the AA is at the center of an intricate web of challenges facing peace and conflict actors in Myanmar. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), one of Myanmar's most militarily significant EAOs, is under increasing pressure from the Tatmadaw to cut ties with the Arakan Army, which trained for years in Kachin State and whose formal headquarters remain there.²⁸ As an ally of the AA, the KIA is important to any long-term solution to conflict in Rakhine State. Meanwhile, the AA and the wider Rakhine community will have a significant impact on the success of any future efforts to reach a settlement for Rohingya, both for groups remaining in Myanmar and others hoping to return. Without a comprehensive plan for Rakhine State that addresses ethnic Rakhine grievances, the Government will not gain buy-in from the Rakhine population for any plans to permanently resettle Rohingya in Myanmar.

The Rohingya crisis is a lightning rod for the challenges facing Rakhine State

Although the NLD government was able to build domestic popularity by depicting the trial at the International Criminal Court as an unjust foreign intervention, the lengthy legal proceedings are still a source of great, often humiliating, pressure for the government in the international arena. The lack of progress on enabling a dignified and safe return of Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh, and the dire living conditions of those who remain in Rakhine State, generate sustained international criticism.

For the Myanmar Government, conflict and Covid-19 are reasons to keep limiting international humanitarian access. For Western donors, ethics and global politics demand that they advocate for humanitarian access and keep the spotlight on the Rohingya issue, regardless of progress, but their options are limited. As the Rohingya crisis has already shown, the sense of being besieged could drive the NLD and Tatmadaw to double down rather than confront the problem and cooperate on solutions. Rakhine communities perceive Western donors as too focused on Rohingya. How donors respond to the simultaneous emergencies of the pandemic and conflict could shift this perception, perhaps creating opportunities to identify and galvanize support for solutions to Rakhine State's multiple crises and work towards a recovery from conflict and the impact of Covid-19.

The AA has called out the issue of treatment of the Rohingya as a government distraction from the cause of greater Rakhine self-determination (see #ArakanDream2020), but it has not presented an inclusive vision for the coexistence of diverse ethnic and religious communities in the state.²⁹ If such a vision were to include a viable future for Rohingya, it might win the AA points with some internationals but could alienate the group's ethnic Rakhine support base. Rakhine-Rohingya tensions are currently low, as attention is focused on the conflict and the pandemic, but there is no evidence to suggest a permanent shift. Changes in conflict or Covid-19 conditions could revive communal tensions.

²⁷ Tabea Campbell Pauli 'Myanmar Peace at a Crossroads in 2020', The Asia Foundation, 30 September 2020. By charging journalists under counter-terrorism provisions for contact with the group, the Government also raised the fears and costs for ordinary citizens of providing any support to the AA.

²⁸ The formal headquarters of both the KIA and the main training camps of the AA are in the Myanmar-China border town of Laiza.

²⁹ See Mathieson, *Arakan Army in Myanmar*, op cit. In several media interviews, the AA leaders have indicated that the Muslims of Rakhine State are not targeted by their forces, and that armed struggle is directed at the Myanmar military and the central state.

Regional and global strategic and security concerns collide

Numerous strategic rivalries and security challenges are at play in Rakhine State. There are many dimensions to competition between U.S. and Chinese interests in Myanmar; a recent theme has involved both sides pointing to each other as a threat to Myanmar's sovereignty.³⁰ For India, too, China's assertiveness hits too close to home in a region of Myanmar that offers new economic opportunities but also old security challenges for India's restive north-east. Bangladesh, faced with the challenge of hosting Rohingya refugees, must also contend with occasional saber-rattling from across the border. Other international actors, including Japan, the UK, and various European countries have diverse roles in these dynamics through their involvement in the peace process or investments in Rakhine State.

Simplistic explanations of 'Western,' 'Chinese,' or even 'Asian' perspectives on Rakhine State's crises and opportunities mask a more subtle and diverse reality. An array of international interests exerts a complicated and sometimes messy influence on humanitarian assistance and on policy discussions about reducing violence or promoting accountability. None can sway the NLD decisively. But the twin crises of escalating conflict and a pandemic sitting atop pre-existing challenges threaten all actors, international and domestic.

Three priorities for internationals

Stay focused on peace and politics

The AA seemed poised to ramp up offenses against a range of political targets after the elections, but this has failed to materialize after the group called for by-elections to be held by the end of 2020, and received a rare public reply from the Myanmar military pledging to cooperate.³¹ As long as 'crushing' the AA remains the Government's priority in Rakhine State, dialogue will remain elusive and the opportunity generated at the end of 2020 will be lost. The NLD leadership and the Tatmadaw need to see the benefits of developing a roadmap to reduce violence and address conflict drivers. International actors could further encourage the Government to rebuild bridges with the Rakhine political class and communities, and to restore mobile internet access. Such measures could begin to address the vulnerability, isolation, and anger within Rakhine communities as well as facilitate Covid-19 responses. International actors would also benefit from integrating the Rakhine crisis within the bigger picture of conflict and peace dynamics in Myanmar. The political lull as the NLD forms a new post-election government is a useful time to reassess the last decade of peace support, reflect on lessons learnt, and revitalize the process.

Prioritize up-to-date knowledge and flexibility

International actors need a coherent strategy to understand the needs of civilians in areas that are contested by the Arakan Army. The new government is likely to maintain its hard line on contact with the armed group. Internationals should coordinate closely to clearly articulate manageable objectives. A

³⁰ In July 2020, the US and China embassies exchanged public letters about how Chinese actions in Kachin and US interference in Rakhine State proved the other side's cunning. George Sibley, '[How the Erosion of Sovereignty Elsewhere Impacts Myanmar at Home](#)', U.S. Embassy in Burma, 18 July 2020. '[Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar Refutes the False Argument by the Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Myanmar](#)', Chinese Embassy, Yangon, Myanmar, 18 July 2020.

³¹ ULA/AA Statement (41/2020) 12 November 2020. Min Tun, '[Arakan Army urges by-elections before end of year in cancelled constituencies](#)', *Development Media Group*, 12 November 2020.

starting point could be agreeing on ways to develop a clearer picture of the state of Covid-19 and other health and humanitarian needs across Rakhine State, as well as increasing coordination with and amongst actors providing support on the ground. Needs and access across the state have been fragmented for some years. With the intensification of conflict and the uncertainty introduced by Covid-19, humanitarian actors will need more localized approaches. Flexibility and agility will help deal with rapidly changing contexts and shifting frontlines. Actors will need to learn constantly, which requires good networks and knowledge-sharing protocols. Internationals can improve their understanding of on-the-ground realities and responses through greater substantive and mutually constructive engagement with community-based organizations³².

Work within existing and emerging systems

Civil society and *parahita* groups, and Rakhine and Rohingya religious leaders, have helped provide humanitarian assistance and information, particularly in those areas where the government response has been seen as slow or inadequate. *Parahita* groups' experience in identifying and quickly responding to needs is crucial for local humanitarian interventions; they should be included in discussions and coordination mechanisms with higher-level actors. Local networks and groups are inevitably a part of the political landscape; international donor agencies should seek to understand how they work. International donors can provide some financial support, carefully devised technical capacity, and information or connections with counterparts undertaking similar work in other parts of the country. Donors should be wary of forcing these groups into adopting boilerplate ways of working which could erode their legitimacy or undermine community-level connections.

Rakhine State faces a unique constellation of challenges given the current surge of Covid-19 and a conflict that could escalate further. The impact on livelihoods and health outcomes, both already deficient before the pandemic, will be significant. With humanitarian access and communications severely restricted in many parts of the state, community organizations, religious leaders, and parahita groups have emerged as a critical element in the humanitarian response. Internationals will have to learn to support that work responsibly and sustainably, while continuing to advocate for progress on the political front and for an improved humanitarian environment. Internationals should seek to encourage ways to reduce violence and put a pandemic recovery plan on the agenda.

Was this resource useful? We invite comments and topic ideas for future briefings on Covid-19 and conflict in Myanmar

မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဆက်သွယ်ရန် - ဦးကျော်မျိုးဦး၊ အကြီးတန်း အစီအစဉ်ညွှန်ကြားရေးအရာရှိ - kyaw.oo@asiafoundation.org

For contact in English: Tabea Campbell Pauli, Program Adviser, tabea.pauli@asiafoundation.org



SMART PEACE



³² 'Rakhine State: The weekly report November 16-20', Arakan Humanitarian Coordination Team